

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

argue, by failing to work together. In 1981, for example, America's NATO allies sided with the United States in only 75 percent of the votes in the General Assembly. Most of the NAM's members, by contrast, voted for the group's official position more than 90 percent of the time.

Western disunity, the authors argue, stems from the cynical view in some Western European capitals that what the UN does matters very little. Europeans cast General Assembly votes with an eye to winning the Third World's goodwill "on the cheap." Yet UN resolutions—condemning Israel, urging a Law of the Sea Treaty, deploring Moscow's downing of a South Korean airliner—*do* influence world opinion, the authors contend.

A united Western bloc in the UN would not often prevail. But by standing together to demand changes in noxious resolutions and voting on principle, the West could arrest what the authors believe is the UN's "dreary downward spiral" into an anti-Western forum.

*Israel's Value*

"Israel as a Strategic Asset" by Steven L. Spiegel, in *Commentary* (June 1983), 156 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

In Congress, the State Department, and the news media, the complaint is often heard that Israel gives the United States nothing but trouble in return for massive aid. U.S. interests in the oil-rich Middle East, it is said, require an arm's-length relationship with the Jewish state, closer ties to the Arabs.

Yet "prodigious and generous efforts" to recruit reliable Arab allies have left Washington empty-handed, contends Spiegel, a UCLA political scientist. Despite receiving advanced U.S. F-15 fighters and AWACs aircraft, Saudi Arabia has refused to accept U.S. Rapid Deployment Force bases and has discouraged its smaller Persian Gulf neighbors, Oman and Bahrain, from cooperating with Washington in their own defense. Egypt is reluctant to risk its ties to the Arab world by working too closely with the United States. Jordan's King Hussein is too preoccupied with his own political survival to be a factor in the region. An (unlikely) U.S. partnership with Iraq would bar any restoration of American ties to Iraq's current battlefield antagonist, Iran, a country of far greater strategic value.

Israel, meanwhile, has proved itself the staunchest of allies. Its army helps deter Soviet military moves in the Middle East, and its leaders would gladly provide logistical support for U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. Jerusalem has even helped some of its traditional foes in the interest of regional stability—also a plus for the United States. In 1970, for example, an Israeli army mobilization, requested by Washington, deterred a Syrian invasion of neighboring Jordan.

Israel is also an asset in more mundane military matters, Spiegel contends. During their 1982 sweep into Lebanon, the Israelis downed advanced Soviet-built Mig-23 and Mig-25 fighters, inspected them, and passed the information along to Washington. Israeli fliers also learned

---

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

---

how to overwhelm Soviet-made Syrian anti-aircraft systems.

Not only does Israel test American-built weapons in battle, Spiegel adds, but it contributes innovations to the American arsenal. A minor example: Sand-clogged helicopter engines aborted the 1980 U.S. Iran rescue mission; the Israelis came up with a workable sand filter.

Close U.S.-Israeli cooperation may strain ties with the Arabs, Spiegel concedes, but it has not kept the United States from becoming the pre-eminent power in the Middle East. Indeed, Anwar Sadat turned from Moscow to Washington in 1975 precisely because he knew the Americans could influence the Israelis. Eventually, other Middle Eastern states may follow the same logic.

---

**ECONOMICS, LABOR, & BUSINESS**

---

*Jobs of the Future*

"The Declining Middle" by Bob Kuttner, in *The Atlantic Monthly* (July 1983), P.O. Box 2547, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

New technology often takes jobs away with one hand and gives them back with the other. But Kuttner, former editor of *Working Papers* magazine, argues that the overwhelming majority of jobs created during the 1980s will be routine and poorly paid. The result, he fears, will be a shrinking middle class and an increasingly stratified U.S. society.

The decline of America's "smokestack" industries—machine tools, autos, rubber—cost nearly three million highly paid production jobs during the last four years alone. Manufacturing accounts for one job in eight today, compared with one in four in 1950.

New jobs are replacing the old, but they are simply not as good. Of the 19 million additional jobs created by 1990, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, only 3.5 million will be for white-collar "professional and technical" workers; there will be twice as many openings for service workers and secretaries.

The fast-growing, "high-tech" industries offer no panacea. Few workers are needed to assemble computers, for example, and they earn little (\$12,000) compared to their "smokestack" counterparts. Overall, electronics industries will not add many jobs: Some 120,000 new computer programmers and 125,000 more electrical engineers will be needed during the 1980s. Because self-diagnosing systems are now being built into computers, even computer repairmen face a tight job market: The American Electronics Association puts the need for new technicians at only 90,000 by 1990. The demand for janitors (600,000), salesclerks (500,000), and fast-food workers (400,000) will be far higher.

While computers are freeing executives and professionals from routine work, Kuttner says, the effects on the lower end of the job hierarchy are just the opposite. At one large Blue Cross/Blue Shield office in