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**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**


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women, school prayer—do not involve constitutional questions: They involve ordinary political issues. Advocates of these amendments are simply not willing to do the hard work of advancing their cause through the regular democratic political process.

Some of today's popular amendment proposals are attempts to bypass earlier Supreme Court rulings on school prayer, abortion, and busing to integrate schools. But the proper response to "judicial activism," McDowell argues, is to convince Congress to vote to remove such matters from the Court's jurisdiction. Advocates of the balanced budget and equal rights (ERA) amendments, he believes, are merely using the Constitution for political symbolism.

After the ERA was rejected last year, McDowell notes, more women began running for public office. Other amendment advocates should follow their example. Using the Constitution to resolve political grievances will render it "so easily changeable as to be meaningless."

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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### *'Strange' War Revisited*

"Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War" by Stephen Peter Rosen, in *International Security* (Fall 1982), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

The doctrine of "limited war" still shapes how and why U.S. conventional forces would fight in such far-off trouble-spots as the Persian Gulf. Yet, despite the failure of this doctrine in Vietnam, the theory of limited war has never been revised.

According to Rosen, an aide to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling, both academics, set the terms of American thinking on limited war in books published in 1957 and 1960, respectively. They emphasized that traditional military goals (i.e., destroying enemy forces) should be subordinated to the political goal of forcing the foe to negotiate. Thus, U.S. politicians, not generals, should direct the war effort.

At first, the American effort in South Vietnam was left mostly to military men. But by 1964, as American "advisory" commitments grew, high-level civilian officials became involved. Few had experience in combat or in military planning; most were former business executives, professors, or lawyers. They distrusted the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but were attracted to the academic theory of limited war, which seemed to offer both civilian control and flexibility.

Thus, Lyndon Johnson adopted a diplomatic "signaling" strategy in 1964–65. White House and Pentagon civilians controlled bombing targets and troop deployments. In late 1964, as intermittent U.S. bombing began, State Department official Walt Rostow complained that "too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North,

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not enough to the signal we wish to send." The result, according to Rosen: The U.S. commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, even "needed special authorization to use anti-personnel rounds in the artillery pieces defending Khe Sanh" in 1968.

By demonstrating American "resolve" through both diplomacy and force, Washington hoped to convince Hanoi that it was futile to continue fighting. But "signaling" was not really a strategy at all. Washington "did not define a clear military mission . . .," Rosen says, and, until 1968, "it did not establish a clear limit to the resources to be allocated." Nobody had a plan to *win* the war.

Limited war *is* "strange" war, Rosen concludes. Civilian leaders must adapt to unusual conditions. While they should not simply give a free hand to the military, they should remember that "strange" wars are like all other wars in at least one way: Politicians must set clear military goals and let the generals find ways to meet them.

### *Foreign Aid For What?*

"The Foreign Aid Dilemma" by Gary Wasserman, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1983), 1800 K St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

The Reagan administration is gradually increasing U.S. foreign aid, but channeling more of it to military assistance. Wasserman, a former U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) official, argues that the United States would profit more by emphasizing development aid.

For 1983, the White House requested congressional approval of an 18 percent increase in foreign assistance funds, boosting economic development outlays by 5.5 percent and security-related expenditures by 35.2 percent. The latter category will now consume nearly half the foreign aid budget, versus 37 percent in 1981. Illustrative of the new emphasis, Wasserman says, is the one-third cut in food programs for Africa matched by a nearly 300 percent increase in military aid to African regimes between 1981 and 1983.

The battle between the two priorities is an old one: Traditionally, Wasserman observes, "foreign policy concerns dictate the [total] amounts allocated while development concerns predominate in determining how funds are spent within the country." President Carter emphasized economic uplift, establishing a bureau to coordinate overseas aid and boosting small-scale "people-to-people" projects, but the U.S. State Department successfully resisted radical change.

The Reagan administration has swung to the other extreme, Wasserman contends, construing U.S. security interests too narrowly. By its criteria, he argues, U.S. aid to India, totaling some \$11 billion over the last 30 years, must be deemed wasted because of New Delhi's ties to Moscow and its public criticism of the United States. Yet U.S. help enabled India to achieve self-sufficiency in grain and thus become a stable democracy—surely to America's advantage.

The tension between security and development aims in foreign aid