OTHER NATIONS

jazz scene in Czechoslovakia as a hotbed of antisocialist conspiracies." A purge was in the making: Dozens of rock and jazz-rock bands have since been forced to break up; Jazz Section chairman Karel Srp has been fired from his job with a printing company and may face 14 years in prison; other Jazz Section leaders face uncertain futures; and the Ministry of the Interior has "curtailed" all activities of the Musicians' Union until union officials dissolve the Jazz Section.

A 'Shining Path' In Peru?

"Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso" by Cynthia McClintock, in World Politics (Oct. 1984), Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648.

During the 1970s, Peru's military government carried out the second most sweeping land reform (after Cuba's) in Latin American history. In 1980, civilian rule was restored. Nevertheless, Peru has become the victim of a bizarre and bloody guerrilla movement, the Sendero Luminoso, or "Shining Path."

Founded in 1968 by Abimael Guzman, a professor at a provincial university in Ayacucho, high in the Andes, the Shining Path took up arms in 1980. Its leaders scorn both the Soviet Union and China, and receive no aid from either. The group is responsible for some 2,500 terrorist attacks nationwide—on factories, power plants, embassies—and 615 deaths. It enjoys growing popularity in the mountains around Ayacucho; the number of active terrorists has jumped from just two or three hundred in 1980 to perhaps 3,000 today.

How can the Shining Path's success be explained? No sophisticated theories are needed, says McClintock, a University of Chicago political scientist: The Andes peasants face increasingly dire poverty.

During the agrarian reforms of the 1970s, the estates of the wealthy were turned into peasant farm cooperatives. But most of the estates were located far from the Andes, where the land is dry, stony, and steep, and the potato and grain farms are very small. Overpopulation and soil exhaustion are the problems there. Government policies have also stirred peasant resentment. Fernando Belaunde Terry's administration has hiked interest rates on farm loans, slashed fertilizer subsidies, and cut protective tariffs on imported food. It has boosted public works outlays in the region, but nearly half of the money goes to showcase rural electrification projects.

Widening gaps between rich and poor are common in Latin America, McClintock notes, but in most cases, inequality grows because the gains of the well-off outpace those of the poor. Only in Nicaragua, Panama, and the Peruvian highlands did the poor get poorer during the 1970s. In the Andes, food consumption per capita dropped below 63 percent of the average daily requirement; income now averages \$50 per person annually.

McClintock thinks that Peru's experience contradicts conventional theories about "why peasants rebel." The Andes peasants treading the

Shining Path are isolated from the world capitalist economy; no wealthy landowners or oligarchs exploit them; their expectations were never unrealistically inflated. They are just losing ground in the struggle to survive. Because most of their countrymen are better off, McClintock gives the guerrillas little chance of winning wider support.

The Philippines's New Communists

"Communism in the Philippines" by David A. Rosenberg, in *Problems of Communism* (Sept.-Oct. 1984), Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

In 1981, President Ferdinand Marcos ended 10 years of martial law in the Philippines. During that decade, argues Rosenberg, a Middlebury College political scientist, Marcos managed through incompetence and bad judgment to rub old scars raw.

Marcos's iron-handed rule (he retains extraordinary powers) has strengthened the political extremes at the expense of the center. Only two Philippine groups have prospered since 1972: the armed forces, which swelled from 60,000 to 155,000 men, and the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army guerrillas. According to Rosenberg, a repressive domestic political climate, a deteriorating economy, and blatant official corruption are bolstering the Communists' cause. They will probably have a strong, though not decisive, say in what happens in this nation of 7,100 islands after the 68-year-old president departs the scene.

This is not the first time that Filipinos have confronted a Communist insurgency. Between 1946 and 1954, the fledgling post-World War II democracy was plagued by some 10,000 "Huk" guerrillas directed by the Philippine Communist Party (PKP). The Huks were defeated by Defense Secretary (later President) Ramon Magsaysay, with the help of American advisers. Emasculated by government crackdowns, infighting, and its own bad strategic decisions, the PKP by 1971 supported the imposition of martial law.

The CPP will not be so easy to beat, Rosenberg fears. Founded in 1968 by a group of young, well-educated Maoists who had been expelled from the PKP, its New People's Army now claims some 20,000 men under arms. These rebels are shrewder than the Huks, in Rosenberg's estimation. They are waging a classic guerrilla hit-and-run campaign in the countryside, avoiding the big pitched battles that decimated the Huks.

There is no evidence that the CPP receives outside aid, Rosenberg adds. Its Maoism is out of favor even in mainland China. Beijing enjoys growing trade with the Philippines and supports U.S. bases there; the CPP opposes both.

Already, the Philippines' Communist insurgents' forays occasionally make the front pages of U.S. newspapers, Rosenberg notes. Once Marcos leaves the stage, the vacuum that he has created at the center of Philippine politics will become even more obvious, and the CPP's power will grow.