

## RELIGION &amp; PHILOSOPHY

## Divine Politics

**THE SOURCE:** "The Sword of the Lord: How 'Otherworldly' Fundamentalism Became a Political Power" by George Marsden, in *Books & Culture*, March–April 2006.

SO PERVASIVE IS THE INFLUENCE of the Religious Right on contemporary American politics that it is sometimes hard to remember that the deep involvement of evangelical Protestants in politics dates only to the 1970s. Earlier in the 20th century, a few prominent preachers campaigned against alcohol or communism, but as a group, evangelists were largely inert politically. Mainline Protestants criticized them endlessly for their inward-looking emphasis on conversion and the private practice of faith.

According to George Marsden, a historian at the University of Notre Dame and author of *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (2nd ed., 2005), it was the South's gradual integration into the American mainstream that propelled fundamentalists into public life. Until the mid-20th century, the fundamentalism preached by Southern Baptists and other evangelicals fit snugly into a "custodial" role in insular Southern culture, allowing them to ride herd on public morality. The turmoil of the civil rights era all but guaranteed that any evangelical forays onto the national political scene would be tainted by charges of racism, but other developments were already pushing believers from their provincial cocoon. Marsden cites a massive migration that occurred from the 1930s through the '50s, when white Southerners carried their values

north and west across America. Evidence of its effect can be seen in the breakthrough success of Billy Graham's 1949 Los Angeles crusade, in the grass-roots support for Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign, and in the successful California gubernatorial run of Ronald Reagan in 1966. "From that time on," writes Marsden, "it would be difficult to find an aspect of renewed religious and cultural militancy of the emerging Religious Right that did not have a major southern component."

Something still held back the fundamentalists' political tide, however. In 1965, a young Jerry Falwell delivered a sermon titled "Ministers and Marchers" in response to growing calls to respond to antiwar demonstrations: Evangelical Christians must "preach the Word," Falwell exhorted, not "reform the externals." It was not until the late 1960s and early '70s, says Marsden, that "changes in standards for public decency, aggressive second-wave feminism, gay activism, and challenges to conventional family structures" spurred evangelicals to greater political engagement. (Evangelical opinion on abortion, he notes, remained divided until the late 1970s.) Perhaps inspired by the crusade of Phyllis Schlafly (a Catholic) against the Equal Rights Amendment during the early 1970s, and disillusioned by "born again" President Jimmy Carter, whom they had supported, fundamentalists finally flexed their political muscle in 1979 with the founding of Falwell's Moral Majority.

As fundamentalists asserted themselves, it was precisely their character as moralizing "outsiders," says Marsden, that allowed them to rail against America as the new Baby-

lon while simultaneously proclaiming it God's chosen nation. Their historical experience kept America's fundamentalists from following in the path of other militant religious groups, such as Islamists. The Baptist tradition from which most American fundamentalism springs has always stressed separation of church and state. And in America's revolutionary period, Protestants were closely allied with the national cause, unlike the status quo religious groups of Europe, for example. Thus, while American fundamentalists are not especially more pacific than their Islamic counterparts, because of their unique historical experience they are perfectly comfortable with exhorting their nation to act as "an agency used by God in literal warfare against the forces of evil." It's a slippery, complicated path, and Marsden ends with a reminder that the Bible is filled with cautionary stories about mixing political power and influence with "unambiguous moral obligations."

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## Ungodless Nation

**THE SOURCE:** "Atheists as 'Other': Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society" by Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and Douglas Hartmann, in *American Sociological Review* (April 2006).

IN AN ERA OF INCREASING religious tolerance, only one group of Americans approaches something like pariah status: atheists.

In a survey of more than 2,000 people, nearly 40 percent said that atheists, much more so than Muslims and homosexuals, did not agree "at all" with their vision of American society, report Penny

Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and Douglas Hartmann, all sociologists at the University of Minnesota. Just under half of those polled said that they would disapprove if one of their children wanted to marry an atheist. A third said they would disapprove of a Muslim spouse.

Churchgoers, conservative Protestants, and people who say that religion is highly salient to their lives are less likely to approve of intermarriage with nonbelievers and more likely to say that atheists do not share their vision of American society. White Americans, males, and college graduates are somewhat more accepting of atheists than are nonwhites, females,

and people without college degrees. Not surprisingly, the lowest rate of rejection of atheists is among those who do not go to church or claim a religious identity, and who report that religion is “not at all” salient to them. Yet even 17 percent of these survey respondents say that atheists do not at all share their vision of America, and one-tenth indicate that they would disapprove of their child marrying an atheist.

It may come as a surprise that nonbelievers are actually hard to find. Only about one percent of Americans self-identify as atheists, though the real number may be up to three percent. And the members of this small band would be hard to

identify, since there are no visible signs of nonbelief.

The attitude toward these godless few is telling, write the authors. “If we are correct, then the boundary between the religious and the nonreligious is not about religious affiliation per se. It is about the historic place of religion in American civic culture and the understanding that religion provides the ‘habits of the heart’ that form the basis of the good society. It is about an understanding that Americans share something more than rules and procedures, but rather that our understandings of right and wrong and good citizenship are also shared.”

## SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

# How to Save the Internet

**THE SOURCE:** “The Generative Internet” by Jonathan L. Zittrain, in *Harvard Law Review*, May 2006.

FOR ALMOST AS LONG AS THERE has been an Internet, enthusiasts have worried that it would be ruined by the intrusion of commerce. Now, that nightmare is closer than ever to being realized. It’s not corporate ogres or bloodsucking regulators that pose the chief danger, according to Jonathan L. Zittrain, a professor of Internet governance and regulation at Oxford University. It’s us.

Today’s rapidly proliferating threats to Internet security have the potential to provoke a backlash among computer users, creating consumer demand for protective

measures that would fundamentally change the nature of the Internet. Some corporations and regulators would be glad to satisfy this demand.

The key to the Internet’s enormous “generativity” has been unimpeded access of one end user to another, writes Zittrain, allowing “upstart innovators to demonstrate and deploy their genius to large audiences.” Virtually every innovation, from Amazon.com to Wikipedia, MySpace, and Skype, has depended on the creators’ ability to send executable code as well as data to the user’s personal computer. But that accessibility also opens the door to danger, as the experience of

CERT, an independent Internet security organization based at Carnegie Mellon University, graphically illustrates. In 1988, it began documenting the number of virus and worm attacks on Internet systems, and it was easy work until the late 1990s. In 2004, however, CERT announced that it was giving up: Attacks had quadrupled in just a few years.

Zittrain sees several possible routes to a more secure but less “generative” Internet that might tempt consumers. For instance, the personal computer could morph into an “information appliance,” running only programs loaded by its manufacturer. That’s not far-fetched. TiVo video recorders, Xbox game consoles, and Web-enabled smartphones are among the devices that already fit this description.

The recent spread of automatic software updating via the Internet