
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Nebraska's Foreign Policy

"The Foreign Policy of Nebraska" by Steven B. Sample and Eugene P. Trani, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1980), Dept. WQ, Transaction Periodicals Consortium, P.O. Box 1262, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

The quadrupling of U.S. exports during the 1970s (to \$181.6 billion in 1979) and the current dependence of more than 4 million American jobs on foreign trade has given individual states a big stake in foreign affairs. Even lightly populated, once isolationist Nebraska has developed extensive foreign economic ties, as well as major overseas educational and cultural programs. So write Sample and Trani, officials of the University of Nebraska and the University of Missouri, respectively.

Covering 77,227 square miles, Nebraska (population: 1.5 million) is larger than 52 of the world's independent countries. The grain and feed the state produced in 1977 could feed 120 million people. In 1977, Nebraska's farm exports totaled \$988 million—350 percent more than in 1972. These sales accounted for 63 percent of the growth of the state's total farm sales between 1972 and 1977. An estimated one-fourth (29,000) of Nebraska's farm workers owe their jobs to exports.

Nebraska's manufactured exports are modest (ranking 35th nationally in 1976) but grew by 130 percent after 1972, to \$309 million. Two of the state's best customers are the Soviet Union and China; both regimes purchased irrigation systems from Valmont Industries, of suburban Omaha. The University of Nebraska has trained hundreds of teachers in Turkey and developed an agricultural research program for Colombia.

Such developments have not been lost on Nebraskans. Groups like the Omaha Committee on Foreign Relations are growing rapidly. So is overseas coverage by Nebraska's newspapers and broadcast stations. And where once the state was represented in Congress by William Jennings Bryan and other famed isolationists, Senators Edward Zorinsky and J. James Exon are currently active, outspoken members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, respectively.

Carrots and Sticks

"Containment Without Confrontation" by Robert Legvold, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1980), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

By launching sustained arms control talks and expanding trade, President Nixon and Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev wrought major changes in superpower relations. But their failure to draw up rules for

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U.S.—Soviet behavior in Third World trouble spots virtually ensured that détente would soon deteriorate, writes Legvold, a Sovietologist at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Soviets, according to Legvold, hoped to regulate “central” bilateral issues (such as the nuclear arms race) and to obtain Western goods and credit while retaining a free hand to boost their influence in the developing world. The United States, however, hoped that the Soviets would reduce their adventurism in return for Western aid.

Not even after each side accused the other of helping spark the 1973 Arab-Israeli war did Washington or Moscow show great interest in a code of conduct for Third World crises. When Cuban troops carried a Soviet-backed faction to victory in Angola’s 1975 civil war, détente’s chief American advocate, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, gave up hope that the two countries would end their “constant jockeying for marginal advantages” in remote regions. But hamstrung by a Democratic Congress unwilling to approve U.S. intervention in Third World conflicts and by divided public opinion, neither he nor Presidents Nixon and Ford found ways to parry Moscow’s Third World thrusts. They bequeathed to President Carter “a Soviet policy in pieces.”

Even before Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan last December, Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa and Vietnam’s Soviet-backed occupation of Cambodia had angered Washington. The Soviets complained about U.S. delays in ratifying SALT II and Congress’s tying of full trade relations to more liberal Soviet emigration policies.

The United States, Legvold contends, must tell the Soviets exactly what kinds of interventions in the Third World are unacceptable. Military thrusts to save crumbling “revolutions” (as in Afghanistan) clearly qualify. Less easy to rule out would be Soviet support for black guerrillas in Zimbabwe or aid that protects national boundaries (such as helping Ethiopia ward off Somali conquest of the Ogaden region).

Legvold urges a dual strategy to revive détente and protect U.S. interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. He favors military steps such as reviving the draft, building up U.S. forces, openly aiding the Afghan rebels, and improving NATO strength. He also favors ending the grain embargo, forging closer economic ties, and pursuing arms control efforts. Most important, Washington and Moscow should put Third World clashes squarely on détente’s agenda—where they belonged from the start.

The U.S. and Israel

“The United States and Israel: A Strategic Divide?” by Harvey Sicherman, in *Orbis* (Summer 1980), 3508 Market St., Ste. 350, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

American-Israeli relations have long been so close that even petty disputes become front-page news. But since 1973, the United States has viewed a quick Mideast peace as the key to solving its energy problems; Israel, on the other hand, has tried to slow the peace process, hoping that the United States will become self-sufficient in energy. So con-