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"Star Wars" speech last year) *after* disarmament was complete. Schell also favors limitations on conventional arms designed to insure East-West balance while allowing for strong defenses.

At least one nation, India, already practices "weaponless deterrence," Schell says. Indians do not exercise their capability to build nuclear arms, seeming to "count it sufficient that their adversaries know that they *can* build the weapons if they want to." In the game of chess, he notes, "when skilled players reach a certain point in the play they are able to see that, no matter what further moves are made, the outcome is determined, and they end the game without going through the motions." The United States and the Soviet Union, Schell writes, have reached the same point with nuclear deterrence. Except that armed deterrence leads to a constant arms race and yields no winners.

Winning in El Salvador

"How to Win in El Salvador" by Alvin H. Bernstein and John D. Wagelstein, in *Policy Review* (Winter 1984), The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

A negotiated settlement or a long, inconclusive war seem today to be the only options available to the U.S.-backed government of El Salvador. But Bernstein and Wagelstein, U.S. Naval War College professor and former commander of the 55 U.S. military advisers in El Salvador, respectively, have a plan to help the Salvadoran government win.

The United States, they argue, should "help the Salvadorans learn from our mistakes" in Vietnam. The 40,000-man army faces just 6,000-8,000 Marxist guerrillas. Yet up to 80 percent of the Salvadoran troops are tied down guarding vital dams, bridges, and power plants. U.S. military advisers are now training Salvadoran reconnaissance squads to seek out hidden guerrilla base camps. (The authors insist that most popular support for the guerrillas is limited to two of El Salvador's 14 provinces. They believe that a better-disciplined army could enlist the *campesinos* in intelligence-gathering.) Also needed are 350-man "hunter battalions," one in each province, to act quickly on the reconnaissance squads' reports by attacking rebel bases and keeping the guerrillas on the run.

The well-trained officer corps on which this strategy depends has not emerged from the yearly crop of 25-35 Salvadoran military academy graduates, an ineffective and "socially exclusive" lot. Some 1,000 Salvadoran cadets have passed through a U.S. Army training program at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the past two years. More will be needed. Improved basic equipment—M-16 rifles, rot-resistant boots, communications gear—is also essential. To save lives and lift battlefield morale, Washington should provide more medical supplies and evacuation helicopters. In South Vietnam, only one of every 10 wounded Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers died; the mortality rate in El Salvador is one of three.

Two self-inflicted curbs must be ended, the authors insist: Congress must rescind its 1980 ban against using U.S. economic aid to finance

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land reform and its 1974 prohibition against aid to (and hence U.S. influence over) local police forces. Both moves could ultimately help the U.S. aid generate more popular support for the El Salvador regime.

The price tag for the authors' program is \$100 million annually in U.S. military aid, probably for several years. (Today's U.S. arms assistance totals \$65 million, economic support \$196 million.)

Anti-Western guerrillas have been beaten before—in Venezuela, Greece, the Philippines—and Bernstein and Wagelstein insist that, with firm U.S. backing, they can be beaten in El Salvador.

Terrorism on The Rise

"The Wolves Among Us: Thoughts on the Past Eighteen Months and Thoughts on the Future" by Neil C. Livingstone, in *World Affairs* (Summer 1983), 4000 Albe-marle St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

In 1983, terrorist attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and on the U.S. Capitol stunned Americans. More shocks are almost certainly in store, as terrorists around the world step up their campaigns.

Ironically, one of terrorism's major defeats—Israel's 1982 drive into Lebanon, which dislodged the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut—is also contributing to its spread. Terrorists from at least 20 groups, from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to the Japanese Red Army (JRA), were driven from PLO training camps. They now form a dangerous "terrorist diaspora," says Livingstone, a Washington, D.C., defense consultant. JRA exiles, for example, were responsible for a wave of anti-Semitic attacks in Italy last year. Western intelligence services' well-developed information networks in Beirut are now useless, so it will be harder to keep tabs on such groups.

Other trends are also ominous. "Contemporary terrorist groups are smaller, more numerous, more tightly organized, and better trained than in the past," Livingstone writes, and thus harder to stop. Virtually all of the groups now have governmental sponsors, chiefly the Soviet Union, Libya, and Cuba. (However, even the Soviets have not escaped attack. In Mozambique, two Russian geologists were killed and 24 of their countrymen kidnapped by antigovernment guerrillas last year.)

Livingstone worries that to capture the attention of a public inured to violence, terrorists may resort to increasingly dramatic acts. Documents captured by the Israelis in Lebanon in 1982, for example, indicate that Moscow has trained some PLO members in the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Latin America may replace the Middle East and Western Europe as the focus of terrorism in the years ahead. Peru, Chile, and Colombia already suffer frequent attacks, along with the nations of Central America. Mexico, with its ailing economy, pervasive government corruption, large population of political exiles from other Latin nations, and one-party government, may not be immune to political violence.

Nor is the United States out of harm's way, Livingstone warns. One natural target: the summer Olympic games in Los Angeles.