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No one doubts its ability to "destabilize" the entire subcontinent.

But to what end? The South Africans would doubtless prefer a buffer of weak black states to the north and may hope for a full-scale "capitalist counterrevolution" against the self-styled Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. But success could spell disaster: Abetting rebellion is relatively easy; propping up new client regimes against rebels would prove too costly even for Pretoria.

South Africa can throw its weight about the subcontinent; it cannot rule it. If it tries, Jenkins predicts, "its achievement will be anarchy."

A False Crisis In Russia?

"Infant Mortality Trends in the Soviet Union" by Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, in *Population and Development Review* (June 1983), The Population Council, 1 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

To some specialists, the sudden jump in the recorded number of infant deaths in the Soviet Union during the early 1970s was a sign of drastic deterioration in the quality of Soviet life [see "A Different Crisis," by Murray Feshbach, *WQ*, Winter 1981].

Between 1971 and 1974 (the last year Moscow published official data on the subject), the number of Soviet babies dying before their first birthday rose by five deaths per thousand births, to 27.9, reversing a 25-year-long decline. But Grupp and Jones, analysts with the U.S. Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies, respectively, note that most of the upsurge occurred in the nation's five Moslem republics. There, they contend, an improvement in data collection produced the illusion of a massive increase in infant deaths.

In Moslem Tadzhikistan, for example, registered infant mortality doubled between 1971 and '74, while European Russia recorded a modest increase of 2.3 deaths per thousand births.

Vital statistics for the Moslem south have never been reliable. Data on infant mortality were not even collected there before the late 1930s. As late as the 1960s, official infant birth and death statistics relied on the reports of parents, not hospital or other medical records. Indeed, in some rural areas, more than half of all children were born at home.

The wider use of computers and a 1969 law that shifted responsibility for record-keeping from the republics to Moscow led to more accurate counts, the authors contend, spurring the 1971-1974 statistical increase.

Even as records showed more Soviet infants dying, other health indicators in the Moslem republics—maternal mortality, the ratio of pediatricians to children, and incidence of childhood disease—all showed improvement. In Tadzhikistan, for example, the 100 percent increase in reported infant deaths coincided with a 19 percent decline in stillbirths and a 29 percent drop in the number of women dying in childbirth.

Grupp and Jones believe that infant mortality in the Moslem republics actually declined during 1971-74, and has continued to fall. And

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they speculate that, thanks to improvements in health care spurred by the shock of the early 1970s' statistics, the rising rates in European Russia have leveled off, and perhaps reversed. At the very least, they write, the Soviet Union during the 1970s suffered nothing like the "epidemic of infant deaths depicted in . . . the Western popular press."

Iberia's Fragile Democracies

"The Emergence of Democracy in Spain and Portugal" by Kenneth Maxwell, in *Orbis* (Spring 1983), Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

During the 1970s, decades-old dictatorships in Spain and Portugal gave way to democracy. But it is too early to cheer, warns Maxwell, a Columbia University historian. Both governments are fragile, and the full integration of the countries into the rest of Western Europe has yet to occur.

The two countries entered the 1970s under regimes linked philosophically to fascism. This unsavory legacy had long troubled the Western democracies, despite Portugal's role as a founding member of NATO and growing trade between the two and Europe during the 1960s.

Portugal's refusal to free her African colonies also drew criticism from the West. Finally, frustration over prolonged wars in Mozambique and Angola radicalized much of the Portuguese army; and in 1974, junior officers toppled strongman Marcello Caetano. The new regime moved rapidly leftward until national elections in 1976 temporarily put a middle-of-the-road coalition in power.

Spain's transition was more systematic. After Generalissimo Francisco Franco's death in 1975, his hand-picked successor, King Don Juan Carlos, guided his countrymen toward parliamentary elections in 1977. Carlos deftly used his prestige to stave off an attempted army coup in 1981, but oldline army generals remain a threat.

In both countries, Left and Right now seem to be gaining at the expense of the moderate center. Portugal's left-wing army officers are still active, drawing support from poor southern peasants, and the industrialized north remains a bastion of conservatism. Lisbon has seen 15 governments in the last nine years. In Spain's 1982 elections, the once-dominant Union of the Democratic Center lost ground to both the winning Socialist Workers' Party and the right-wing Popular Alliance.

Maxwell sees more trouble ahead. Lisbon is negotiating a new financial bail-out agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which will entail unpopular cuts in social programs. Spain's new Socialist Premier, Felipe Gonzalez, plans to cut military manpower from 300,000 to 160,000 and to reduce the officer corps by one-quarter. Politically, both are "tricky and potentially dangerous moves," warns Maxwell.

Stronger ties with the West could strengthen the Iberian democracies. But it may be premature to discard the snide dictum of 19th-century French diplomat Talleyrand: "*Europe begins at the Pyrenees.*"