


Mediterranean drama with all its betrayals, blunders, and illusions, he conveys the intensity of the protagonists' passions without sharing them or holding them up to scorn.

**GOLOMBEK'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHESS**

by Harry Golombek  
Crown, 1978, 360 pp. \$14.95  
L of C 77-7635  
ISBN 0-517-53146-1



"Chess is a lake in which a gnat may bathe and an elephant may drown." The Indian proverb applies to encyclopedias as well. But in this one, British chess master Harry Golombek swims gracefully through rules, tournaments, history, and biography. His tales of battling giants like Russia's Tigran Petrosian and America's Bobby Fischer convey an almost epic sense of the game. He acknowledges its Walter Mitty aspects: In Budapest in 1960, blindfolded Hungarian János Flesch played 52 players simultaneously; he won 31 games, lost 3, and drew the rest. Golombek is at his best explaining the classic problems. Here, for example, is a problem (mate in five) composed by Sam Loyd in 1858 to confound a boastful player. Loyd bet the man a dinner that he could not say which White piece (opposite) would *not* give the mate.

*Hint: The man selected QNP as the most unlikely—and paid for the dinner. To find out why, see page 192.*

**SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND COLD WAR CRISES**

by Richard K. Betts  
Harvard, 1977, 292 pp. \$15  
L of C 77-8068  
ISBN 0-674-81741-9

Do the U.S. military brass always urge a more aggressive policy than the President's top civilian advisers? No, says Richard K. Betts of Brookings in this eye-opening scholarly study. He examines the advisory role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lesser military men during each of some 20 Cold War crises, ranging from the Korean War and the 1961 Berlin crisis to Vietnam and the North Korean seizure of the *Pueblo* in 1968. Each service chief's views were shaped in part by his own service's organization and doctrine. But by and large the military were no *more* eager to intervene in crises abroad than the top civilians, and were sometimes *less* eager, as in the case of Laos in 1961. Once U.S. troops were in battle, however, the military tended to urge

stronger policies than did civilians, as in Vietnam after 1965. For better or worse, "military advice," says Betts, "has been most persuasive [to Presidents] as a veto of the use of force and least potent when it favored force."

*Contemporary Affairs*

**THE JEWS**

by Chaim Bermant  
Times Books, 1977  
278 pp. \$12.50  
L of C 77-79020  
ISBN 0-8129-0705-1

"It's good to be a Jew, which is a somewhat un-Jewish thing to say, for Jews are rather more accustomed to hugging their wounds than counting their blessings." So begins this perceptive book by Bermant, a Glasgow Rabbinical College graduate, novelist, and historian. He believes that Sigmund Freud and the revolutionary Marxist Rosa Luxemburg exemplify "the inherited Jewish capacity to stand their ground in the face of all opposition." Others (the Rothschilds, Marc Chagall, Sandy Koufax, Leon Trotsky, Fanny Brice) reveal such traits of the Jewish psyche as a mixture of pride and diffidence stemming from the idea of God's Chosen; studiousness; a near-obsession with health; a strong propensity for charity; and "a pronounced sense of guilt." In Bermant's view, there is less anti-Semitism in the world today than ever before, but he sees American Jewry in the '70s as "waiting for the backlash." The psychological effects of the Holocaust linger on: "To have one's existence made a capital offense," he writes, "is not a fact which can fade quickly from the memory."

**ARAB POLITICS: The Search for Legitimacy**  
by Michael C. Hudson  
Yale, 1977, 434 pp. \$22.50  
L of C 77-75379  
ISBN 0-300-02043-0

It makes sense to treat Arab politics as a whole. This attempt, the first in English to discuss in one book each of the 18 Arab states plus the stateless Palestinians, deserves praise despite its flaws. Hudson, director of the Center for Arab Studies at Georgetown University, examines the elements of Arab identity, the treatment of religions and ethnic minorities, the legacies of imperialism, and modernization. He finds throughout the Arab world an inability to open political participation to enough of the people to build needed