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grounds (Stevens). That allowed the two liberals—Brennan and Marshall—to forge majorities in 31 of 57 close decisions during the 1981 and 1982 terms, albeit on fairly narrow grounds.

But Gillers attributes the Court's failure to go Right mostly to Brennan's intellectual leadership. Brennan shaped or authored many key Warren Court decisions, establishing precedents that today's Court must consider, and he has special qualities—"clarity, a willingness to listen, flexibility, and perhaps a gentle persistence"—that help him persuade his new colleagues to share his point of view.

Yet Brennan, like Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, and Powell, is already well into his 70s. Conservative contenders who might lead the Court to the Right are waiting in the wings. They stand a good chance of winning appointment, particularly if President Reagan seeks and wins re-election in 1984.

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War and Peace And the Public

"Why the Right Gets it Wrong in Foreign Policy" by William C. Adams, in *Public Opinion* (Aug.-Sept. 1983), American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

For all his talents as a "Great Communicator," Ronald Reagan has had difficulty rallying support for his stoutly anticommunist foreign policy.

Conservatives blame the lukewarm popular response on the influence of the liberal national news media or the public's "post-Vietnam syndrome." Actually, writes Adams, a professor of public administration at George Washington University, tough foreign policy talk in peacetime makes Americans uneasy: Critics in the news media are more in tune with majority sentiments.

Americans, he argues, have no first-hand experience with the kind of centuries-old people-to-people enmity that divides, for example, the Russians and the Poles. They distrust Soviet *leaders*, but not ordinary citizens. And they believe that any U.S. president "genuinely interested in peace is always prepared to talk" to anyone. It is no accident that among President Richard Nixon's most popular moves, as measured by public opinion polls, were his 1972 trip to Communist China and reaching a (short-lived) *détente* with Moscow. Anti-Soviet rhetoric strikes a few responsive chords, but White House appeals for "mutual understanding" strike even more.

Moscow's oppressive domestic policies reinforce the public's antipathy towards communism. But Americans oppose human rights violations "wherever they occur," says Adams. Thus, White House calls for aid to heavy-handed Third World regimes fighting Marxist rebels (e.g., in El Salvador) are likely to rouse little enthusiasm.

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American antiwar sentiment, Adams adds, was not born during the Vietnam tragedy. In a Gallup poll taken in July 1941, five months before Pearl Harbor and a year after Hitler had conquered France, 79 percent of the respondents opposed U.S. entry into World War II. Immediately after war's end, one-quarter of those polled maintained that the United States should have stayed out. Today, advocates of a more "interventionist" U.S. role abroad face an uphill battle against lingering heartland traditions.

Raking Over Cold War Ashes

"The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" by John Lewis Gaddis, in *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1983), Scholarly Resources Inc., 104 Greenhill Ave., Wilmington, Del. 19805.

Among American historians, the debate over the causes of the Cold War is still a hot topic.

Until the late 1960s, the orthodox view was that Josef Stalin's aggressive stance forced America into the Cold War during the late 1940s. Then, New Left "revisionist" historians, such as Oregon State's William Appleman Williams and York University's Gabriel Kolko, stood the old orthodoxy on its head. The United States, they argued, emerged from World War II bent on acquiring a worldwide empire needed to ensure growing markets for American goods and to prevent the collapse of the capitalist system. Alarmed, the Soviet Union moved to safeguard its security in Europe and elsewhere.

Now, thanks in part to the opening of U.S. government archives from the 1940s, a new "post-revisionist" synthesis of the two opposing views is emerging, according to Gaddis, an Ohio University historian and himself a leader of the new school.

These records show that top Truman administration officials did not fear for capitalism's future. They used U.S. economic power (e.g., the Marshall Plan) to serve political, not material goals. They backed regional trading blocs, such as the European Common Market, that hampered U.S. overseas trade but strengthened anticommunist allies.

Moreover, Gaddis contends, the New Left revisionists based their benign view of the Soviet Union "upon faith, not research." Vojtech Mastny's scrutiny of the record in *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (1979) showed that Stalin rejected several major postwar opportunities for cooperation with the West, preferring to safeguard Soviet security unilaterally, notably by creating a buffer of satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. Nor, Mastny showed, did Stalin alarm Washington alone: Greece, Turkey, and Iran were among the nations that looked to America for protection from Soviet hegemony.

Yet post-revisionism is more than the old "orthodoxy plus archives," Gaddis cautions. He and his colleagues reject the standard right-wing notion that the Kremlin had a blueprint for world domination. They view Stalin as "a cagey but insecure opportunist." And they agree with