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the specialists—scientists, military men, civilian advisers—who have played a role in the development of U.S. strategic policy during the nuclear age. Thinking about the unthinkable are, according to Herken, two broad groups: One is represented by military historian Bernard Brodie, who, as early as 1946, declared that the “ultimate weapon” left the U.S. military establishment with “no other useful purpose” than the prevention of war with the Soviet Union. The other is epitomized by presidential adviser Paul Nitze: Standing in the rubble of Hiroshima, he foresaw the possibility of future nuclear wars in which one side might emerge “victorious.” Brodie and Nitze, of course, are only two of the men who have variously argued over U.S. nuclear strategy since Harry Truman’s day. Herken describes the strategists’ institutional habitats—among them the Pentagon, the Rand Corporation, and the Hudson Institute—and their often macabre jargon: city-busting, the Sunday Punch, fail-safe, MAD, Peacemaker, and “sunshine unit” (for unit of radiation). In the end, White House nuclear arms policies often owe more to political considerations than to all the diagrams, charts, and top-secret reports. In 1961, though fearing an arms race, President John F. Kennedy bowed to pressure from the military and Congress and proposed to build 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Herken names no villains, but his chronicle echoes Lord Salisbury’s warning that “you should never trust in experts.”

**PRETORIA’S  
PRAETORIANS:  
Civil-Military Relations  
in South Africa**  
by Philip H. Frankel  
Cambridge, 1984  
215 pp. \$44.50

During the late 1940s, South Africa was an “esteemed member of the international community, a prime mover behind the Charter of the United Nations.” Today, after more than 35 years of National Party rule, marked most dramatically by its policy of institutionalized racism (apartheid), South Africa has become a “pariah state,” routinely denounced in the UN Assembly it once fostered. One striking result of international isolation and internal racial tensions has been the increased militarization of South African society. Frankel,

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a political scientist at the University of Witwatersrand, describes the ties between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the civilian sector—the prime minister, the bureaucracy, and the business community. Underlying this relationship, Frankel explains, is the “total strategy,” a counter-revolutionary national development plan conceived by the French general André Beaufre in response to his country’s experiences in Algeria and Indochina. Studied by all officers at South Africa’s Joint Defence College, the strategy stresses the coordination of nonmilitary (i.e., industrial, scientific, technical) and military resources. It also calls for nationwide psychological mobilization, literally a “total” effort, to destroy the will of any adversary. For their part, civilian leaders have backed increased defense expenditures (which are more than 10 times greater today than they were 12 years ago) and have encouraged the SADF to participate in industrial policy-making, education (through cadet programs in white schools), the media, and police activities. Thanks to such affinities, it is highly unlikely, Frankel concludes, that the Defence Force will ever emulate Third World military establishments, overthrowing the civilian government to install one of its own men. Ironically, this also means that the military leaders will not likely become a force for moderation—although, with 40 percent of their personnel “non-white,” they could well lead the way in reducing racial inequalities.

*Arts & Letters*

**CAHIERS DU CINEMA**  
**Vol. 1, The 1950s:**  
**Neo-Realism,**  
**Hollywood, New Wave**  
 edited by Jim Hillier  
 Harvard, 1985  
 305 pp. \$22.50

If the names of the contributors to this renowned film magazine read like a roster of the great French directors of the 1960s, it is no coincidence. During the 1950s, François Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, and Eric Rohmer, among others, used the pages of the *Cahiers* as a forum for articulating their cinematic principles and prejudices. Their essays and