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not enough to the signal we wish to send." The result, according to Rosen: The U.S. commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, even "needed special authorization to use anti-personnel rounds in the artillery pieces defending Khe Sanh" in 1968.

By demonstrating American "resolve" through both diplomacy and force, Washington hoped to convince Hanoi that it was futile to continue fighting. But "signaling" was not really a strategy at all. Washington "did not define a clear military mission . . . ," Rosen says, and, until 1968, "it did not establish a clear limit to the resources to be allocated." Nobody had a plan to win the war.

Limited war is "strange" war, Rosen concludes. Civilian leaders must adapt to unusual conditions. While they should not simply give a free hand to the military, they should remember that "strange" wars are like all other wars in at least one way: Politicians must set clear military goals and let the generals find ways to meet them.

Foreign Aid For What?

"The Foreign Aid Dilemma" by Gary Wasserman, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1983), 1800 K St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

The Reagan administration is gradually increasing U.S. foreign aid, but channeling more of it to military assistance. Wasserman, a former U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) official, argues that the United States would profit more by emphasizing development aid.


For 1983, the White House requested congressional approval of an 18 percent increase in foreign assistance funds, boosting economic development outlays by 5.5 percent and security-related expenditures by 35.2 percent. The latter category will now consume nearly half the foreign aid budget, versus 37 percent in 1981. Illustrative of the new emphasis, Wasserman says, is the one-third cut in food programs for Africa matched by a nearly 300 percent increase in military aid to African regimes between 1981 and 1983.

The battle between the two priorities is an old one: Traditionally, Wasserman observes, "foreign policy concerns dictate the [total] amounts allocated while development concerns predominate in determining how funds are spent within the country." President Carter emphasized economic uplift, establishing a bureau to coordinate overseas aid and boosting small-scale "people-to-people" projects, but the U.S. State Department successfully resisted radical change.

The Reagan administration has swung to the other extreme, Wasserman contends, construing U.S. security interests too narrowly. By its criteria, he argues, U.S. aid to India, totaling some \$11 billion over the last 30 years, must be deemed wasted because of New Delhi's ties to Moscow and its public criticism of the United States. Yet U.S. help enabled India to achieve self-sufficiency in grain and thus become a stable democracy—surely to America's advantage.

The tension between security and development aims in foreign aid

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policy is not likely to dissipate soon. In fact, the most successful U.S. aid programs—the 1947 Marshall Plan, the 1961 Alliance for Progress in Latin America—combined both. Such balanced efforts may not be ideologically satisfying to either conservatives or liberals, Wasserman says, but they are the most useful.

Shaping Up the Pentagon

"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment" by David C. Jones, in *The New York Times Magazine* (Nov. 7, 1982), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

The Reagan administration's military build-up may be long overdue, but according to General Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1978–82), a complete overhaul of the Pentagon bureaucracy is also needed to upgrade U.S. military effectiveness.

The Defense Department suffers the problems of all large organizations, compounded by structural flaws. The four independent service bureaucracies within the Pentagon—Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines—resist economy measures and changes in military strategy or organization. Yet civilian defense officials must draw heavily on their advice in drawing up the Pentagon's annual budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a possible counterbalance, but in reality the four service chiefs who dominate it merely reflect the views of the bureaucracies they represent. The Chiefs' chairman, the only senior military adviser not tied to a particular constituency, has a staff of only five.

One result is inefficiency. The services tend to make major decisions on weapons purchases not by evaluating the nation's overall military