

of *Great Power Politics* (2001) that conflict would continue because societies *always* fight for power, not the spread of “nice ideas.” He predicted that coming conflicts would make people miss the “simplicity and stability of the Cold War.” Walls may fall, but nothing really changes.

Betts argues that some of Fukuyama’s conclusions bring him more in line with his peers than is obvious at first. Fukuyama foresaw a struggle for recognition by many groups, stirring the potent forces of nationalism and religion. He conceded that history could “restart,” particularly if people who felt unrecognized politically sought to assert greater power on the world stage. Fukuyama said little about China, leaving “an elephant-sized exception to the end of history.” If China “restarts” history, the distance between the Fukuyama thesis and the pessimistic scenarios of Mearsheimer and Huntington shrinks considerably.

Big ideas are essential for policymakers, who need an overarching vision as they grapple with daily challenges. But none of these three ideas has become the consensus position for shaping policy; they are “out of step with the attitudes that have dominated U.S. foreign policy and made it overreach after the Cold War.” What is needed, Betts says, is a fourth vision, one that preserves the “compatible elements” of Fukuyama, Huntington, and Mearsheimer, and provides policymakers with a framework to help guide them as they navigate the 21st century.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Ending the Endless War

THE SOURCE: “The End of Al Qaeda? Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror” by Adam Klein, in *Columbia Law Review*, Nov. 2010.

WILL THE WAR ON TERRORISM ever end? The nature of the conflict—irregular, against a nonstate enemy—has raised fears that it won’t. Our traditional understanding of war, with its simple on/off options and relatively clear-cut legal distinctions, is not well suited to the current conflict, argues Adam Klein, a law student at Columbia University.

The war on terrorism is now nearly 10 years old, legally inaugurated by the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force. The law’s scope is broad, giving authority to the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those

nations, organizations, or persons” that had any role in the 9/11 attacks “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”

Some aspects of the war on terror do resemble traditional warfare. The terrorist organization Al Qaeda, for example, is hierarchical and centralized, like a sovereign state. It is possible to imagine a time when Al Qaeda, weakened structurally and financially, is no longer a threat. (That time is not now. Al Qaeda was still strong enough in 2009 to assist the would-be Christmas bomber in his attempt to blow up a plane on its way to Detroit from Amsterdam.)

But many terrorism specialists argue that the graver threat today is from homegrown cells and lone individuals, such as Army psychologist Nidal Hasan, charged with the 2009 shootings at Fort Hood, Texas. Such terrorists, aided and inspired by Internet sites, are members of something that is more like a social movement than an organization.



A clear-cut end is unlikely in the war on terrorism, since no one enemy can wave a white flag.

Traditionally, the legal power to detain an enemy combatant is premised on—and limited by—the notion that a soldier is an agent of his sovereign. When the sovereign declares the war over, the soldier is no longer a threat. But that's not true of terrorists who act on the basis of personal ideology.

Congress or the president could end certain aspects of the war on terrorism, such as military action, by a public act. But Klein argues that the federal government will still need the power to detain dangerous individuals. Courts, in his view, should be given the authority to assess the threat a detainee poses and the validity of his detention, in a process akin to deciding whether to release a criminal suspect on bail before trial. Thus, the power to detain would continue until each individual in custody had been released or died in detention.

This hybrid model of a war that extends certain wartime powers beyond others lacks the “superficially satisfying clarity” that comes with the absolute end to traditional wars, Klein concedes. But clarity is not a characteristic of the war in which we are now engaged.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Refugee Crisis That Wasn't

THE SOURCE: “The Politics of Aid to Iraqi Refugees in Jordan” by Nicholas Seeley, in *Middle East Report*, Fall 2010.

AFTER THE U.S.-LED INVASION of Iraq in 2003, Iraqi refugees began trickling into neighboring

The United Nations vastly overestimated the number of Iraqi refugees who fled to Jordan following the 2003 invasion.

countries, particularly Jordan. By 2007, the United Nations was estimating that there were 750,000 Iraqis living in Jordan—the equivalent of more than 10 percent of Jordan's population—and some thought even that number was too low. In the United States, Democrats seized on the influx as an indictment of the Bush administration's entire gambit in Iraq. U.S. aid poured in, but much of it has helped poor Jordanians rather than displaced Iraqis. This isn't your typical case of aid gone awry, writes Nicholas Seeley, editor of *JO*, an English-language magazine based in Amman. It turns out that there weren't so many Iraqis who needed help.

Before 2007, in its dealings with international donors, Jordan generally downplayed the number of Iraqis arriving in its cities. King Abdullah II's desert nation was reluctant to provide assistance, worried that the “guests” would get too comfortable and never return to Iraq. In April 2007—perhaps because of international pressure to address the situation—Jordan changed its tune and began arguing that it needed help to deal with a refugee population it claimed was

costing the country \$1 billion a year. The international community directed nearly \$400 million in aid to Jordan to help with the influx of Iraqi refugees from 2007 to 2009.

But evidence has emerged to indicate that the number of Iraqi refugees was nowhere near 750,000. A Norwegian research organization, Fafo, worked with Jordan's Department of Statistics and found that, by one statistical measure, the true number might be as low as 161,000, though Fafo cautioned that some Iraqis may not have identified themselves for fear of deportation.

The United Nations' Refugee Agency has never registered many more than 65,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan. When Jordan opened its schools to Iraqi children in 2007, officials expected some 50,000 students to enroll, but only 12,000 have, and leaks from the Ministry of Education indicate that even that figure may be inflated. Despite the mounting evidence, Jordanian officials continue to claim that there are more than 500,000 displaced Iraqis within their borders, arguing that other data (such as cell phone registrations) support this higher estimate.

Because Iraqi refugees settled among poor Jordanians, some aid programs stipulated that 25 to 50 percent of the beneficiaries be Jordanian, but it seems likely that a lot more Jordanians than that have been reaping the benefits of American efforts to mitigate the damage caused by the war in Iraq.