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bills passed during the 1970s. Individuals can contribute up to \$1,000 to each congressional candidate, PACs up to \$5,000. (In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional any limits on spending by the candidates and on "independent expenditures" by noncampaign organizations.) A 1979 amendment permitted unlimited spending on grass roots activities by political parties. The result, unforeseen at the time, was a vast advantage for the Republicans, thanks to their fundraising prowess. Ever since, Glen writes, both parties have been on guard against "hidden agendas" in reform proposals.

There is no shortage of reform ideas. But one that seems logical to some outside observers is moribund: Public financing of congressional campaigns could not win approval on Capitol Hill even during the 1970s, when Democratic supporters of the plan were strongest. Many of them, notably Senator William Proxmire (D.-Wis.), now favor granting tax credits to campaign contributors if the candidate agrees to limits on his donations from PACs and on his total campaign outlays. Like public financing, however, that plan could cost taxpayers (indirectly) a sizable dollar amount.

Senator David L. Boren (D.-Okla.) advocates a \$100,000 ceiling on the amount House candidates could receive from PACs. But many of his fellow Democrats are unenthusiastic. PAC money often benefits Democrats more than Republicans: Incumbent House Democrats raised 45 percent of their 1984 campaign funds from PACs; Democratic challengers 30 percent. The comparable figures for GOP candidates were 37 and 17 percent.

Without another Watergate to inflame public opinion, Glen concludes, campaign finance reform is dead in the water. About the only thing Congress is likely to agree on this year is the creation of a bipartisan panel to study the issue.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Arms Control


"Pie in the Sky" by Theodore Draper, in *The New York Review of Books* (Feb. 14, 1985), P.O. Box 940, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

As a new round of Soviet-American arms control talks commences in Geneva, the Reagan administration's negotiating position is still experiencing "bureaucratic birth pangs." Draper, a historian, detects its rough outlines in articles published by administration officials.

He does not like what he sees.

In *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1984-85), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director Kenneth Adelman and Paul H. Nitze, special U.S. State Department adviser on arms control, present what Draper describes as "studies in ambivalence."

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Arms control pacts have not stopped U.S. and Soviet nuclear stockpiles from growing. Would growth have been faster without such treaties?

Adelman concentrates on the obstacles to effective arms control—the problem of verification, contrasting Soviet-American “force structures.” Rather than negotiate fruitlessly, he concludes, Moscow and Washington should practice “arms control without agreements.” Each side should voluntarily make concessions (e.g., halting research on antisatellite weapons) without formal pacts, encouraging the other to follow suit.

To Draper, that sounds suspiciously like a simple plan to avoid doing anything. How, after all, he says, would arms control without agreements overcome all the obstacles that face arms control *with* agreements?

Nitze’s views on “Living with the Soviets” sound to Draper like “variations on [Adelman’s] theme.” Like Adelman, Nitze devotes most of his article to an inventory of the difficulties of superpower relations. But then he abruptly advocates a policy of “live and let live” (not a policy but a slogan, Draper contends) and argues for a strategy of “complementary actions” towards the Soviets. Draper asserts that Nitze and Adelman are talking about the same thing: “The real meaning of ‘live and let live’ is ‘arm and let arm.’”

Draper suggests that previous administrations, Democratic and Republican, were not much more deeply committed to genuine arms reductions. The Soviets, he adds, make matters worse. They come to each set of talks with no position or proposal and wait to get the best offer they can. Then Moscow usually turns it down.

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Negotiations as now conducted, concludes Draper, "are only a continuation of the struggle for [global] power by other means." Each major new weapons system—antiballistic missiles, multiple warheads, the Strategic Defense Initiative—brings a new round of arms talks. Even when they "succeed," Draper writes, nuclear arsenals keep growing. Seeking "plain, simple, and sufficient" deterrence with a small number of nuclear weapons on each side is the only logical solution, in Draper's view. But until both sides decide they want it, he concludes, talks at Geneva are futile.

The Red Phone

"The Button" by Daniel Ford, in *The New Yorker* (April 1 and April 8, 1985), 25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

After President John F. Kennedy moved into the Oval Office in 1961, his thoughts turned to the famous "red telephone" that would alert him in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had kept the phone in a desk drawer, but now it was nowhere to be found.

It turned out, recalls Ford, a freelance writer, that Mrs. Kennedy had done some redecorating. Eisenhower's desk had been replaced, and the red telephone mistakenly disconnected and removed.

The red telephone is the last link in the U.S. nuclear "command and control system"—the vast network of early warning satellites, military command posts, radio circuits, and ordinary telephone lines that stretch to the White House from around the world. As the Kennedy episode suggests, it was often neglected. Since the late 1970s, when the growing size and sophistication of the Soviet arsenal made the U.S. system more vulnerable to attack, Pentagon officials have been paying more attention. But the weaknesses remain.

Ford cites the case of the Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellite, the Pentagon's chief means of detecting a Soviet land-based missile launch. (There are DSP back-ups, but it would take several precious minutes to switch them on.) The satellite is controlled from a Sunnyvale, Calif., base—"within bazooka range of a highway," says one specialist. It sends its data to a ground station in Australia, which relays it through an American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) transoceanic cable to San Francisco. Then the signals go to North American Aerospace Defense Command headquarters inside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado.

Saboteurs, to say nothing of nuclear explosions, could sever communications almost anywhere. Until recently, the AT&T building in San Francisco, where the cable comes ashore, was unguarded.

Moreover, major U.S. command centers are not built to survive direct hits by nuclear missiles—not even the Cheyenne Mountain outpost. At most, U.S. leaders would have 25 to 30 minutes to decide how to respond to an incoming Soviet missile attack.

Thus, a pre-emptive "decapitating" nuclear attack aimed at the U.S. leadership and communications network is a tempting military strategy.