was Japan. The United States, Italy, and Canada were the only Western industrial nations to record an increase (though slight) in *manufacturing* jobs during the decade.

Schultze adds that an attention-grabbing influx of imported cars, TVs, and stereos has obscured more significant trends: U.S. exports of manufactured goods doubled during the 1970s; "high-tech" exports—computers, plastics, and aircraft—exceeded imports by $40 billion in 1979.

Industrial policy's promoters are wrong not only about the United States, Schultze says, but about Japan as well. They attribute Japan's postwar economic "miracle" to deft coordination of industry by Tokyo's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). But if that is so, Schultze says, MITI has lost its touch: Japan's gross national product grew at a vigorous 9.9 percent annual rate from 1960 to 1973 but has averaged only 3.5 percent since.

In fact, writes Schultze, astute Japanese businessmen can claim most of the credit for their country's success. They had great advantages: a huge pool of personal and business savings (30–35 percent of the Japanese GNP) to invest and, because they were playing "catch-up" with the United States, no need to buy untested manufacturing equipment or develop speculative products. Once Japan caught up during the 1970s, it no longer enjoyed these advantages and growth slowed.

MITI may have helped the Japanese somewhat (though it made some mistakes, such as trying to discourage the Honda company from entering the car business), but an American-style MITI wouldn't work at all, Schultze believes. American government, with its emphasis on fairness rather than efficiency, tends to spread money among all claimants. The U.S. Economic Development Administration, for example, was created in 1965 to revitalize "depressed areas" of the United States: Under EDA rules, 80 percent of the counties in the nation qualify for assistance.

An American MITI would become a giant pork barrel, Schultze fears. "We have enough real problems," he says, "without creating new ones."

OPEC Lives

"The OPEC Multiplier" by Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1983), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The choke-hold that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) once had on the Western industrialized nations has eased since 1980, but it could tighten again.

Mossavar-Rahmani, a former Iranian delegate to OPEC (1977–78) now at Harvard, writes that the oil cartel's fortunes have reached low ebb. Prices dropped from $35 or more per barrel in 1981 to $28 in late 1983. OPEC's output fell 16 percent in 1981, 16.8 percent in 1982, and averaged 16 million barrels per day (MBD) during the first half of 1983, its lowest level since 1966. These declines far exceed the world's largely recession-induced cuts in energy consumption since 1980, which have averaged less than one percent annually.

Therein lies a clue to OPEC's future, says Mossavar-Rahmani. Small movements in energy use—up or down—have disproportionate effects on OPEC because the cartel, which pumps half of the world's oil, bears the brunt of any change in consumption. When U.S. energy demand drops, for example, imported oil is the first energy source to lose customers. But when consumption rises and usable domestic supplies —oil, natural gas—are exhausted, domestic users must look overseas to meet all their new needs. Thus, world energy consumption increased by 5.2 percent in 1973, the year before the first OPEC "price shock," but OPEC's output grew by 14.4 percent. That, says the author, is the "OPEC multiplier."

Conservation, the development of new oilfields in Mexico, Alaska's Prudhoe Bay, and Western Europe's North Sea, and wider use of coal, natural gas, and other fuels may mute the multiplier's effects. But as the world economy revives, Mossavar-Rahmani says, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan will have to start importing more oil. By 1987, the cartel could be pumping oil at its peak capacity of 31 MBD —and that would put OPEC back in the driver's seat again.

SOCIETY

Going to College May Get Easier

"Higher Education's Future" by Herbert L. Smith, in *American Demographics* (Sept. 1983), P.O. Box 68, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.

As the tail end of the Baby-Boom generation nears its 30s, U.S. college presidents are bracing themselves for declining enrollments and years of financial belt-tightening. But things may not turn out all that badly, according to Smith, an Indiana University sociologist.

On the face of it, he concedes, the future for American institutions of higher learning looks bleak. Children born in 1957, the peak year of the Baby Boom, are now past their college years. And the pool of potential students will shrink further: Whereas there were some nine million American men aged 18–21 in 1980, there will be only eight million in 1985, and seven million in 1990.

But that is not the whole story, writes Smith. Some countervailing trends suggest a happier scenario. For one thing, more and more women are going to college. Enrollment among women aged 20–21 jumped from only 11 percent in 1959 to 30 percent in 1981.

Moreover, despite rising tuition fees, most parents will find it easier to pay for their children's college education in the future. One reason: Families are getting smaller. The students of the 1970s and early '80s came from families with an average of three children; during the next decade, college-age youngsters will come from families with only two offspring. Also, those children will be spaced further apart than those