

## EXCERPT

## The Park's New Wildlife

Any crime you find in the big city you'll find here in [Kentucky's] Daniel Boone National Forest, but no big-city police officer gets the chance to deal with such a variety of offenses: assault, murder, rape, turkey baiting, timber theft, drug trafficking, body dumping, ginseng poaching,



Where the bodies, the ginseng, and the marijuana are buried.

looting of archaeological sites, DUIs and off-road vehicle violations, illegal camping, fishing and hunting out of season. Marijuana is grown on the mountain-sides in the southern half of the Daniel Boone, and every fall, especially at Halloween, the woods are set afire. With fewer and fewer wild places left, less and less "outdoors," many more Americans flock to the national forests, bringing their own ideas of "wilderness" with them.

—KATHY DOBIE, author of *The Only Girl in the Car* (2003), in *Harper's Magazine*, July 2008

ter it was in the 1980s. A striking "pro-city sensibility" has emerged. "The demographic changes that have taken place in America over the past generation—the increased propensity to remain single, the rise of cohabitation, the much later age at first marriage for those who do marry, the smaller size of families for those who

have children, and, at the other end, the rapidly growing number of healthy and active adults in their sixties, seventies, and eighties—have combined virtually all of the significant elements that make a demographic inversion not only possible but likely," Ehrenhalt concludes.

The leafy suburbs of today are

unlikely to become the slums of 2030, but may retrofit themselves with more town centers and sidewalks and street grids superimposed on strip mall landscapes. The friendly mom-and-pop grocer will not reappear, but within our big cities, Ehrenhalt writes, "we are groping toward the new communities of the 21st century."

## FOREIGN POLICY &amp; DEFENSE

## Bogged Down Again

**THE SOURCE:** "America's Quagmire Mentality" by Dominic Tierney, in *Survival*, Winter 2007–08.

WHAT DO POST-CIVIL WAR Reconstruction and U.S. nation-building efforts in the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, and

now Afghanistan have in common? The average American prematurely branded them all quagmires.

Americans are predisposed to see failure in state-building efforts, writes Dominic Tierney, a political scientist at Swarthmore College. Almost as

soon as federal troops undertook Reconstruction in the South in 1865, Northerners began to lose heart over the slow rate of progress. Deciding by 1877 that the effort was a failure, they supported the troop withdrawals that would leave blacks to their fate.

Fast-forward to the second wave of nation-building, at the turn of the 20th century—in the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, and elsewhere. In Manila, Mark Twain wrote, America blundered into "a mess, a quagmire

from which each fresh step renders the difficulty of extraction immensely greater." In 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised to end the interventions.

After the Cold War, the United States launched another round of interventions, in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. "In a now familiar pattern," Tierney writes, "Americans perceived every one of these missions as a failure."

Yet in the course of intervening in Somalia during 1992 and '93, the United States saved probably around 100,000 lives, halved the number of refugees, and repaired much of the infrastructure, at a cost of 43 American lives. Likewise, the U.S. force present in Haiti from 1994 to '96 reinstalled an elected government, mitigated suffering, halted the exodus of refugees, supervised elections, and trained police at a cost of four American lives. Even so, Somalia is considered a military disaster; Haiti, a failure.

The long newsreel of U.S. nation-building includes only one scene that the public applauds as successful—the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. The postwar exception to the quagmire axiom shows that Americans approve of nation-building only when the nation turns out looking a lot like the United States.

Vietnam appears to be a turning point in quagmire history. It evokes such negative memories that even oblique references skew polling results about nation-building. Responses were 15 percentage points more positive toward U.S. efforts in Somalia when the question contained no allusion to Vietnam than when it did. Most observers do not compare the

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results of recent nation-building efforts to the results in Vietnam, but, rather, look at basic information about a mission and "see failure analogous to Vietnam," Tierney says.

Rogue states, failed states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism are likely to require more nation-building in the future, according to Tierney, even as Americans today are inclined to seize a verdict of failure from the jaws of success. The best presidential strategy for the inevitable need to rebuild chaotic countries is to avoid grandiose claims, promote a long-term perspective, and fight back the tide of skepticism and disillusionment.

#### FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

## And by the Way . . .

**THE SOURCE:** "Morning in Latin America: The Chance for a New Beginning" by Jorge G. Castañeda, in *Foreign Affairs*, Sept.-Oct. 2008.

IT IS A RARE PRESIDENTIAL election that isn't billed as the most important in memory, but 2008 has a real claim to the title. The new president will face two ongoing wars, a flagging economy, huge federal deficits, high oil prices, and all the issues surrounding global warming. Meanwhile, four big challenges on the minds of our neighbors to the south barely make the list: Cuba, immigra-

tion, trade, and a handful of "swash-buckling" nations with hard-left presidents and easy access to Venezuelan oil money.

Jorge G. Castañeda, the former Mexican foreign minister who now teaches at New York University, says that whoever succeeds the deeply unpopular George W. Bush will enjoy a honeymoon that he can use to ease strained hemispheric affairs. Cuban relations will move toward normalization if America seizes the initiative by lifting its embargo and dropping restrictions on travel and remittances. Better Cuban deportment can come later—if Cuba really wants to be part of the international community, it will need to deal with the confiscated property claims of Miami émigrés and such. Immigration reform can be enacted along the lines of the measures recently defeated in Congress if a new, more popular president with a genuine mandate makes it an early priority. Trade pacts can be extended and improved with the addition of labor and environmental protections.

Perhaps most touchy will be dealing with Latin America's "two Lefts." There is a "modern, democratic, globalized, and market-friendly Left, found in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, parts of Central America, and up to a point, Peru," Castañeda says. Then there is a hard Left—a "retrograde, populist, authoritarian, statist, and anti-American Left thriving in Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, in Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay."

The soft-Left countries, Castañeda writes, are reluctant to stand up to the hard liners and don't try to export their models of democracy. But the