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**NO MORE VIETNAM WARS!**

*One 1983 legacy of Vietnam: widespread hostility toward any U.S. intervention abroad, even in Central America, "America's backyard."*

# America's National Security

The past two decades have been extraordinarily difficult, sobering, even traumatic for the United States in matters of war and peace. President John F. Kennedy's inaugural summons of January 21, 1961, to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty" now may seem extravagant, even naive—after Vietnam and Iran and the harsh complexities of Lebanon and Central America.

In some ways, threatening as they were, the major confrontations of the Kennedy era—the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis and the 1962 Cuban missile episode—seem simpler than today's more complicated long-range challenges to the security and well-being of the United States and its allies. During the early 1960s, the United States enjoyed economic and military pre-eminence—and a high degree of domestic agreement on defense and foreign policy matters. "Containment" of communism—Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese, or Cuban—was the order of the day. And, as even France's Charles De Gaulle noted after the Cuban missile crisis, America's nuclear advantage over the Soviets was "the essential guarantee of peace" in the world.

Today, that clear advantage is gone, thanks to a long, massive Soviet arms build-up. Now, Americans and Europeans alike differ on how best to handle the Russians. The Soviet downing of a South Korean airliner last September did not end the arguments, notably over NATO's decision to deploy U.S. cruise missiles and Pershing IIs this winter to match the Soviet nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe—unless agreement can be reached with the Soviets on some sort of mutual reduction. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration is attempting to gain an accord with Moscow on strategic nuclear arms to follow SALT I and II. Both U.S. efforts involve bargaining with an adversary whose world-view, shaped by history and ideology, is vastly different from that of the West, and whose only claim to parity with the West lies in its military power.

**DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES, 1983**



*Shown above are the major deployments of U.S. ground units and forward Navy carrier task forces; in addition, 55 U.S. advisers are in El Salvador, and 1600 Marines are "peacekeepers" in Lebanon. The general pattern has not changed since the mid-1950s. Yet China is no longer seen as an adver-*

The United States is also no longer dominant in the economic field. The Arab "oil shocks" of the 1970s, the rise of Japan as a domestic U.S. competitor, Western trade rivalries and worldwide financial troubles—all these make "global interdependence" sound a good deal less benign to Americans than it did before it became a reality. Differences with European allies over the Mideast, over El Salvador, over East-West trade, and over arms control have further complicated matters.

For all its worries, the United States is still Number One. But it has not presented the world with a coherent defense policy since Kennedy's day. Reacting to Vietnam and Watergate, Congress put unprecedented curbs on presidential discre-



sary; France has left NATO; U.S. manpower in NATO is down from 434,000 in 1962; U.S. access to overseas bases has sharply declined; Moscow now has a big "open ocean" navy, and deploys Cuban proxies and/or Soviet advisers in Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa.

tion in foreign affairs. At the same time, weakened party leadership and other changes in Congress made it extremely difficult for any White House incumbent to negotiate a firm deal with the senior lawmakers on Capitol Hill; the latter often could not deliver their "troops." Hence, Ronald Reagan's resort to bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions (on the MX missile, on Central American policy) to achieve a consensus. Some of America's difficulties, now as in the past, are self-inflicted.

In the articles that follow, the authors variously describe four of the elements in the continuing debate on U.S. national security policy: the Soviet Union, our NATO allies, our commitments overseas, and our all-volunteer military force.

## THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN

*by David Holloway*

When Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, died in November 1982, he left a Soviet Union more powerful in military terms than ever before. For more than twenty years, a steady supply of new missiles, ships, and tanks had strengthened the Soviet armed forces.


As a result, the Soviet Union has moved from a position of military inferiority to parity with the United States.

Yet the Kremlin's view of the world is by no means as rosy as one might suppose merely from counting up Soviet SS-20 missiles and T-62 tanks. In reality, Brezhnev bequeathed his country some serious difficulties both at home and abroad. And many of these difficulties stemmed directly from the drive to build up Soviet military power and influence.

Contrary to some Western analyses, the Soviet Union has not built up its armed forces simply in reaction to moves by the United States. Rather, the growth of Soviet military strength has its roots in historic Russian fears of militarily superior foreign powers. The Bolsheviks inherited from Imperial Russia—the victim of invasions by the Mongols during the 13th century and the French during the 19th—a deep anxiety about security, which went hand in hand with a determination to be strong and to dominate potential enemies.

Josef Stalin played on these feelings in forcing through his policy of rapid industrialization. "One feature of the history of old Russia," he told Soviet factory directors in 1931, "was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness." The Soviet Union, he said, must catch up with the advanced capitalist countries to avoid further defeats.

Stalin created a powerful arms industry. But he also destroyed the Red Army High Command in the purges of the late 1930s and failed to heed warnings that Hitler was planning to attack. When the German blitzkrieg came on June 22, 1941, it caught the Red Army by surprise. The Wehrmacht's rapid advance during the first months of the war called into question the very survival of the Soviet state. Only by a tremendous effort



*Red Army riflemen on winter maneuvers. The Warsaw Pact has three times as many tanks and twice as many men on the Central Front as does NATO. Yet, the Soviets must watch their East European allies; Russian tanks suppressed revolts in East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), and Prague (1968).*

was the Red Army able to stop the German drive, turn the tide of battle, and push forward to Berlin. Even so, 20 million Russians died in the war.

The trauma of the "Great Patriotic War" strengthened old Russian attitudes toward security. Hitler had attacked in the belief that he could smash the Soviet state with one blow. The Nazi aggression showed Stalin how important it was to avoid weakness, or even the appearance of vulnerability. He did not relax. The victory over Germany reinforced Stalin's hopes of playing a decisive role in future world politics. But he was conscious of relative Soviet weakness and showed restraint in the face of American opposition to the expansion of Soviet power during the late 1940s in Greece, Iran, Turkey, and West Berlin.

Stalin's chief gains had come in Eastern Europe. The Red Army's advance gave Stalin control over the political destinies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania and thus promised to enhance Soviet security by closing off the traditional avenues of attack against Russia. But the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe provided no defense against the atomic bomb. After the war, Stalin launched major programs to develop the new technologies in which the

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Soviet Union lagged behind the West: nuclear weapons, jet propulsion, rockets, and radar.

Nuclear weapons finally became available to the Soviet armed forces during the mid-1950s, along with the bombers and missiles that could carry them to targets in Europe and the United States. Earlier, Stalin had barred any public assessment of the impact of nuclear weapons on warfare, but now military policy had to be revised. Paralleling the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Soviet armed forces were reduced from 5,763,000 in 1952 to 3,623,000 in 1959, and conventional arms production was cut as the transition to nuclear weapons was made. Military spending remained at about \$30 billion a year during this period.

#### **'Sufficiency' Was Not Enough . . .**

But according to the CIA, Soviet defense expenditures then grew by four or five percent annually from 1960 to 1976, and by two percent each year after that.

The Soviet build-up originated in the transition to a defense policy based on nuclear weapons. In 1960, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party and Soviet Premier, outlined a new strategic doctrine, which stressed that the firepower of nuclear weapons was more important than the number of men under arms. Khrushchev acknowledged that "mutual deterrence" already existed, in the sense that if one side launched a surprise attack against the other, the attacker would suffer enormous destruction in retaliation. A new world war was not inevitable, he said, but if it took place, it would begin with missile strikes deep into the enemy's homeland and end with the victory of socialism.

The Kennedy administration reacted to Khrushchev's boasts about Soviet strategic power by rapidly building up U.S. forces. By 1964, the year of Khrushchev's fall from power, the Soviet Union still lagged by a ratio of four-to-one behind the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). But Moscow made a determined effort to catch up and by 1972 had achieved

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a rough parity in strategic weapons. The pace and scale of the Soviet effort surprised U.S. officials. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, for example, had concluded in April 1965 that the "Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative race" and were not "seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours." As Soviet deployments continued, this comforting belief was superseded in Washington by the fear that the Soviet Union was aiming for strategic superiority.

It soon became clear, moreover, that the SALT Agreements of 1972 would not stop the Soviet Union from building up its strategic forces. Indeed, Brezhnev told President Richard Nixon at the Moscow summit in May 1972 that he would press ahead with the weapons programs not covered by SALT. Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union has deployed a new generation of long-range, land-based missiles: the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 ICBMs, and the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), targeted on Western Europe and the Far East. These missiles are MIRVed (equipped with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and are far more accurate than their predecessors.

The Reagan White House has asserted that the new Soviet ICBMs give Moscow a clear margin of superiority by enabling it, in theory, to destroy approximately 90 to 95 percent of American ICBMs in their silos in a single strike. If the Soviet Union launched such an attack, the President (so the argument runs) would be faced with the choice between accepting this disaster, or retaliating with surviving U.S. forces against Soviet cities—in the knowledge that the Soviet Union could then demolish American cities in response.

#### **Ambiguous at Best**

But this kind of doomsday scenario can hardly look as promising to the Soviet leaders as it seems threatening to the Reagan White House. The men in the Kremlin would have to assume that all their missiles would function as well as they have on their best test flights, and that the U.S. President would not then retaliate against the Soviet homeland with SLBMs and bombers, which carry about 75 percent of U.S. strategic warheads.

Soviet political leaders have always stressed that nuclear war would be catastrophic for all concerned. Since the late 1970s, moreover, they have explicitly denied that they are pursuing strategic superiority. Brezhnev said more than once that "to try to outstrip each other in the arms race or to expect to win a nuclear war is dangerous madness." The Soviets apparently concede that, for the time being at least, they cannot escape



### STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

"At each stage of the SALT negotiations, and with each new agreement, the nuclear forces on both sides have increased," wrote Daniel Patrick Moynihan in 1979.

The ostensible U.S. (and Soviet) aim in arms control talks, of course, has always been just the opposite: to slow the arms race and to lessen the likelihood of nuclear showdowns. Some agreements have worked. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, Washington and Moscow created an electronic "hot line" to speed communications in a crisis and signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which barred nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. And in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, they pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries.

But the superpowers have failed to agree on how to slow the relentless pace of the arms race, and ironically, American arms control theory may have contributed to the problem.

By the mid-1960s, it became clear that the Soviets would soon achieve strategic parity with the United States. Defense Secretary McNamara convinced President Johnson that the best way to deter a Soviet attack would be to hold Soviet cities hostage. The idea was "mutually assured destruction" (MAD): Each side's missiles would be able to survive and retaliate, thus deterring a first strike. Consequently, the United States equipped its new Minuteman and Polaris missiles with small, one-to-two kiloton warheads powerful enough to devastate vulnerable Soviet cities, but not to destroy most protected ICBMs.

Strategic arms control talks with Moscow were the next logical step. In 1969, President Nixon renewed negotiations begun during the Johnson years. The two-part 1972 SALT I accords raised popular hopes of an end to the arms race. The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms limits the number of ICBM (1,054 for the U.S., 1,608 for the USSR) and SLBM (710 for the U.S., 950 for the USSR) "launchers," and restricts modernization of ICBMs.

Technology, however, was advancing faster than the arms control process. By 1968, the Johnson administration had begun testing MIRVs (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) to insure that even if Moscow launched a first strike, enough U.S. warheads would survive to overwhelm any Soviet defense system. The Nixon White House did not seek limits on MIRVs during the SALT talks because it assumed that superior American technology would keep the United States forever ahead.

The Soviets, in fact, never accepted the logic, such as it was, of "sufficiency" or of MAD. Without openly breaking SALT I, Moscow produced so many highly accurate, MIRVed SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s during the late 1970s that Pentagon analysts began to suspect that the Kremlin sought a first-strike capability. And the Sovi-

ets' concurrent deployment of 243 mobile SS-20s trained on Western Europe threatened to upset the regional nuclear balance.

SALT II—begun by Nixon and Ford, and signed by Carter—was designed to stabilize the arms race by setting equal numerical ceilings (2,250) for U.S. and Soviet bombers and missiles and by limiting each side's MIRVed missiles. But the treaty disappointed liberals by failing to achieve real *cuts* in nuclear weaponry. And critics on the Right complained that SALT II allowed the Soviets to keep their big "silo-busting" SS-18s while denying the United States the right to build any comparable first-strike missiles.


Even SALT's strongest advocates could not overlook the implications of the Soviet build-up. President Carter had no sooner signed the SALT II treaty in June 1979 than he asked Congress to fund development of the MX, a strategic missile carrying 10 warheads. Carter also endorsed Helmut Schmidt's proposal to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe beginning in December 1983 to offset the SS-20s.

But Carter's critics had no easy answers, either. During the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan attacked Carter and SALT II and promised to close the "window of vulnerability." Yet by April 1983, Reagan's bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, while backing the controversial deployment of 100 MX land-based missiles, argued that nothing could *guarantee* their survival. It also implied that the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs did not really matter if the Triad's other elements—submarines and bombers—could survive and retaliate.

The prospects for arms control have probably never been bleaker. Technology keeps racing ahead: The current development by both sides of strategic cruise missiles—cheap, easily hidden, and mobile—may pose insurmountable problems of verification.

The lack of progress in the Reagan administration's Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks with Moscow has spawned proposals to stop the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. But a "nuclear freeze" would probably eliminate any U.S. leverage on the Kremlin to reduce its nuclear arsenal; it would be impossible to enforce as long as the wary Soviets continue to bar mutual on-site inspection.

"Any form of atomic escapism"—hoping the bomb will go away, or treating it as just another weapon—"is a dead end," the 1983 Harvard Nuclear Study Group concluded. As a practical matter, the superpowers cannot *abolish* nuclear weapons. But they cannot abandon their efforts to control the arms race, for without further progress, the security of each may be further imperiled.



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from their relationship of mutual vulnerability with the United States. The pursuit of clearcut superiority would merely stimulate further costly and dangerous competition, in which the Soviet Union might well fare worse.

Still, the Soviet Union *has* tried to develop ICBMs capable of destroying hardened American missile silos, and Soviet strategic writings suggest that if the Kremlin leaders believed World War III were inevitable, they would strike first in order to smash a U.S. attack before it got off the ground. The Soviet military leadership also apparently has not accepted the American idea of "assured destruction"—the notion that a Soviet capacity to survive a first strike and retaliate against U.S. cities would be enough to guarantee Soviet security. In 1969, the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal N. I. Krylov, spoke of imperialist propaganda "to the effect that there will be no victors in a future nuclear war." He said: "These false affirmations contradict the objective laws of history."

The combination of an offensive military doctrine with the Soviet political leaders' peaceful rhetoric looks at best ambiguous, at worst ominous, to Western statesmen.

Strategic programs have been the key element in the Soviet build-up, but conventional forces also have grown. Khrushchev had hoped to cut military manpower by one-third, as Soviet nuclear firepower increased, but the High Command opposed this plan. Following the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviet Union has vastly strengthened its ground forces facing China, which has become a potential adversary.

### Pressing the West

In Europe, too, Soviet forces have been built up. During the early 1960s, Soviet strategists apparently assumed that any conflict in Europe would inevitably be nuclear from the start. But by the end of the decade, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, responding to NATO's doctrine of "flexible response" (which envisages a conventional phase in a European war), began to prepare for nonnuclear and nuclear operations.

During the 1980s, Moscow's thinking about the role of conventional forces seems to have undergone a further shift, thanks to the changing strategic balance. Apparently, the Soviets seek to use their nuclear forces—notably the SS-20s and tactical nuclear weapons—to deter NATO from resorting to nuclear weapons, and thus prevent a land battle in Europe from "going nuclear." If successful, this strategy would allow the Soviet Union to exploit its advantage in men, tanks and artillery; it

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would also undermine the credibility of NATO's policy, namely, seeking to deter a Warsaw Pact attack by threatening to use nuclear weapons if allied armies in West Germany were overwhelmed.

The Soviet Union's growing ability to intervene in the Third World is another element that has worried the West, notably the United States. During the 1970s, the Soviet press argued that increasing Soviet strength made détente possible, because Western leaders now realized that they could not deal with the Soviet Union from a position of superiority, and were thus willing to adopt a more "realistic" view of their relations with Moscow.

### **Mixed Results**

While growing Soviet power provided the basis for East-West cooperation, in Russian eyes it also provided new opportunities for extending Soviet influence in the Third World. Encouraged by the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and by the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa, General I. Shavrov, chief of the General Staff Academy, pointed to the "process of change in the correlation of forces on the world arena in favor of the forces of progress and socialism." During the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union shifted to greater use of military power (arms supplies, advisers, Cuban troops) to gain influence in Africa and Indochina. The Kremlin had always claimed for itself the leading role in moving the world from capitalism to communism and had long been active (with very mixed results) in the Third World; the interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan marked a new and more energetic phase in Soviet policy.

During the 1970s, Moscow did not seem to acknowledge that its build-up of military power and its threatening actions in the Third World might undermine détente with the West. But there is little doubt that Soviet policy during the 1970s did contribute to the collapse of Soviet-American détente by the end of the decade.

Indeed, since the late 1970s, the United States, alarmed by the Soviet Union's growing military power and its intervention in the Third World, has embarked on major weapons programs (the Pershing II IRBM, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the B-1 bomber, the MX ICBM, and the Trident submarine) that could pose serious problems for Soviet security. Brezhnev apparently slowed the rate of growth of military spending during the late 1970s; now it seems that the High Command has been pressing for military outlays to grow more rapidly, this time in response to the American effort.

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Moreover, Moscow's vigorous policies during the late 1970s drove its main adversaries—the United States, China, Japan, and Western Europe—closer together. To shake this quasi-alliance, the Soviet Union has been playing (with limited success) on differences between Western Europe and the United States and seeking some sort of rapprochement with China.

In spite of these shifts of emphasis, the new Kremlin leadership is unlikely to undertake bold new initiatives. Nor is the Soviet Union going to withdraw completely from its global role, as its rearming of Syria after the Lebanese war makes clear. The Soviets will pursue arms reduction agreements as a way of "managing" the strategic relationship with the United States, but they will not feel impelled to make far-reaching concessions to gain such agreements.

### **No Great Hopes**

Why is this so? Military power is the area in which the Soviet Union has come closest to achieving its goal of matching and then overtaking the advanced capitalist powers. The Soviets' view is that parity, as they define it, must be maintained.

The Kremlin is likely to pursue better relations with the United States, but it will not hope for too much. The Soviets found the United States a difficult and unreliable partner during the 1970s, partly as a result of the vagaries of American domestic politics, and partly because Washington was unwilling (the Soviet leaders felt) to recognize the Soviet Union as a global superpower. But Soviet-American relations will continue to preoccupy the Kremlin because they are, in Soviet eyes, the main axis of world politics.

As a result, the Soviet Union may well temper its activity in the Third World, since it has become clear that its actions there affect the East-West relationship. Besides, the Kremlin's optimism during the mid-1970s about the prospects for expanding Soviet influence seems to have been replaced by a more sober assessment of the costs and benefits involved. The Soviet Union is embroiled in a counter-guerrilla war in Afghanistan; the Soviet-backed regimes in Angola and Ethiopia face strong internal opposition; and financial aid for Cuba and Vietnam is a drain on the Soviet economy.

In Eastern Europe, too, the Soviets face difficulties. The political situation in Poland remains unsettled. And the region as a whole, staggering under foreign debts totalling \$80 billion in early 1983, has become an economic liability to the Soviet Union, which must provide subsidies to its allies even while its

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own economy is suffering from a declining rate of growth.

When the Soviet Union's domestic headaches are added to its uncertain prospects abroad, a rather different picture emerges of the Soviet position in the world than if one simply looks at the size and weaponry of its formidable armed forces. As Soviet publications make clear, industrial and agricultural production has fallen short of domestic requirements, and technological innovation is sluggish. The Politburo is finding it more and more difficult to allocate resources for both military programs and civilian needs.

It is not surprising, then, that the Soviet leaders feel beleaguered. In the month before he died, Brezhnev gave a speech to senior military leaders in which he painted a bleak picture of the Soviet Union's international position. The United States, he said, had "launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive" against the Soviet Union and begun "an unprecedented arms race."

Although we know in principle that East-West relations are not a zero-sum game, that one side's loss is not necessarily the other's gain, we tend in practice to assume that because the world now appears more dangerous and complicated to the West, it must be more hospitable to the Soviet Union. But that is not so. The failure of détente with the United States during the 1970s has created serious difficulties for the Soviet Union. The fact that these troubles are in large measure of the Soviet Union's own making does not make them any easier for the Kremlin leaders to contemplate.

