gave poor advice to the White House and the State Department." But the recently opened papers of then CIA director Allen Dulles tell a somewhat different story, according to Vandenbroucke, a Brookings Institution researcher.

In an article that was never published, Dulles, who resigned shortly after the Bay of Pigs affair, maintained that he never assured President John F. Kennedy that the exiles would succeed, only that they had a "good fighting chance, and no more." Nor was there any CIA promise that the invasion would trigger an immediate popular anti-Castro uprising. Kennedy, Dulles complained, was only "half sold on the vital necessity of what he was doing [and was] surrounded by doubting Thomases." Moreover, the President steadily "whittled away" at the CIA's plan, fearful of unfavorable public reaction to a large-scale invasion, especially if its U.S. sponsorship were revealed.

To minimize publicity, Kennedy shifted the landing site from the coastal town of Trinidad to the more remote Bay of Pigs. What he did not seem to realize was that a quiet landing would cut the chances of sparking a popular uprising and that the Bay of Pigs, surrounded by swamps, offered little shelter for the exiles should the attack falter.

Dulles, not wanting to deepen Kennedy's doubts, chose not to disabuse him. "We felt convinced," he wrote, "that when the chips were down . . . any action required for success would be authorized [by Kennedy] rather than permit the enterprise to fail." Accustomed to dealing with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had fewer inhibitions about the uses of American power, Dulles and his CIA colleagues clearly thought that Kennedy too would eventually see the wisdom of their plan, Vandenbroucke writes. Given the leeway that the clandestine services had enjoyed during the 1950s, the assumption was not unreasonable—just wrong.

How the Israelis Fared in Lebanon

"Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon" by Richard A. Gabriel, in *Military Review* (Aug. 1984), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 66027.

The Israeli Army is one of the world's crack military outfits. Yet, during the 1982 Lebanon War, Israeli generals fell victim to a classic military malady: They were prepared only to "fight the last war."

The "last war" for the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, notes Gabriel, a Saint Anselm College political scientist and a U.S. Army Reserve officer. In 1973, as in previous wars, the Israelis confronted several hostile neighbors on largely open terrain. (Before 1982, the Israelis had not fought a major battle on Lebanese soil.) The 1973 experience confirmed existing IDF battlefield doctine: Rely on tank columns supported by infantry in armored personnel carriers to drive quickly and deeply into enemy territory.

No doctine could have been more ill suited to Lebanon, where Syrian troops were dug into mountain positions in the east, while Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) forces held the towns and cities in the west. In narrow mountain passes and city streets where there was little room for armor to maneuver, the IDF insisted on using tanks instead of infantry to spearhead its assaults. "It paid dearly in the number of ambushes that it suffered [and] it allowed the enemy the advantage of engaging or disengaging at a point of his choice." Forty of the 1,240 Israeli tanks mobilized for the invasion were destroyed by enemy fire; another 100 were temporarily knocked out of action.

The Syrian forces did most of the damage, effectively employing infantry and antitank missiles against the outmaneuvered Israelis. The IDF, Gabriel says, should have responded by sending its foot soldiers ahead to clear the way for the tank forces. The PLO's guerrilla tactics seemed to stymie the IDF: The Israelis resorted to artillery barrages and air strikes to counter guerrilla harassment.

The outcome of the conflict was never much in doubt. The IDF outnumbered its foes by 2 to 1 and was vastly better equipped and trained. But Israel's losses of 368 dead and 2,383 wounded during the invasion and the subsequent siege of Beirut were a heavy price to pay for a nation of only four million people.

Floating Outposts

"Military Necessities and Political Uncertainties" by Michael Vlahos, in *Worldview* (Aug. 1984), P.O. Box 1935, Marion, Ohio 43305.

In 1960, the United States boasted 150 major air and naval installations around the world. Today, it has just 30. And while declining numbers have made each remaining base more precious, hostility or instability in the host countries have made the status of each more precarious.

Some 480,000 U.S. military personnel are on active duty in Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and at sea. But the Stars and Stripes flies in only three Third World locales: the Philippines, Diego Garcia (in the Indian Ocean), and the Panama Canal Zone. Total U.S. manpower in these areas is 22,000. America has no permanent bases in the volatile Middle East. And U.S. forces are scheduled to withdraw from the Canal Zone in the year 2000. The Philippines could well become inhospitable if President Ferdinand Marcos's beleaguered regime collapses.

Even in Greece and Spain, writes Vlahos, director of Security Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, it takes "seemingly interminable wranglings and elegant diplomatic choreography" to win renewal of the leases for U.S. bases. Host governments regularly hike the rent and impose limits on what can be done on their land (e.g., barring Israel-bound U.S. war materiel).

The United States needs secure, no-strings-attached military bases, and it needs to free itself of the necessity of striking deals with unstable or simply unsavory governments. "What the U.S. needs, in fact, is a cross between a ship and an island," Vlahos says. His unusual pro-