according to Rumer, a former Soviet economist now at Harvard, it, too, is doomed to failure.

The underlying cause, he says, is the industrial "renovation" policy of the Brezhnev era, continued under the 1981–85 plan. This policy emphasizes buying new machinery for existing factories rather than building new plants from scratch. But numerous contradictions have cropped up: New equipment does not fit into old facilities; machine-producing factories have not been geared up to meet the increased demand; plant managers favor new construction and seek to circumvent the policy. As a result, between 1972 and 1980, buildings declined only from 30 to 29 percent as a share of the existing Soviet capital stock; machinery added only two points to its share.

The 1981–85 plan calls for a paltry one percent increase in investment and 3.4 percent growth in national income. But it boosts industry's overall share of investment by 23 percent, earmarking much of the increase for oil and gas exploitation in Siberia. Investment in "nonproductive" sectors—housing, service industries, schools, and hospitals—already at a postwar low (28 percent of investment) will be further curtailed. Yet the Kremlin has promised its people more consumer goods.

The new plan also exacerbates old difficulties: While industrial renovation will be concentrated in western Russia, and new energy and raw materials sources will be developed in the distant east, no allowance has been made for increased transportation. And the underfinanced machine-building industry cannot meet the demand for new equipment. From the first to the latter half of the 1970s, Rumer says, the number of prototypes for new machinery dropped 27 percent for energy-related equipment and five percent for machinery used in manufacturing computers. Soviet factory managers must compensate for shortages by repeatedly overhauling old equipment.

If Moscow's new leadership decides to abandon renovation, it will have to accept a temporary drop in industrial output, increased Western investment, and a shift away from the heavy emphasis on defense-related production. But that may ultimately prove more attractive to Moscow than what it has now—no coherent investment policy at all.

'Bureaupathology' in Modern Egypt

"The Deadlock in Egyptian Administration" by Nazih N. M. Ayubi, in *Middle Eastern Studies* (July 1982), Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 11 Gainsborough Rd., London E11 1RS, England

After Egyptian President Anwar Sadat embarked in 1974 on his *infitah* (open door) policy to attract foreign investment, Cairo began reducing the state's role in the nation's economy. But as in other lands, says Ayubi, a UCLA political scientist, the bureaucracy has kept growing.

Why? Cairo still hires all college graduates who cannot find jobs in the private sector, adding some 100,000 new graduates and $47 million

OTHER NATIONS

to the government payroll annually. By 1978, the bureaucracy had swelled to 1.9 million souls, with another 1.3 million employed in government-owned corporations. [Egypt's 1979 population: 41 million.]

Overstaffing has reached monumental proportions: The Central Auditing Agency, for example, has no fewer than 72 undersecretaries of state. Other "bureaupathologies," Ayubi notes, include inefficiency and poor performance. Only 15 percent of government employees regularly report to work on time. Cabinet ministers, whose tenures average only 18 months, seldom gain control over their departments.

Some civil servants—teachers, policemen, staffers in prestigious ministries—do work hard, Ayubi notes. But spreading limited funds throughout the bureaucracy keeps salaries low. Annual inflation averaging 30 percent exacerbates the problem. Corruption is common.

The bureaucracy has been mushrooming ever since the 1952 revolution. Egypt's leaders have regularly sought reforms—in vain. Refusing to guarantee jobs for the educated would create a politically formidable disaffected group; hiring them deepens Egypt's bureaupathologies and makes the country less attractive to foreign investors.

The situation has its comic touches: Work schedules are so lax that rush hour occurs not in the morning or evening, but in the middle of the day, when "most people are either going to or coming from their offices." But it is a demoralizing problem that President Hosni Mubarak's government will have to solve.

Why African Nations Don't Go Under

"Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood" by Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, in *World Politics* (Oct. 1982), Princeton Univ. Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648.

Despite war, civil strife, and weak governments, none of the 40-odd (depending on how they are counted) nations of black Africa has disintegrated or even lost significant territory. The explanation, argue Jackson and Rosberg, political scientists at the universities of British Columbia and California at Berkeley, respectively, lies in the force of international organizations and homemade rules.

Black Africa's states appear ripe for catastrophe. Deep ethnic divisions have sparked civil disorders or wars in 10 nations since 1956. Forty-one governments in 22 countries fell victim to military coups between 1958 and 1981. The chronic weakness and inefficiency of these national governments also characterize their military forces. In 1981, the authors say, the governments of Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda could not claim a "monopoly of force" inside their own borders.

Jackson and Rosberg trace the instability of today's black African states to the late 19th century, when European colonialists carved up the continent without regard to existing kingdoms. But the new African