
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

which prods government workers to stay on their toes.

Because politics ultimately sets the goals of senior public sector managers, Kramer notes, they will always have a more complex task than their corporate counterparts. But given the past performance of executives in such industries as steel and autos, it is wrong to assume that all the bad managers work for government, all the good ones for industry.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Three-Way Street

"The Moscow-Beijing Détente" by Donald S. Zagoria, in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1983), P.O. Box 2515, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

The slowly ripening détente between Moscow and Beijing, a source of some anxiety in Washington, does not pose a serious threat to the West.

The two Communist powers have been at odds over ideological and security issues since the late 1950s, when China insisted on building its own nuclear weapons. Even as they move toward détente, writes Zagoria, a Hunter College political scientist, mutual fears will keep the Chinese and the Soviets at arm's length.

Both sides have good reason to reduce tensions. Since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, Beijing has muffled its ideologues, once given to vitriolic denunciations of the Soviets' "betrayal of Marxism." The Chinese now emphasize economic modernization; a lean defense budget and increased trade with Russia are keys to achieving it. The Kremlin has economic problems of its own, and would also like to see the U.S.-Chinese friendship cool.

Yet immutable differences remain. Beijing wants a pullback of Soviet troops along the 4,150-mile-long Sino-Soviet frontier, total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Mongolian People's Republic, a resolution of the border disputes that sparked armed clashes during the 1960s, and a cutoff of Moscow's aid to Vietnam, China's chief adversary in Southeast Asia. Moscow is unlikely to yield very much. Thus, the best the two sides can hope for, Zagoria believes, is "limited détente" with increased trade, more cultural and technological exchanges, and fewer polemics.

The Chinese, he adds, "know very well that their long-range interests depend on containing the advance of Soviet power and [thus] an American connection is indispensable." Barring a major fumble by Washington, Beijing will maintain its U.S. ties and continue to discourage Soviet expansionism in Asia. And because both Communist nations desperately need U.S. trade and technology, Washington will still have the upper hand in dealings within the "strategic triangle."

The proud Chinese were not willing to become a "junior partner of the Americans" during the 1970s, says Zagoria. Nor will they now take

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guidance from Moscow. Beijing's new independence means America will have to deal with the Chinese as equals, not as a "card" to be played, but the Chinese will still have every reason to lean to the West.

Come Home, America

"The Case for a Withdrawal of Our Forces" by Earl C. Ravenal, in *The New York Times Magazine* (March 6, 1983), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Budget-minded members of Congress who favor trimming Pentagon outlays are whittling while Rome burns. The only way to control defense spending and shore up the ailing U.S. economy is to abandon the 35-year-old U.S. strategy of "containing" Soviet global expansion.

So argues Ravenal, professor of international relations at Georgetown University. The Reagan administration's proposed 1984 budget provides \$274 billion for the Pentagon. The projected 1984 U.S. budget deficit: \$189 billion.

Even budget cutters who would scrap such big-ticket items as the B-1 bomber and the MX missile would save only a total of \$13.5 billion in 1984. Indeed, strategic nuclear forces are relatively cheap. Costing a total of \$62 billion in 1984 by Ravenal's tally, they account for only 23 percent of the Pentagon's budget. The remainder, \$212 billion, is needed to maintain U.S. conventional forces around the world.

Some defense-policy reformers believe "selective" containment of the Soviet Union would reduce such costs. But the U.S. commitments they would honor—to Western Europe, Japan, and the Persian Gulf—are the most expensive. Ravenal estimates that American naval, air, and ground forces in Europe will consume \$115 billion in 1984; Asian defense will cost \$45 billion; and the bill for Rapid Deployment Forces, chiefly designed for the Persian Gulf, will come to \$52 billion.

Ravenal's "non-interventionist" strategy would require only enough forces for home defense and for responding to overseas attacks "clearly directed against our homeland." A gradual 10-year withdrawal of U.S. troops from their bases abroad would reduce the number of U.S. servicemen from 2,165,000 today to 1,185,000 in 1994. Nuclear deterrence could be maintained by submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed cruise missiles, eliminating the need for costly ICBMs. U.S. defense outlays would drop to \$140 billion (in 1984 dollars).

How Moscow would respond to such a retreat is an open question, Ravenal concedes. But the Soviets, already facing economic difficulties at home, might find the costs of a greatly expanded empire too high. And our NATO allies in Europe have adequate means to defend themselves if they wish: Their combined gross national products are greater than Moscow's. The most obvious Soviet target, the Persian Gulf, supplies less than 2.5 percent of U.S. energy needs.

"Containment without tears," Ravenal believes, is no longer possible. Better to accept some losses overseas, he says, than to "wreck our economy and warp our society."