

contest between opposing armed forces, massive retaliation presaged the demise of the military profession. . . . Worse, this new reliance on nuclear weapons to defend America on the cheap appeared to legitimize the targeting of civilian populations for wholesale destruction,” and to raise the specter of a preventive nuclear strike against them. In effect, the president was demanding that the army’s leaders carry out a policy that rendered the traditional tenets of their profession obsolete.

For the next 18 months, Bacevich writes, Ridgway and the army “obdurately” fought the new doctrine, carrying the campaign to the press and to the Council on Foreign Relations. Finally, in 1955, Eisenhower forced Ridgway to retire. But army resistance continued, and Ridgway’s successor,

General Maxwell Taylor, would angrily leave active duty and publish his famous indictment, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1960).

Far from affirming civilian control, the struggle between Eisenhower and his generals accelerated the politicization of the senior military leadership, Bacevich writes. “No longer able to claim that warfare provided the basis for their role in society and was the wellspring of their authority, neither would they be able to claim to be the authoritative source of advice on military matters.” They were cast adrift. The “tragic dénouement of this process,” Bacevich says, would come when American involvement in the Vietnam War grew, yet top officers sacrificed their professional judgment of the military situation to the exigencies of civilian politics.

Toward a Smaller World

Have reservations about the growing global hegemony of Ronald McDonald, Sly Stallone, and the rest of their crowd? Not to worry, says David Rothkopf, managing director of Kissinger Associates and an adjunct professor of international affairs at Columbia University, writing in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1997).

Many observers contend that it is distasteful to use the opportunities created by the global information revolution to promote American culture over others, but that kind of relativism is as dangerous as it is wrong. American culture is fundamentally different from indigenous cultures in so many other locales. American culture is an amalgam of influences and approaches from around the world. It is melded—consciously in many cases—into a social medium that allows individual freedoms and cultures to thrive. Recognizing this, Americans should not shy away from doing that which is so clearly in their economic, political, and security interests—and so clearly in the interests of the world at large. The United States should not hesitate to promote its values. In an effort to be polite or politic, Americans should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and improve itself, and the best model for the future.

Bazaar Foreign Policy

“The Selling of American Foreign Policy” by Lawrence F. Kaplan, in *The Weekly Standard* (Apr. 28, 1997), 1150 17th St. N.W., Ste. 505, Washington, D.C. 20036-4617.

The Clinton administration has put commerce at the center of U.S. foreign policy, in the hope of promoting peace, democracy, and human rights throughout the world. The result has been to cut American foreign policy loose from its strategic and ideological moorings, asserts Kaplan, a Fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s Nitze School of Ad-

vanced International Studies.

In the name of “commercial diplomacy,” the United States now “engages” nations of all sorts, he says, even those whose links to terrorist activities and human rights abuses have won them places on the State Department’s roster of rogue states. “No profit margin is too small [and] almost no regime [is] too distaste-

ful for the apostles of commercial engagement,” such as Jeffrey Garten, who served as undersecretary of commerce for international trade during 1993–95. When Occidental Petroleum last year wanted to pump oil from a Sudanese field, Clinton provided an exemption from the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act. Syria, too, got an exemption, and “continues to enjoy millions of dollars in American investment.” The White House now is considering lifting the trade embargo on Iran.

The official pariah status of such states as Syria limits trade done with them, but the Clinton administration “tirelessly promotes” business deals with equally egregious countries, Kaplan says. China is only the most prominent example. Despite the repressive policies of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the late commerce secretary Ron Brown secured Indonesian contracts worth billions for American companies. Mexico—the source of three-fourths of the cocaine that flows into the United States each year—poses, according to the State Department, “a more immediate narcotics threat to the United States” than any other nation. Yet, even after learning “that the commander of Mexico’s much lauded anti-drug effort was himself a drug dealer,” Kaplan notes, Clinton “certified the commitment of our third

largest trading partner to fighting narcotics trafficking.”

The administration also has encouraged American firms “to auction off previously restricted technologies to foreign bidders,” Kaplan points out. It has abolished nearly all export restrictions on computer and telecommunications technology, and, brushing aside Pentagon concerns, has authorized the launching of commercial satellites to take high-resolution photos that could be used for military purposes.

While the administration gives “potential adversaries . . . lucrative trade deals and sensitive technology,” Kaplan observes, it often uses trade “as a weapon with which to bludgeon our strategic allies,” notably Japan.

“By promoting commercial diplomacy at the expense of our strategic interests,” he warns, “President Clinton has essentially rolled the dice, betting that security issues represent nothing more than what one administration official described . . . as ‘stratocrap and globaloney.’ The White House assumes that the rest of the world will recognize the diminished utility of military power—the notion that war will soon go the way of dueling. Unfortunately, no evidence exists to suggest that nations such as China and Syria share that conviction.”

Scrap the Nukes?

“The Case in Favor of U.S. Nuclear Weapons” by Robert G. Spulak, Jr., in *Parameters* (Spring 1997), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa. 17013–5238; “Retired Generals Re-ignite Debate Over Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” by Craig Cerniello, in *Arms Control Today* (Nov.–Dec. 1996), 1726 M St. N.W., Ste. 201, Washington, D.C. 20036.

The siren song of nuclear disarmament seemed a dangerous one when the Cold War was on. But now that the Soviet threat has vanished, the idea of ridding the planet of nuclear weapons is attracting fresh support from an unlikely quarter: the military. Two eminent retired American generals—Lee Butler, former commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and Andrew Goodpaster, former supreme allied commander in Europe—were among more than 60 retired generals and admirals from 17 countries who recently urged the United States and other nuclear powers to move resolutely, step by step, toward complete nuclear disarmament.

“In the world environment now foreseen,” declare Butler and Goodpaster,

nuclear weapons “are not needed against non-nuclear opponents. Conventional capabilities can provide a sufficient deterrent and defense against conventional forces and in combination with defensive measures, against the threat of chemical or biological weapons.” That being so, nuclear weapons are not needed except as “an option to respond in kind” to a nuclear threat or attack. The United States and Russia, Butler and Goodpaster say, should take the initiative in reducing their nuclear arsenals, thus “open[ing] the door” for negotiated reductions by all nuclear powers, and leading to a world permanently free of nuclear weapons.

That is a utopian fantasy, argues Spulak, a senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center,