

However, with “one in every four inhabitants of Bavaria claiming Sudeten German heritage, and with Bavaria representing the power base—and much of the economic muscle—of [Chancellor Helmut] Kohl’s conservative coalition government, Neubauer exercises considerable leverage in Bonn,” Ryback says. The Germans removed a clause from the 1992 Czechoslovak-German friendship treaty that would have annulled all Sudeten German property claims in Czechoslovakia, and Germany has blocked compensation payments to 12,000 Czech survivors of Nazi persecution. In the Czech Republic, meanwhile, the Czech Constitutional Court in 1995 not only upheld an old postwar decree depriving the Germans of their property and assets but declared the German people “collectively responsible” for the Nazis’ crimes.

By last spring, it appeared that senior German and Czech officials had smoothed things over. But in May, at the annual Sudeten German rally in Nuremberg, German finance minister Theo Waigel roiled the waters with a broadside attacking the Czechs for the “ethnic cleansing” of 1945 and subtly threatening to block their



Nazi troops march into the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, soon after “peace for our time” was secured at Munich.

petition for full membership in the EU unless a public apology was forthcoming.

The best course for both countries, Ryback believes, would be an apology from Prague in exchange for a renunciation by the German government of Sudeten German claims in the Czech Republic. Such a joint declaration would provoke howls of outrage on both sides, but the uproar probably would not have lasting consequences. In the end, he says, the most remarkable feature about the current conflict may be that the German government has been able, in the shadow of the Nazi past, to speak firmly about an injustice done to Germans then, but without trying to equate the vengeance killings with the Nazi atrocities. “The contemporary Germans are indeed not the Germans of 50 years ago.”

Professors of Genocide

“Africa’s Murderous Professors” by Michael Chege, in *The National Interest* (Winter 1996–97), 1112 16th St. N.W., Ste. 540, Washington, D.C. 20036.

When the predominant Hutus savagely eliminated some 850,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, their weapon of choice was the garden machete, and it was widely assumed that the driving force behind this genocide was just as primitive—“tribalism.” In fact, says Chege, a citizen of Kenya who is director of the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida, Gainesville, “The catechism of the madness

that . . . overtook Rwanda was authored not by some African magician extolling the supremacy of the Hutu race in ancient ‘tribal’ wars, but by accomplished Rwandan professional historians, journalists, and sociologists at the service of a quasi-traditionalist and genocidally inclined cabal.”

President Juvénal Habyarimana’s Hutu-dominated regime might have reached a

compromise with the Tutsi guerrilla forces—the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—in October 1993, Chege says, had it not been “for the determination of a group of Hutu intellectuals and extremists to keep the Tutsis out of power at all costs.”

Working with the extremist Akazu faction of the ruling Hutus, Chege says, Leon Mugesira and Ferdinand Nahimana, both professors of history at Rwandan National University at Butare, along with another member of the faculty, Vincent Ntzipimana, “manufactured doctrines of Hutu ethnic supremacy depicting all Tutsis as a malignant cancer in the nation’s history that deserved to be excised once and for all.”

Shrill calls for the extermination of the Tutsis, broadcast on Rwandan radio and carried in print, mobilized Hutu peasants, militias, and the urban unemployed for murder. After the massacres, Emmanuel Bugingo, the new rector of the university’s Butare campus, lamented that “all the killing in Rwanda was carefully planned by intellectuals and those

intellectuals passed through this university.”

After the Tutsi RPF seized the capital of Kigali in May 1994, Prime Minister Paul Kagame’s government provided human rights groups with the names of 463 surviving ringleaders of the 1994 genocide. Many of them have been traced to Kenya. At the University of Nairobi’s Chiromo campus, for example, Charles Nyandwi—number 35 on the Rwandan list of war criminals—was appointed in 1995 to teach applied mathematics.

“Professor Nyandwi and his colleagues are in good company,” Chege writes. “The Kenyan government has been repeatedly accused by Amnesty International of the systematic torture of its political opponents.” Academics there, too, have joined the regime in fanning ethnic hatred (against the Kikuyu minority). Genocide is also a real possibility in Zaire, Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa. Hatemongering by African intellectuals, Chege warns, must not be tolerated by Africans—or by Western aid givers.

The Asian Arms Race

“East Asia’s Arms Races” and “East Asia’s Militaries Muscle Up” by Michael Klare, in *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (Jan.–Feb. 1997), 6042 S. Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

With the decline and fall of the Soviet empire, global military spending has plunged, from \$1.3 trillion in 1987 to \$840 billion in 1994. But in East Asia, military expenditures have climbed—from \$126 billion (in constant 1994 dollars) annually during the 1984–88 period to \$142 billion between 1992 and ’94. This trend, warns Klare, who heads the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies in Amherst, Massachusetts, could lead to war.

China began to transform its military in 1985, when it shifted its strategic focus from an all-out “people’s war” with the Soviet Union or another invading power to smaller regional conflicts. It has reduced its ground force from four million to three million active-duty troops—still the world’s largest army—while beefing up its air and naval arms. Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore have been taking similar steps.

The East Asian nations have become “avid consumers” of sophisticated military gear

produced in the United States, France, Russia, and elsewhere. Between 1985 and 1994, they spent about \$67 billion on imported arms, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and other high-tech weapons. Taiwan now has 60 Mirage-2000-5 and 150 F-16 jet fighters, and even Malaysia, though not yet in the same league, has 20 MiG-29 and eight F-18 jet fighters.

This binge is partly a product of affluence, Klare points out. Chronic regional disputes, including those between China and Taiwan and between South Korea and North Korea, along with more recent quarrels (such as that among China, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea), have also whetted the appetite for arms.

With the chief exception of China, East Asia’s arms industries “are still embryonic,” Klare says. As long as that remains true, the East Asian nations “will be subject to some degree to the political wishes of their principal suppliers.” But as they become more self-sufficient, Klare fears, the threat to peace in the region could grow.