complete freedom to reshape Japanese government and society. Nishi, happily, reaches beyond his stated subject, American-directed educational reforms, to analyze and evaluate the nature of that effort, particularly the imposition of a "no-war" constitution. "Unconditional democracy" summarizes the author's judgment that, while the goals of the U.S. occupation (1945–1952) were substantively correct, the means employed, outright dictation, posed many problems. One consequence, for example, of imposing a democratic constitution upon the defeated nation is that Americans continue to doubt the true strength of democracy in Japan.

Recounting his own experiences as a student in Japanese schools after the war, Nishi goes on to present an overview of the initial postsurrender reforms and of subsequent U.S. efforts to correct those reforms (e.g., the "Red Purge" of communists earlier "liberated" from jails; the reorganization of the armed forces despite constitutional prohibitions). Nishi concludes with the San Francisco Treaty of 1952, whereby the United States effectively enlisted Japan as an ally in the growing chill of the Cold War. In the course of his narrative, he touches on a number of topics that have previously been scanted. Notable among these were the efforts of Douglas MacArthur's aides to force the Japanese to rewrite their history texts (the aim: to "pacify" Japan's past) and to ban the Japanese language throughout the country and replace it with English. Ironically, occupation forces also played an important role in fostering the Japanese Teachers' Union, which has since become a radical anti-American political force.

The Japanese have adjusted well to the occupation reforms. They have become a great economic power, while remaining wholly dependent upon U.S. protection. America is obviously dissatisfied with this state of affairs. But before anything can change, the United States must recognize that it has placed the Japanese in a double-bind: Having imposed a "no-war" constitution upon Japan, it now insists that Japan play a greater defense role. Unless America comes to grips with this contradiction, the Japanese problem will continue to fester.

—Tetsuya Kataoka

C. WRIGHT MILLS:
An American Utopian
by Irving Louis Horowitz
Free Press, 1983
341 pp. $19

When C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* first appeared in 1956, it seemed to many readers to be a devastating critique of the political naiveté of most Americans—notably their faith in U.S. governmental institutions and processes as infallible guarantors of democracy. Analyzing the historical development of America's political establishment, Mills argued that the United States was run by a largely nonelected and unobserved network of politicians, businessmen, and soldiers. This elite held power because the broad populace was disorganized and ineffective.

The book's analysis was less than novel. In fact, such interpretations of

the defects of Western democracy were commonplace long before 1956 (and most were, like that of Mills, non-Marxist). Nevertheless, Mills's book went on to become the bible—often unread—of the New Left during the 1960s.

Mills's real importance, this biography shows, was not that he said such things but that he said them even though he was a member of the American academic community of sociologists—a supposedly value-neutral community, at least during the quiescent '50s. Mills (1916–1962) was a renegade, being, for one thing, a Texan, at a time when that state was more on the edge of American cultural and intellectual life than it is now. He also took unusual stands, including opposition to American involvement in World War II, apparently as an old-style isolationist.

Horowitz, himself a sociologist at Rutgers University, traces Mills's career from student days at the University of Texas on through his teaching years at the Universities of Wisconsin, Maryland, and Columbia. Interestingly, Horowitz reveals, American philosophers such as William James and John Dewey had an earlier and more enduring influence on Mills than did the European pantheon of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Mannheim. Mills had a considerable impact upon American Marxists, but despite certain affinities, he could never accept their mechanistic class analysis of American society. His political outlook, radical and populist in the American tradition, made him distrustful of European-style leftism and Marxism, both of which, in his view, placed excessive faith in an intellectual elite and in revolutionary change.

Horowitz describes Mills as a "utopian," using the word idiosyncratically to mean someone who is concerned not so much with designing the perfect political system as with engaging in direct action to achieve reform. During his last years, from around 1957 until his death in 1962, he abandoned academic analysis and began pamphleteering against American foreign policy (particularly Washington's preoccupation with the Soviet threat in the Third World) and for the causes of the New Left. Yet, perhaps his most successful work of these years was his popular and devastating appraisal of the pretentiousness and emptiness of contemporary research in sociology, *The Sociological Imagination* (1959).

I would argue that Mills was a kind of 20th-century Tom Paine who attempted to devise a style of social analysis that was consistently "antiestablishment" in tone. At the very least, he succeeded in stirring up his academic peers. Sociologist Edward Shils, reviewing *The Sociological Imagination*, described Mills as a "burly cowpuncher" from the provinces, dealing with matters far beyond his intellectual grasp. Mills ignored this heavily *ad hominem* attack. Oddly enough, Horowitz sees Mills's refusal to reply as marking his "final disaffiliation from professionalism in sociology." In fact, it seems to have been a very professional thing to do.

—Tom Garvin