
35,000 factories to spew forth three million tons of nitrous oxide into the air each year.) In Cairo's Khan al Khalili—the "city of the living dead," Gupte calls it—there are about 1.4 people to every square foot. Gupte notes some hopeful trends: In such countries as Bali, Sri Lanka, and South Korea, where women have attended school and found jobs outside the home, birthrates have declined. Still, the war on population growth is far from won. By the end of this century, at least 11 countries' populations will exceed the 100 million mark. Gupte sees the need for more birth-control programs such as the one Mexico employed to bring down its population growth rate, during one five-year period, from 3.5 percent to 2.5 percent, the fastest decline registered by any nation in recent history.

**MEASURING MILITARY
POWER: The Soviet Air
Threat to Europe**
by Joshua M. Epstein
Princeton, 1984
288 pp. \$22.50

Why, in assessing the Soviet military threat, do U.S. analysts tend to assume that the Russian military is free from the inefficiencies that plague the rest of Soviet society? Epstein, a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow, looks specifically at the USSR's tactical air wings committed to the European theater, but his methods and conclusions have broader application. New jet aircraft and increasingly sophisticated weapons systems have posed even more problems for the Soviets than they have for the U.S. Air Force, contends Epstein. The reason: the absence of any Soviet intermediate maintenance capability between the forward Air Regiments and the rear depot. As a result, fighter aircraft with anything more than simple mechanical failures are "deadlined" for lengthy periods. Furthermore, writes Epstein, Soviet pilot training is woefully inadequate to the complex demands of modern combat. Epstein applies a mathematical "threat assessment" formula to various hypothetical Soviet assaults on NATO forces. And while he finds that the Soviet threat is overestimated, his conclusion is not comforting: Uncertain of their ability to sustain operations, Soviet military leaders are likely to favor a "short war" doctrine, involving mass, surprise, and pre-emption.