
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

mine a presidential preference." Far more important than paid TV time are candidates' day-to-day performances on the stump under the scrutiny of local print and TV journalists and in such forums as televised debates and talk shows.

Why, then, do candidates spend so much time and energy raising money? One reason, suggests Robinson, is that, in the eyes of the all-important reporters and pundits, "raising and spending money has become a bizarre test of the seriousness of a candidacy."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Up in Arms

"The Case against Arms Control" by Seymour Weiss, in *Commentary* (Nov. 1984), 165 East 65th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Most Americans believe that accords with the Soviets on nuclear arms control are, in general, good and necessary. Weiss, a retired U.S. diplomat, emphatically disagrees.

"Just what evidence exists," he asks, "that recent nuclear arms limitations agreements with the USSR have actually contributed to U.S. security?" In his view, none. The United States enjoyed clear nuclear superiority over the Soviets during the 1960s; today, the Soviets are ahead "both in fact and in the perception of most of the world."

Agreements such as the 1972 SALT I pact and the (never ratified) 1979 SALT II agreement required virtually no force reductions by either side but established upper limits on expansion. Moscow built as many missiles as it was allowed (and more, if allegations of its treaty violations are true); the United States failed to keep pace. The relaxed attitudes bred in Washington by arms agreements made it hard to win congressional funding for new U.S. weapons. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown put it, "When we build, they build; when we cut, they build."

Does not arms control at least save money? Not really, Weiss argues. He points to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ban on all but limited defenses against nuclear missiles did spare the United States the immediate expense of installing an ABM system that would have cost \$10 billion or more. But today Washington faces the prospect of spending many times that sum to build the MX missile, needed to reduce U.S. vulnerability to a Soviet first strike.

Then perhaps just talking with the Kremlin leadership would be worthwhile? Wrong again, writes Weiss. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain met many times with Adolph Hitler, "but proximity did not breed a general comprehension of reality. Conversely, Winston Churchill required no intimate contact to perceive the truth."

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
The truth in the case of the Soviet Union, Weiss says, is that its leadership is bent on creating a "socialist" international order. "What is the basis for believing that the Soviets will ever agree to limit or reduce the very military power they require to maintain and advance their national objectives?" Weiss sees only two conditions under which arms talks would make sense: if Moscow were to abandon its designs on other nations or if U.S. military power were to become so great that the Soviets had no choice but to bargain honestly. Neither condition is likely to be fulfilled soon. In the meantime, Weiss contends, arms control will remain a repository of "false and dangerous hopes."

*Remembering
The Bay of Pigs*

"The 'Confessions' of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs" by Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, in *Diplomatic History*, Dept. of History, 106 Dulles Hall, Ohio State Univ., Columbus, Ohio 43210.

The April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion by 1,500 U.S.-backed anti-Castro Cuban exiles was a fiasco that looms large in recent American history. Within days, every invader was either killed or captured.

In an editorial, the *New York Times* set the tone of future interpretations when it wrote that "basic and inexcusable miscalculations were made by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [which] presumably



Coming only three months after his inauguration, the Bay of Pigs failure was particularly embarrassing to President John F. Kennedy.