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ping inaccurate and even grotesque beards onto beardless Lincoln portraits." Interestingly, while Lincoln was Commander-in-Chief of the Union forces during the American Civil War, he was seldom pictured in the company of military men. The President's 1863 Emancipation Proclamation ignited a new round of commentary-cum-prints.

After Lincoln's assassination in 1865, he suddenly seemed largely beyond politics. Printmakers began depicting him in sentimental family scenes, the authors note, "though the presidency was destructive to his domestic happiness, and though he never posed with his wife or family." In Victorian America, the authors observe, "the home was above criticism, and so at last was Lincoln."

The Mirage of Cabinet Government

"The Cabinet in the American Presidency, 1789-1984" by R. Gordon Hoxie, in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Spring 1984), Center for the Study of the Presidency, 208 East 75th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Nearly every U.S. president solemnly promises at the beginning of his first term that he will rely heavily on his cabinet. Yet the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of a cabinet; the institution has varied in function and importance according to the desires of each chief executive.

After his inauguration in April 1789, George Washington asked Congress to create three departments—State, Treasury, and War—whose secretaries he regarded as no more than "assistants." (Today there are 13 departments.) According to Hoxie, who heads the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the secretaries became an advisory cabinet largely by default: It quickly became apparent that the president would not be able to turn to either the Supreme Court or Congress for counsel. (When Washington went to the Senate floor in August 1789 to seek advice, he received a chilly welcome. Washington left "with sullen dignity," one senator recalled.)

Washington's cabinet was powerful, largely because of the presence of two energetic personalities, Thomas Jefferson at the State Department and Alexander Hamilton at the Treasury. But when Jefferson won the Presidency in 1800, memories of his running feud with Hamilton dimmed his enthusiasm for cabinet government. The institution went into decline.

Thereafter, the cabinet's importance varied with circumstance and the president's needs. Andrew Jackson, who occupied the White House from 1829 to 1837, was the first President to call regularly on the advice of a group of outsiders, his "Kitchen Cabinet." (Grover Cleveland had his "Fishing Cabinet," Franklin Roosevelt his "Brains Trust.")

Especially since the creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, the White House staff has been the cabinet's chief rival for the president's ear. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the chief practitioner of cabinet government in recent times, but he also greatly strengthened the National Security Council, which now competes with the Department of State for influence in the Oval Office.

Gerald Ford restored the cabinet to prominence. Watergate, he said,

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"was made possible by a strong chief of staff and ambitious White House aides who were more powerful than members of the Cabinet." While it has been argued that the American cabinet system is obsolete, Hoxie believes that its very adaptability argues for its survival.

Business and Labor Look at Moscow

"Business, Labor, and the Anti-communist Struggle" by Arch Puddington, in *National Review* (Jan. 27, 1984), 150 East 35th St., New York, N.Y. 10016.

It is no surprise when Big Business and Big Labor wind up on opposite sides of the political fence. But in foreign policy, the two groups defy all expectations: Corporate leaders favor détente with the Soviet "workers' state." Most labor unions oppose it.

Puddington, executive director of the League for Industrial Democracy, says that Big Business's attitude is nothing new. A 1944 opinion survey by *Fortune* found business leaders to be the "most friendly" toward the USSR of all American groups.

Big Business has an obvious economic interest in nurturing East-West trade. Toward that end, key corporate executives have balked at U.S. economic sanctions against Moscow after the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and at Reagan administration plans to block construction of the Soviet natural-gas pipeline to Western Europe. In 1982, they insisted that Poland be spared a damaging declaration that it had defaulted on loans from the West. (U.S. exports to the Soviet Union, mostly wheat, totaled \$2 billion in 1982; Western Europe's exports were \$8.8 billion.) But many businessmen also argue that cutting trade with the Soviet bloc reduces Washington's leverage in Moscow, or that it is ineffective because the Soviets buy the goods elsewhere.

Often, Puddington believes, businessmen are politically naive; they have "little understanding of the [communist] threat to the capitalist system and its attendant freedoms." Citibank executive Thomas C. Theobald asked during the Polish crisis, "Who knows what political system works best? All we can ask is: Can they pay their bills?"

American labor unions are far more skeptical about dealings with the Soviet Union. As a result of the struggle with American Communists for control of many unions during the 1930s, labor leaders are staunchly anticommunist. Unlike its Western European counterparts, the 13.8-million strong American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) regularly supports economic sanctions against the Soviets.

Yet the AFL-CIO is under increasing pressure from the Left to abandon its anticommunist policy because it stands in the way of a closer alliance with environmentalists, nuclear freeze advocates, and other dovish elements of the Democratic Party. Puddington notes that "nothing in the nature of trade unionism" demands an anticommunist stance. It is possible, he says, that organized labor could abandon "raw common sense" and support Big Business in fulfilling the prophecy that capitalists will sell Russia the rope with which to hang themselves.