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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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*While some critics oppose giving U.S. military aid overseas, others argue that little development assistance actually reaches the people. All told, 69 nations now receive U.S. bilateral aid.*



policy is not likely to dissipate soon. In fact, the most successful U.S. aid programs—the 1947 Marshall Plan, the 1961 Alliance for Progress in Latin America—combined both. Such balanced efforts may not be ideologically satisfying to either conservatives or liberals, Wasserman says, but they are the most useful.

### *Shaping Up the Pentagon*

“What’s Wrong With Our Defense Establishment” by David C. Jones, in *The New York Times Magazine* (Nov. 7, 1982), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

The Reagan administration’s military build-up may be long overdue, but according to General Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1978–82), a complete overhaul of the Pentagon bureaucracy is also needed to upgrade U.S. military effectiveness.

The Defense Department suffers the problems of all large organizations, compounded by structural flaws. The four independent service bureaucracies within the Pentagon—Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines—resist economy measures and changes in military strategy or organization. Yet civilian defense officials must draw heavily on their advice in drawing up the Pentagon’s annual budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a possible counterbalance, but in reality the four service chiefs who dominate it merely reflect the views of the bureaucracies they represent. The Chiefs’ chairman, the only senior military adviser not tied to a particular constituency, has a staff of only five.

One result is inefficiency. The services tend to make major decisions on weapons purchases not by evaluating the nation’s overall military

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needs, but by striking compromises among themselves. The lack of a unified command also impairs military operations, Jones warns. In Vietnam, for example, each service maintained its own independent air contingent. Indeed, the two services responsible for the final air evacuation from Saigon in 1975 each set their own "H-hours" for departure.

A greatly strengthened role for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is needed to integrate defense planning and tighten control, says Jones. The chairman's staff should be expanded and he alone, rather than all the Joint Chiefs, should speak for the military on operational needs.

The British armed forces recently adopted a similar centralized staff scheme, Jones notes, and it contributed to their success in the Falklands campaign. Unless the United States does the same, he warns, the outcome of its next crisis may not be nearly so happy.

### *A U.S. Obsession With Europe?*

"The European Question" by Robert K. Olson, in *Foreign Service Journal* (Nov. 1982), 2101 E St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Deep disagreement within NATO over defense policies and trade with the Soviets have prompted fresh debate on the future of the alliance. Olson, a retired U.S. foreign service officer, argues that Americans could learn much by looking at history.

Before World War I, Britain, like the United States today, was the world's pre-eminent power. Its main interest in European affairs was to maintain the status quo as it tended to its far-flung overseas interests. But Britain finally "stumbled over the rock of Europe," failing to prevent the Great War, the beginning of the end of its empire.

Olson argues that the U.S. position today is analogous. Washington seeks to keep things as they are—Europe divided between East and West, with Western Europe dependent militarily on the United States—even as the Europeans themselves become increasingly restive. The Americans' deepening preoccupation with the complex "European Question," meanwhile, has helped to prevent them from dealing effectively with other pressing global interests: Latin America, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Africa, and Cuba.

Before World War I, determining who would dominate Europe was the question. Today, it is finding a "European identity," Olson writes. Behind today's transatlantic discord is a desire among the Western Europeans for greater independence from the United States—and for more unity among themselves, possibly including political union.

Washington should encourage such moves, Olson argues, to free itself for a wider leadership role in the world. The danger of a united, independent Western Europe, he concedes, is that it might become a stronger commercial rival, neutral in the East-West contest, or, far worse, an ally of Moscow. But Olson says that gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Western Europe "would probably concentrate the European mind." By removing Europe from Soviet-American contention,