with civil and political liberties, argues Adelman. Some 90 percent of the African countries have one-party governments or military dictatorships. Few have independent judiciaries or protect free speech. However, the Carter administration is apparently not prepared to make human rights the criterion for a consistent policy toward both black and white Africa. And rather than directly confront Soviet-sponsored arms build-ups, the United States has relied on Britain and France to cope with "the nasty business" of African national security (as in 1977, when France airlifted Moroccan troops to help defend Zaire).

The White House now lacks any coherent long-range plan for South Africa. But a step in the right direction, Adelman contends, would be to recognize that, given Pretoria's substantial military power, economic base, and resolve, the South African story will not end with whites being pushed into the sea. One solution may be wholesale readjustment of South Africa's borders, creating one "smaller white-dominated state" and a few "truly independent black ones," as opposed to South Africa's current "homelands" policy, which assigns 6 million blacks to poverty-ridden tribal areas, such as Transkei, where many of them have never been.

This approach would be "unappealing" to many Americans, accustomed to a multi-racial, multi-ethnic state. But it is nevertheless both feasible and just. South Africa has shown a willingness to cede territory if not power; but it is as determined to maintain a white-ruled state in a hostile environment "as Israel is to preserve its Jewish-ruled one." And for all their militant rhetoric, neighboring black-ruled nations are inclined to maintain economic ties with Pretoria; South Africa runs Mozambique's ports and rail system, while providing 80 percent of its foreign exchange, and Zaire sends three quarters of its copper out through South African ports.

The Inevitability of Surprise


The first paradox of surprise military attacks is that aggressor "signals" can never be trusted by the defense. While there may be no lack of "noise" from the enemy's camp, all of it is distorted. As a result, writes Handel, a foreign affairs analyst at Jerusalem's Hebrew University, there may be guidelines for deciphering enemy intentions and capabilities, but there is no foolproof way of preventing—or apprehending in advance—a surprise attack. This the Israelis learned to their cost in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

For the Israelis, the years after the 1967 Six Day War seemed prosperous and free of threats, leading them to assume that what was good for Israel must also be good for the Arabs. According to Western military logic, no nation will resort to war unless its chances of victory are

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good. But in 1973, the Arabs were willing to risk military defeat to improve their international political position. Thus, paradox 2: The more risky the attack, the less risky it really may be.

During 1967–73, Washington and Moscow moved toward détente, leading Israel to believe that the Russians favored negotiation over aggression by their Arab allies. Meanwhile, Handel notes, Israel committed an intelligence error by imputing its own strategic theory to the enemy. It assumed that Egypt and Syria would contest Israel’s air superiority with jet fighters rather than negate it by effective use of new Soviet ground-to-air missiles. Paradox 3: A quiet international environment is an ideal cover for war preparations. And 4: The better the intelligence service, the greater the risk of relying on its detailed but faulty findings.

The decision to initiate war, Handel concludes, is not always dictated by a capability to win. While analysis can certainly be improved, any nation’s best protection against surprise attacks, he contends, is a system of deployment that assumes “no warning time at all.”

Let’s Just Be Rivals

U.S.-Soviet relations have cooled during the Carter administration, and the cause, to many critics, seems as obvious as the fact itself: President Carter’s allegedly inexperienced, self-righteous diplomacy. Brown, director of the U.S.-Soviet relations program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, disagrees. The present difficulties, he argues, stem from widely held misconceptions about the nature of U.S.-Soviet interdependence.

Over the past decade, both Washington and Moscow have attempted to load the negotiating table with more than it could hold. On the agenda have been (1) stabilization of the political status quo in Europe, (2) a slowdown of the arms race, (3) expansion of the East-West trade, and (4) avoidance of a Soviet-American showdown in the Middle East. Not only are these questions complex in themselves, says Brown, but their final resolution is often beyond the power of both governments, even when acting in concert. In the Mideast, for example, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are to a large degree at the mercy of local events.

A second reality is that material and nonmaterial interests can never really be separated. If, as some scholars maintain, the White House and the Kremlin share a “confluence of interest” in certain economic and strategic matters, a wide ideological chasm still exists between the two superpowers. Opposing world views, Brown believes, produce recurrent suspicions in both Washington and Moscow that détente really gives the other side an advantage. As a result, both governments are tempted to “score against each other in the persisting rivalry for global ascendency.”

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