

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE


The truth in the case of the Soviet Union, Weiss says, is that its leadership is bent on creating a "socialist" international order. "What is the basis for believing that the Soviets will ever agree to limit or reduce the very military power they require to maintain and advance their national objectives?" Weiss sees only two conditions under which arms talks would make sense: if Moscow were to abandon its designs on other nations or if U.S. military power were to become so great that the Soviets had no choice but to bargain honestly. Neither condition is likely to be fulfilled soon. In the meantime, Weiss contends, arms control will remain a repository of "false and dangerous hopes."

*Remembering
The Bay of Pigs*

"The 'Confessions' of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs" by Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, in *Diplomatic History*, Dept. of History, 106 Dulles Hall, Ohio State Univ., Columbus, Ohio 43210.

The April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion by 1,500 U.S.-backed anti-Castro Cuban exiles was a fiasco that looms large in recent American history. Within days, every invader was either killed or captured.

In an editorial, the *New York Times* set the tone of future interpretations when it wrote that "basic and inexcusable miscalculations were made by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [which] presumably



Coming only three months after his inauguration, the Bay of Pigs failure was particularly embarrassing to President John F. Kennedy.

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gave poor advice to the White House and the State Department." But the recently opened papers of then CIA director Allen Dulles tell a somewhat different story, according to Vandenbroucke, a Brookings Institution researcher.

In an article that was never published, Dulles, who resigned shortly after the Bay of Pigs affair, maintained that he never assured President John F. Kennedy that the exiles would succeed, only that they had a "good fighting chance, and no more." Nor was there any CIA promise that the invasion would trigger an immediate popular anti-Castro uprising. Kennedy, Dulles complained, was only "half sold on the vital necessity of what he was doing [and was] surrounded by doubting Thomases." Moreover, the President steadily "whittled away" at the CIA's plan, fearful of unfavorable public reaction to a large-scale invasion, especially if its U.S. sponsorship were revealed.

To minimize publicity, Kennedy shifted the landing site from the coastal town of Trinidad to the more remote Bay of Pigs. What he did not seem to realize was that a quiet landing would cut the chances of sparking a popular uprising and that the Bay of Pigs, surrounded by swamps, offered little shelter for the exiles should the attack falter.

Dulles, not wanting to deepen Kennedy's doubts, chose not to disabuse him. "We felt convinced," he wrote, "that when the chips were down . . . any action required for success would be authorized [by Kennedy] rather than permit the enterprise to fail." Accustomed to dealing with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had fewer inhibitions about the uses of American power, Dulles and his CIA colleagues clearly thought that Kennedy too would eventually see the wisdom of their plan, Vandenbroucke writes. Given the leeway that the clandestine services had enjoyed during the 1950s, the assumption was not unreasonable—just wrong.

How the Israelis Fared in Lebanon

"Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon" by Richard A. Gabriel, in *Military Review* (Aug. 1984), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 66027.

The Israeli Army is one of the world's crack military outfits. Yet, during the 1982 Lebanon War, Israeli generals fell victim to a classic military malady: They were prepared only to "fight the last war."

The "last war" for the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, notes Gabriel, a Saint Anselm College political scientist and a U.S. Army Reserve officer. In 1973, as in previous wars, the Israelis confronted several hostile neighbors on largely open terrain. (Before 1982, the Israelis had not fought a major battle on Lebanese soil.) The 1973 experience confirmed existing IDF battlefield doctrine: Rely on tank columns supported by infantry in armored personnel carriers to drive quickly and deeply into enemy territory.

No doctrine could have been more ill suited to Lebanon, where Syrian troops were dug into mountain positions in the east, while Palestine