political scientist at Nigeria's University of Ife.

Qaddafi's ideological principles, outlined in his *Green Book*, justify Libya's adventurism in the name of Arab-Islamic unity. He rejects capitalism as exploitative and communism as godless, and he regards today's individual Arab nations as relics of Western colonialism. Many of Qaddafi's aggressive moves since coming to power in 1969—backing coup attempts and rebellions in Niger, Upper Volta, Gambia, Ghana, and, most recently, Chad—can be seen in part as attempts to aid Muslim minorities in these countries and to build a Greater Islamic State.

The search for new energy resources also plays a role in Qaddafi's foreign ventures. While Libya (pop. three million) remains one of the world's major oil suppliers and has, as a result, the highest per capita annual income in Africa ($6,800), its wells could begin running dry in as little as 10–15 years. Already, the drop in world oil prices has forced Tripoli to curtail some domestic development projects.

Moreover, Qaddafi's adventures abroad divert attention from domestic troubles. While most Libyans live comfortably thanks to the nation's oil revenues, opposition to the dictator's iron rule is considerable. In 1980, more than 2,000 Libyans were arrested for political "crimes," and 800 were executed. Over the years, Qaddafi has quashed several attempted army coups.

While the Libyan leader has close ties to Moscow—he supported its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan—it would be a mistake, warns Ogunbadejo, to view him purely as a Soviet proxy. The Soviets have sold him a $13 billion arsenal of advanced weapons, too much for Libya's tiny 55,000-man army. Half the arms remain in packing crates or lie in the desert. Moscow has no wish to alienate Qaddafi's neighbors (Chad, Egypt, Niger) by urging him to pursue his grand designs.

What should the United States do? The downing of two Libyan jet fighters over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 by U.S. Navy interceptors, Ogunbadejo says, merely stirred up anti-Americanism among Qaddafi's neighbors. Rather than confront the Libyan dictator directly, Washington should help those neighbors ease the poverty that makes them ripe for Libyan-backed domestic subversion.

An Unlikely Japanese Hero

"Japan's Crusader Against Bureaucratic Waste" by Ezra Vogel, in *Asia* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), P.O. Box 1308-A, Fort Lee, N.J. 07024.

What would you get if you rolled Lee Iacocca, Abraham Lincoln, and Ronald Reagan all into one? If you asked the average Japanese, he might answer: Toshio Doko.

The 86-year-old Doko is the pre-eminent critic of Japanese affluence and Big Government, reports Vogel, author of *Japan as Number One* (1979). His life story—the subject last year of a Japanese television documentary—is a legend among his countrymen. Born a peasant, trained as an engineer, Doko rose through the ranks to become president of the

OTHER NATIONS

Toshio Doko by Asahi Shimbun *newspaper cartoonist Shoji Yamafuji.*

giant Toshiba Electric Corporation in 1966. Eight years later, he took the helm of Keidanren, a powerful national business organization, becoming "'prime minister' of the business community," says Vogel.

Yet, Doko's personal life is austere. He rises at four every morning to pray. The simple wood-frame house he has lived in for 60 years lacks central heating. He allowed no electric appliances in his home until his Toshiba colleagues convinced him that it hurt the company's public image. According to Vogel, Doko is "easily the most respected public figure in Japan."

Doko worries that affluence and generous public welfare programs are sapping the Japanese will to work and promoting decadence. He is a harsh critic of Tokyo's taxing and spending policies (government at all levels consumes 35 percent of Japan's gross national product, 21 percent of the United States') and a stout defender of free enterprise. "If we go on like this," he says, "Japan will be a wreck in the 21st century."

In 1981, Doko was put in a position to make his prescriptions stick. Named by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki to head the government's Administration Reform Commission, he was given a broad mandate to suggest spending cuts. Among the Commission's recommendations, issued last March: Sell off the national railway, telephone, and tobacco companies, trim the government payroll.

Those proposals are now being debated by the Japanese Diet (parliament), where Doko's influence is considerable. In 1982, Tokyo's expenditures fell for the first time since World War II. Suzuki stepped down the same year, in part because he realized that he could not keep his public pledge to Doko to balance the budget by 1985.

The current Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, is not bound by such a promise. But nobody in Japan was surprised that Nakasone's first official visitor after he took office was Toshio Doko.

A Soviet Oil Squeeze?

"Is There an Energy Crisis in the Soviet Union?" by Jonathan Kamin, in *East European Quarterly* (Sept. 1983), 1200 University Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80309.

The Soviet Union possesses 59 percent of the world's known reserves of coal, 30 percent of all natural gas. It pumps more oil (12.1 million barrels per day) than any other nation. Yet it may be on the brink of a major energy crisis.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that Soviet oil output will drop to 10 million barrels daily by 1985. Mismanagement explains some of Moscow's woes, writes Kamin, a Northwestern University researcher. Soviet planners' pursuit of short-term gains over long-term potential is now paying grim dividends. To speed extraction, for example, the Soviets pump water under high pressure into oil wells. At first, the wells yield more oil, but gradually water dilutes the flow and cuts productivity. (The average Soviet well now pumps 50 percent water.)

The Soviets would have to boost output in oil-rich Siberia by 70 percent during the next few years to compensate for the loss of production in such wells. But in a region where the ground can freeze a mile deep in winter, development is costly and total success unlikely. To make up for the shortfall, Soviet planners hope to generate 20–25 percent of the nation's electricity from nuclear power by 1990, compared with six percent today, and to accelerate coal production. Kamin thinks their targets are unrealistic.

Could conservation ease the Soviet oil squeeze? There will be no relatively painless cuts in gasoline consumption as there were in the United States after 1974. Since there is only one car for every 42 people, autos are not big consumers. Industry, which accounts for 59 percent of Soviet energy use, could conserve by investing in energy-efficient machinery, but Moscow has to spend most of its available cash on expanding oil, gas, and coal production. Given autonomy, individual factory managers could cut energy use, but liberalization is anathema to Moscow.

The only bright spot for Moscow appears to be natural gas, which promises to replace oil as the nation's chief energy source by 1990. Gas exports to Western Europe will probably bring in $1.6 billion annually in hard currency through the year 2000, allowing the Soviets to buy much-needed Western energy technology.

Even so, Kamin believes, the Soviets face hard times. So do their Eastern European clients, who rely on the Soviet Union for much of their fuel. Barring an unlikely about-face in Moscow on economic reform, massive investments will be needed in the Siberian oil fields—money that will come out of the pockets of Soviet workers.