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Kraft, a syndicated columnist, many senior Saudi officials welcome a breather after a decade of helter-skelter modernization.

Riyadh's revenues from oil and other sources are down this year from \$90 billion to \$70 billion. The resulting cuts in public works spending have hurt Saudi construction companies. But the Saudi government's savings will ease the pain; some \$10 billion will be withdrawn from foreign banks to make up the deficit. No fiscal crisis looms.

Meanwhile, the Western-educated "technocrats" in the Saudi cabinet view the construction slowdown as an opportunity to shift the nation's emphasis from steel and concrete—schools, bridges, highways—to basic "people" services. Magnificently equipped new hospitals abound, for example, but many village water supplies are still polluted.

Culturally, the Saudis are undergoing a kind of restoration, says Kraft. The American influence is apparent in English-Arabic street signs and other ways, but Westerners are leaving as demand for their expertise dries up. The maintenance and operation of the refineries and factories built by Americans and Europeans is being assumed by a growing labor force of Pakistanis, Filipinos, and Koreans, whose customs conservative Moslems find less threatening to traditional mores.

Indeed, Islamic fundamentalism is resurgent, Kraft reports. The religious extremists who seized Mecca's Grand Mosque in 1979 accused the Saudi royalty of abandoning the true faith, and the resulting publicity stirred a back-to-basics movement. Public segregation of the sexes is enforced with growing rigor; Saudi Arabia is the only Persian Gulf state where women are not allowed to drive automobiles.

Still, the Westernization begun during the 1960s may be irreversible. Women are opening their own boutiques and beauty salons, and 25,000 women work for the government. Another 10,000 are enrolled in (single-sex) Saudi universities. "You can't keep women in the house if you educate them," remarked a Riyadh bureaucrat.

Saudi Arabia's economic revival, dependent on a renewed demand for oil, is likely to follow recovery in the West. But Saudi officials seem in no hurry to embark on the next round of growth. Said one, "We are in the position of an overweight man who goes on a diet."

South Africa's Grand Designs

"Destabilisation in Southern Africa" by Simon Jenkins, in *The Economist* (July 16, 1983), P.O. Box 2700, Woburn, Mass. 01888.

South Africa's political leaders spent much of the 1960s and 1970s trying fruitlessly to win friends overseas. Pretoria promised reform of its apartheid system, made overtures to black African states, and, for a time, worked closely with Washington. Now Prime Minister P. W. Botha has given up on popularity; his regime is trying to dominate its neighbors by force or subversion.

Jenkins, an *Economist* writer, traces the country's new go-it-alone attitude to two events: Washington's refusal to back a 1975 South African

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South Africa's neighbors are now free of European colonial rule. But Pretoria is reluctant to end its control over Namibia, first granted under a 1920 League of Nations mandate.

military foray into Marxist-ruled Angola that it initially encouraged, and leftist Robert Mugabe's 1979 election as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, a possible safe haven for hostile black guerrillas from South Africa's exiled African National Congress (ANC).

Since then, Botha's government has used its economic power and military strength to pressure its three weakest neighbors, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, into banning ANC activity on their territory. And it has made life unpleasant for the leaders of other nearby African states.

South Africa has armed and trained 10,000 members of the dissident Mozambique National Resistance, challengers of Marxist President Samora Machel. Pretoria was probably behind the sabotage of two-thirds of Zimbabwe's military aircraft in July 1982 and the destruction last December of \$12 million worth of its oil reserves. And it also supports Jonas Savimbi, whose rebel UNITA guerrillas control the southern half of Angola, despite the intervention of 18,000 Cuban troops; Savimbi's men have inflicted some \$7 billion worth of damage on Angola's roads, railways, and factories since 1975.

South Africa's economy is three times larger than all its neighbors' combined. It controls critical transportation outlets for Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, and boasts a crack army.

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No one doubts its ability to "destabilize" the entire subcontinent.

But to what end? The South Africans would doubtless prefer a buffer of weak black states to the north and may hope for a full-scale "capitalist counterrevolution" against the self-styled Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. But success could spell disaster: Abetting rebellion is relatively easy; propping up new client regimes against rebels would prove too costly even for Pretoria.

South Africa can throw its weight about the subcontinent; it cannot rule it. If it tries, Jenkins predicts, "its achievement will be anarchy."

A False Crisis In Russia?

"Infant Mortality Trends in the Soviet Union" by Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, in *Population and Development Review* (June 1983), The Population Council, 1 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

To some specialists, the sudden jump in the recorded number of infant deaths in the Soviet Union during the early 1970s was a sign of drastic deterioration in the quality of Soviet life [see "A Different Crisis," by Murray Feshbach, *WQ*, Winter 1981].

Between 1971 and 1974 (the last year Moscow published official data on the subject), the number of Soviet babies dying before their first birthday rose by five deaths per thousand births, to 27.9, reversing a 25-year-long decline. But Grupp and Jones, analysts with the U.S. Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies, respectively, note that most of the upsurge occurred in the nation's five Moslem republics. There, they contend, an improvement in data collection produced the illusion of a massive increase in infant deaths.

In Moslem Tadzhikistan, for example, registered infant mortality doubled between 1971 and '74, while European Russia recorded a modest increase of 2.3 deaths per thousand births.

Vital statistics for the Moslem south have never been reliable. Data on infant mortality were not even collected there before the late 1930s. As late as the 1960s, official infant birth and death statistics relied on the reports of parents, not hospital or other medical records. Indeed, in some rural areas, more than half of all children were born at home.

The wider use of computers and a 1969 law that shifted responsibility for record-keeping from the republics to Moscow led to more accurate counts, the authors contend, spurring the 1971-1974 statistical increase.

Even as records showed more Soviet infants dying, other health indicators in the Moslem republics—maternal mortality, the ratio of pediatricians to children, and incidence of childhood disease—all showed improvement. In Tadzhikistan, for example, the 100 percent increase in reported infant deaths coincided with a 19 percent decline in stillbirths and a 29 percent drop in the number of women dying in childbirth.

Grupp and Jones believe that infant mortality in the Moslem republics actually declined during 1971-74, and has continued to fall. And