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American antiwar sentiment, Adams adds, was not born during the Vietnam tragedy. In a Gallup poll taken in July 1941, five months before Pearl Harbor and a year after Hitler had conquered France, 79 percent of the respondents opposed U.S. entry into World War II. Immediately after war's end, one-quarter of those polled maintained that the United States should have stayed out. Today, advocates of a more "interventionist" U.S. role abroad face an uphill battle against lingering heartland traditions.

Raking Over Cold War Ashes

"The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" by John Lewis Gaddis, in *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1983), Scholarly Resources Inc., 104 Greenhill Ave., Wilmington, Del. 19805.

Among American historians, the debate over the causes of the Cold War is still a hot topic.

Until the late 1960s, the orthodox view was that Josef Stalin's aggressive stance forced America into the Cold War during the late 1940s. Then, New Left "revisionist" historians, such as Oregon State's William Appleman Williams and York University's Gabriel Kolko, stood the old orthodoxy on its head. The United States, they argued, emerged from World War II bent on acquiring a worldwide empire needed to ensure growing markets for American goods and to prevent the collapse of the capitalist system. Alarmed, the Soviet Union moved to safeguard its security in Europe and elsewhere.

Now, thanks in part to the opening of U.S. government archives from the 1940s, a new "post-revisionist" synthesis of the two opposing views is emerging, according to Gaddis, an Ohio University historian and himself a leader of the new school.

These records show that top Truman administration officials did not fear for capitalism's future. They used U.S. economic power (e.g., the Marshall Plan) to serve political, not material goals. They backed regional trading blocs, such as the European Common Market, that hampered U.S. overseas trade but strengthened anticommunist allies.

Moreover, Gaddis contends, the New Left revisionists based their benign view of the Soviet Union "upon faith, not research." Vojtech Mastny's scrutiny of the record in *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (1979) showed that Stalin rejected several major postwar opportunities for cooperation with the West, preferring to safeguard Soviet security unilaterally, notably by creating a buffer of satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. Nor, Mastny showed, did Stalin alarm Washington alone: Greece, Turkey, and Iran were among the nations that looked to America for protection from Soviet hegemony.

Yet post-revisionism is more than the old "orthodoxy plus archives," Gaddis cautions. He and his colleagues reject the standard right-wing notion that the Kremlin had a blueprint for world domination. They view Stalin as "a cagey but insecure opportunist." And they agree with

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their New Left counterparts that America built a postwar empire of sorts, though chiefly in self-defense and at its allies' request.

Does it all matter? Yes, says Gaddis. What historians write today "will affect [Americans'] historical consciousness in the future, and that in turn can . . . affect history itself."

*Taking the UN
Seriously*

"Western Strategy in a Third World Forum" by Kenneth Adelman and Marc Plattner, in *Atlantic Quarterly* (Spring 1983), Longman Group Limited, Subscriptions Dept., Fourth Ave., Harlow, Essex CM19 5AA England.

To many Americans, the glass-walled United Nations headquarters in New York is both a symbol of hope for international cooperation and a source of chronic irritation.

Simple arithmetic makes a certain amount of U.S. frustration inevitable, note Adelman and Plattner, former member of the U.S. delegation at the UN (now director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and delegation staff member, respectively.

Western nations now comprise a distinct minority of the UN's 157 members. Delegates from the Third World—organized into the Group of 77 (now comprised of 123 members) on economic issues and, on political and military questions, the slightly smaller Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—fix the General Assembly's agenda and vote together, often against the West, their chief source of economic aid. (In the 15-member Security Council, the United States has veto power, but usually needs some Third World support to pass resolutions.)

Yet the Western powers sometimes make matters worse, the authors



In a 1982 Gallup survey, half of those polled said that the UN does a "poor" job, but only 12 percent favored giving up U.S. membership.