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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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could be in orbit within 10 years, though at great cost.

Such weapons are banned by the 1972 ABM (antiballistic missile) treaty. But Jastrow contends that Moscow has repeatedly violated the pact. Last summer, for example, U.S. spy satellites discovered a sophisticated radar complex located near the Soviets' Siberian ICBM fields. The only possible use for the radar is to direct antimissile rockets. Other evidence suggests that Moscow has tested such ABMs.

Jastrow envisions a three-tier defense of lasers and "mini-missiles." If each layer had a 10-percent "leakage rate," only one Soviet warhead in 1,000 would reach its military target—not enough to disarm U.S. forces. (The Soviets now have 4,560 nuclear warheads.) Handing over the technology to the Soviets would give both sides a secure defense—and little practical use for their vast atomic arsenals.

Nuclear weapons will never disappear entirely, in Jastrow's view. But he believes that virtually impregnable defenses may eventually bring a day when nuclear weapons are outmoded and are taken off the firing line to be stockpiled against an unlikely suicide attack.

## *How to Ban the Bomb*

"Reflections (Nuclear Arms)" by Jonathan Schell, in *The New Yorker* (Jan. 2 & 9, 1984), 25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Jonathan Schell's best-selling critique of the arms race, *The Fate of the Earth* (1982), made him a hero of the antinuclear movement. Yet, as both Schell's friends and foes observed, the *New Yorker* writer did not offer any way out of the world's nuclear predicament.

This is Schell's answer. Two standard antinuclear goals—unilateral disarmament and world government—he dismisses as impractical and possibly dangerous. But he contends that a third often denigrated alternative, an agreement among the world's nuclear powers to abolish nuclear weapons, could work.

The usual objection to complete disarmament is that while atomic weapons can be destroyed, the knowledge of how to build them cannot. Eventually, the temptation for one nation to rearm in secret to blackmail or conquer its rivals would be overwhelming.

But Schell proposes to use that imperishable knowledge to establish "weaponless deterrence." While each nation would disarm (in stages), each would retain just enough laboratories, factories, and other facilities to enable it to build new warheads within a few weeks. (Missiles and bombers would not be banned.) The *capacity* of their rivals to rebuild nuclear weapons, Schell argues, "would deter nations from rebuilding them and then using them, just as in our present, nuclear-armed world possession of the weapons themselves deters nations from using them."

As insurance against cheating, Schell would require regular inspections of all weapons production sites. Far more important, all nations would be permitted to build unlimited antinuclear defenses (including the space-based antimissile lasers President Reagan proposed in his

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"Star Wars" speech last year) *after* disarmament was complete. Schell also favors limitations on conventional arms designed to insure East-West balance while allowing for strong defenses.

At least one nation, India, already practices "weaponless deterrence," Schell says. Indians do not exercise their capability to build nuclear arms, seeming to "count it sufficient that their adversaries know that they *can* build the weapons if they want to." In the game of chess, he notes, "when skilled players reach a certain point in the play they are able to see that, no matter what further moves are made, the outcome is determined, and they end the game without going through the motions." The United States and the Soviet Union, Schell writes, have reached the same point with nuclear deterrence. Except that armed deterrence leads to a constant arms race and yields no winners.

### *Winning in El Salvador*

"How to Win in El Salvador" by Alvin H. Bernstein and John D. Wagelstein, in *Policy Review* (Winter 1984), The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

A negotiated settlement or a long, inconclusive war seem today to be the only options available to the U.S.-backed government of El Salvador. But Bernstein and Wagelstein, U.S. Naval War College professor and former commander of the 55 U.S. military advisers in El Salvador, respectively, have a plan to help the Salvadoran government win.

The United States, they argue, should "help the Salvadorans learn from our mistakes" in Vietnam. The 40,000-man army faces just 6,000-8,000 Marxist guerrillas. Yet up to 80 percent of the Salvadoran troops are tied down guarding vital dams, bridges, and power plants. U.S. military advisers are now training Salvadoran reconnaissance squads to seek out hidden guerrilla base camps. (The authors insist that most popular support for the guerrillas is limited to two of El Salvador's 14 provinces. They believe that a better-disciplined army could enlist the *campesinos* in intelligence-gathering.) Also needed are 350-man "hunter battalions," one in each province, to act quickly on the reconnaissance squads' reports by attacking rebel bases and keeping the guerrillas on the run.

The well-trained officer corps on which this strategy depends has not emerged from the yearly crop of 25-35 Salvadoran military academy graduates, an ineffective and "socially exclusive" lot. Some 1,000 Salvadoran cadets have passed through a U.S. Army training program at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the past two years. More will be needed. Improved basic equipment—M-16 rifles, rot-resistant boots, communications gear—is also essential. To save lives and lift battlefield morale, Washington should provide more medical supplies and evacuation helicopters. In South Vietnam, only one of every 10 wounded Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers died; the mortality rate in El Salvador is one of three.

Two self-inflicted curbs must be ended, the authors insist: Congress must rescind its 1980 ban against using U.S. economic aid to finance