

oppression than a case of pressing a sectarian agenda. It is generally acknowledged that chaplains can pray to the god of their choice in religious services, but conflicts come when chaplains preside over services or ceremonies attended by people of many faiths. Steven L. Smith, a retired Navy chaplain and a Southern Baptist, writes that his decision to use the “inclusive language” sought by the Navy stemmed from his effort to think of “the good of the community, not just the individual.”

For many in the Navy, the fate of Klingenschmitt is “less important than the debate it has touched off about the role of the military chaplain” when ministering to sailors of different faiths, writes Lt. Steven R. Obert, a submariner who is attending the George Washington University Law School.

The Navy, with a tradition of prayer at sea that goes back to the 18th century, bases the legitimacy of its chaplain corps on the clause in the First Amendment of the Constitution that says that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the “free exercise” of religion. Because sailors are required to serve away from their hometowns and churches, chaplains are needed to facilitate their “free exercise,” Obert writes. At the same time, the Constitution also prohibits any “establishment” of religion, a provision that has been used to regulate prayer in public schools and remove religious symbols from courthouses.

The Klingenschmitt affair is unlikely to settle the issue. A federal appeals court dismissed a suit in 1985 that sought to eliminate the Army Chaplain Corps, saying that although there was strong justifica-

tion under the establishment clause for abolishing the corps, chaplains were necessary to the free exercise of religion by troops serving in remote locations. But since the military chaplaincy passed constitutional muster 22 years ago, new issues have arisen and the ranks of the chaplaincy have changed. Once chaplains were mostly Catholics and mainline Protestants; today there are many more evangelicals. Klingenschmitt has become a cause célèbre on Christian television and the Internet. The Air Force Academy has been roiled by allegations that military clergy were engaged in inappropriate proselytization, and 75 chaplains have sued the Navy on personnel grounds. These evangelicals have filed a class-action suit, claiming that they have been passed over for promotion because of their faith.

## PRESS & MEDIA

# Two Faces of Revolution

**THE SOURCE:** “An Emblematic Picture of the Hungarian 1956 Revolution: Photojournalism During the Hungarian Revolution” by Eszter Balázs and Phil Casoar, in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Dec. 2006.

AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHER RUSS Melcher had a symbolic image of the Hungarian Revolution in his mind as he roamed the streets of Budapest on the morning of October 30, 1956. He wanted to portray the “youth and spirit of freedom” that had led Hungarian students and workers to rise up against their Soviet overlords.

Sometimes armed only with kitchen implements and gasoline, the rebels had won remarkable victories in a week of fighting across the country, and the Soviets seemed hesitant, even willing to negotiate.

Spotting Jutka, with a wound on her face, and Gyuri, carrying a machine gun too large for him, Melcher was captivated by their half-bohemian, half-proletarian look and their shabby clothes. A passerby, never identified, refused to get out of the frame, and moved toward the

photographer carrying a pistol.

Melcher's photograph, “Heroes of Budapest,” became emblematic of the revolution, which was effectively crushed by Soviet tanks only a week later, with the loss of thousands of lives. It became a powerful symbol in both the West and the East, write Eszter Balázs, a Ph.D. candidate at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Phil Casoar, a Paris journalist. In the West, it symbolized the idealism of a dedicated young couple determined to free their native Hungary. In the East, it was evidence that counterrevolutionaries—such as the menacing man with the pistol—had recruited children to overthrow the legitimate government.



A week after Hungarian rebels launched their 1956 uprising against the Soviets, an American photographer took this photo of two young partisans and a pistol-toting passerby that became the iconic image of the Hungarian Revolution. It was used for opposite propaganda purposes in the East and West.

In the tradition of war photojournalism, the picture's genesis was a haphazard affair. It was shot by a photographer who had set out to record another event in another country, but slipped into Hungary when the Czech border was closed. It was falsely credited to a *Paris-Match* photographer, Jean-Pierre Pedrazzini, who was fatally wounded the afternoon the picture was taken. Melcher allowed *Paris-Match* to attribute the photo to the late Pedrazzini in "homage" and to increase circulation of the image. "If a photographer has been killed in action and this is one of his last pictures, every paper wants to publish it," Melcher explained to Casoar in an interview. It was posed,

not spontaneous, but the pistol-toting passerby who wouldn't step out of the way added a sinister twist that became its salient element in the Eastern bloc. The picture appeared inside an edition of *Paris-Match* that featured Israeli general Moshe Dayan on the cover, but it is the image from Hungary that has become famous.

Captions and text framed the propaganda battle over the photograph's meaning. *Paris-Match* identified the youths as heroes: "In the eyes of this couple, our reporters on the street saw the soul of the uprising. He took his gun from an army depot. She, wounded, turned her school bag into a first-aid kit. Behind them, a passerby with a pistol." In sep-

arate commentary, the magazine lauded Hungary as a "noble and Christian nation [that] has never given its support to totalitarianism and barbarism." In America, *Time* magazine used the *Paris-Match* picture as partial inspiration for its composite Hungarian freedom fighter "Man of the Year."

Soon after, in Budapest, the picture was reproduced in exhibitions, a film, and in popular books to show how "counterrevolutionary elements put children forward to hide their black intentions," according to a caption for an exhibition, Counterrevolution of 1956, that opened in June 1957. Pictures "show well who was behind the children," the caption con-

tinued, referring to the man with the pistol. Communist-bloc reproductions of the picture looked overexposed, dark, or awkwardly retouched with a brush to make the couple look repulsive and frightening, according to Balázs and Casoar. Hungarian books put the pictures in Soviet historical context, describing how imperialist and fascist opponents of the Russian-backed government had been plotting since 1948, waiting for the right moment when Hungary would become the “battlefield of the international class fight.” Photos of young fighters taken during the rebellion were used as conclusive proof of treason during later trials, and one young woman was hanged. Gyuri’s fate is unknown, but Jutka was listed in Hungarian records as a “prohibited person” until 1989. She died a year later, in exile in Australia.

## PRESS &amp; MEDIA

## The Dodgy Sex Dossier

**THE SOURCE:** “The ‘Dodgy Dossier’: The Academic Implications of the British Government’s Plagiarism Incident” by Ibrahim Al-Marashi, in *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, June 2006.

FOUR YEARS AGO, TO BOLSTER support for an invasion of Iraq, British prime minister Tony Blair released a dossier titled “Iraq—Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception, and Intimidation.” Nineteen paragraphs had been copied almost verbatim from the work of an Iraqi-American Ph.D. candidate at Oxford University. And that was only the beginning.

Ibrahim Al-Marashi’s thesis was

based on 300,000 declassified Iraqi state documents abandoned in Kuwait when the American-led international forces launched the first gulf war in 1991. In 2003, when the dossier was being written by Blair’s “spin doctor,” Alistair Campbell, Al-Marashi was on leave from pursuit of his doctorate to work at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. Four days after the dossier was slipped to journalists in the final buildup to the war, the doctoral candidate got an e-mail from a British academic: Had he collaborated with the government on the dossier? Al-Marashi hadn’t heard of it, but when he placed it side by side with an article he had adapted from the second chapter of his thesis, he found long sections of his own words in the 19-page document. It wasn’t just outrage that he felt. As a young scholar hoping to teach in the Middle East, he feared that the use of his research to justify a war against his native Iraq would blackball him forever. But while the British government’s plagiarism caused considerable concern, to say the least, writes Al-Marashi, “I found the media’s coverage of the incident even more disturbing.”

In the press frenzy surrounding the incident, the Blair government’s plagiarism of two other authors was largely forgotten. “It was far more incompetent to plagiarize a California ‘student’ than a published author,” Al-Marashi explains. The media played the story as if he were “an undergraduate in shorts and sandals whose ‘homework assignment’ was copied by the British government.”

Alexander Cockburn, in an arti-

cle for *The Nation*, accused Al-Marashi of writing a “politically inspired document” for an “Israeli think tank hot for war.” Within a week, *The Guardian* had promoted him to postdoctoral status. *The Washington Post* wrote that the plagiarized material was 12 years old, though it later issued a retraction. The London *Observer* relayed “mutterings” that the French could not be expected to back a war on Iraq justified only by a “failed doctoral thesis.”

Even worse, Al-Marashi had written that one of the responsibilities of the Iraqi intelligence service was “aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes.” That was juiced up in the dossier into an assertion that the Iraqi intelligence services were “supporting terrorist organizations in hostile regimes.” Al-Marashi’s work had opened the door to the charge that Saddam Hussein supported Al Qaeda.

The Al-Marashi dossier was not the only one produced by “spin doctor” Campbell. In an earlier document, he had claimed that Iraq could deploy chemical munitions in 45 minutes, inserting the short time frame into the separate study in order to “sex up” the document, Al-Marashi writes. This became known as the “sexex-up dossier,” while the “Al-Marashi” paper was called the “dodgy dossier.” Many people lost the distinction, and Al-Marashi repeatedly had to decline responsibility for the “dodgy sex dossier.” Then he was enshrined for posterity as a grammatical lout when a misplaced comma in his original thesis was reprinted in a best-selling