
ARTS & LETTERS

U.S. viewers have unrealistic notions about the international film industry.

Only a tiny selection of foreign movies is distributed in this country. (Such "art films" accounted for one-half of one percent of U.S. film industry income in 1981.) Far more typical of the European cinema, Grenier says, are cops-and-robbers and adventure movies.

Indeed, across Europe, *American* films are most widely admired. Clint Eastwood, Paul Newman, and Robert Redford grace marquees all over Europe. In West Germany, Hollywood productions accounted for 55 percent of film revenues during 1980.

What accounts for the sophisticated American moviegoer's attitude toward European cinema? Grenier cites both the "Bloomingdale's factor"—the idea, inspired by designer imports featured at Manhattan's swank East Side department store, that "foreign is better"—and the biases of American critics.

He points to the critical praise lavished upon West Germany's Rainer Werner Fassbinder, director of *The Marriage of Maria Braun* (1979), *Lili Marleen* (1981), and some 40 other films, who died at age 36 in June 1982 of drug and alcohol abuse. Fassbinder and his *Neue Welle* (New Wave) cinema colleagues produced spectacular box-office failures at home, surviving only through Bonn's generous movie subsidy program, which sometimes even pays theater-owners to show films. Grenier describes Fassbinder's screen oeuvre as "an institutionalized amateur night"; the director did not even view the "rushes" of the scenes shot each day to take stock of his work.

Yet Fassbinder reigned on the international film festival circuit during the 1970s. In the United States, he rose to cult status among cosmopolitan moviegoers. The reason, Grenier suggests, was the "counter-culture flavor"—antimaterialistic, antibourgeois—of his works, which stamped them as "high art" in the eyes of the cinema elite.

Financial success in the film industry, muses Grenier, is a matter of sheer caprice, as the makers of *Jaws* (1975) can attest. They feared the public would never accept a plastic shark.

OTHER NATIONS

*Moscow's Sour
Investments*

"Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems" by Boris Rumer, in *Problems of Communism* (Sept.-Oct. 1982), Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Beginning in 1965, the Soviet Union adopted three ambitious five-year plans for economic growth; all three failed to meet Kremlin targets. The latest plan, unveiled in November 1981, is far more modest, but

OTHER NATIONS

according to Rumer, a former Soviet economist now at Harvard, it, too, is doomed to failure.

The underlying cause, he says, is the industrial "renovation" policy of the Brezhnev era, continued under the 1981-85 plan. This policy emphasizes buying new machinery for existing factories rather than building new plants from scratch. But numerous contradictions have cropped up: New equipment does not fit into old facilities; machine-producing factories have not been geared up to meet the increased demand; plant managers favor new construction and seek to circumvent the policy. As a result, between 1972 and 1980, buildings declined only from 30 to 29 percent as a share of the existing Soviet capital stock; machinery added only two points to its share.

The 1981-85 plan calls for a paltry one percent increase in investment and 3.4 percent growth in national income. But it boosts industry's overall share of investment by 23 percent, earmarking much of the increase for oil and gas exploitation in Siberia. Investment in "non-productive" sectors—housing, service industries, schools, and hospitals—already at a postwar low (28 percent of investment) will be further curtailed. Yet the Kremlin has promised its people more consumer goods.

The new plan also exacerbates old difficulties: While industrial renovation will be concentrated in western Russia, and new energy and raw materials sources will be developed in the distant east, no allowance has been made for increased transportation. And the underfinanced machine-building industry cannot meet the demand for new equipment. From the first to the latter half of the 1970s, Rumer says, the number of prototypes for new machinery dropped 27 percent for energy-related equipment and five percent for machinery used in manufacturing computers. Soviet factory managers must compensate for shortages by repeatedly overhauling old equipment.

If Moscow's new leadership decides to abandon renovation, it will have to accept a temporary drop in industrial output, increased Western investment, and a shift away from the heavy emphasis on defense-related production. But that may ultimately prove more attractive to Moscow than what it has now—no coherent investment policy at all.

'Bureaupathology' in Modern Egypt

"The Deadlock in Egyptian Administration" by Nazih N. M. Ayubi, in *Middle Eastern Studies* (July 1982), Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 11 Gainsborough Rd., London E11 1RS, England

After Egyptian President Anwar Sadat embarked in 1974 on his *infitah* (open door) policy to attract foreign investment, Cairo began reducing the state's role in the nation's economy. But as in other lands, says Ayubi, a UCLA political scientist, the bureaucracy has kept growing.

Why? Cairo still hires all college graduates who cannot find jobs in the private sector, adding some 100,000 new graduates and \$47 million