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on their campaigns—more than three times as much as did unsuccessful challengers. But the average winning challenger in 1982 spent only \$287,000. Since most winners were Democrats, Cohen argues, other factors besides campaign outlays, such as the economic recession, must have led voters to turn out G.O.P. incumbents.

Some critics contend that PAC contributions influence votes in Congress. Yet as Representative Thomas Foley (D-Wash.) argues: “Members often receive money from people who like their views. But that doesn’t mean the vote is because of the contribution.”

Reformers, meanwhile, cannot agree on a solution. One option—limiting total campaign spending for each candidate—was written into law by Congress in 1974 but struck down by the Supreme Court in 1976. Other proposals meet with stiff opposition in Congress.

Also in the background is the cautionary example of the 1974 campaign finance reforms, which limited both PAC and individual donations. In response, donors simply created more PACs: Contributions by PACs have more than doubled since 1978.

Exploiting the Constitution

“On Meddling with the Constitution” by Gary L. McDowell, in *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Fall 1982), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 541, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

Recent years have brought a sharp increase in the number of constitutional amendments proposed in Congress, usually at the behest of special-interest groups. Far from being a sign of democratic vitality, says McDowell, a Dickinson College political scientist, the upsurge is symptomatic of an American political malfunction.

Since the Constitution was adopted in 1789, some 10,000 constitutional amendments have been proposed. Only 33 were sent to the states for a vote; 26 were ratified; the last, in 1971, permitted 18-year-olds to vote.

Amending the Constitution has always served as an outlet for the popular passions of the moment, McDowell notes. (An 1838 proposal would have barred anyone who fought in a duel from holding public office.) But the average number of amendments proposed each year suddenly rose to 310 during the 1963–68 period, from an average of 65 during the previous 35 years. Since 1969, U.S. Congressmen and Senators have introduced an average of 232 amendments each year.

The emphasis has changed since the early 1960s. In the past, proposed amendments were split evenly between those concerned with the forms of government—presidential elections, the tenure of judges—and with individual rights, such as divorce or voting. Today, rights-related proposals predominate.

Such developments, McDowell argues, reflect “a general deterioration in public faith in the institutions of republican government.” Most of the amendments put forth today—on abortion, equal rights for

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women, school prayer—do not involve constitutional questions: They involve ordinary political issues. Advocates of these amendments are simply not willing to do the hard work of advancing their cause through the regular democratic political process.

Some of today's popular amendment proposals are attempts to bypass earlier Supreme Court rulings on school prayer, abortion, and busing to integrate schools. But the proper response to "judicial activism," McDowell argues, is to convince Congress to vote to remove such matters from the Court's jurisdiction. Advocates of the balanced budget and equal rights (ERA) amendments, he believes, are merely using the Constitution for political symbolism.

After the ERA was rejected last year, McDowell notes, more women began running for public office. Other amendment advocates should follow their example. Using the Constitution to resolve political grievances will render it "so easily changeable as to be meaningless."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

'Strange' War Revisited

"Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War" by Stephen Peter Rosen, in *International Security* (Fall 1982), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

The doctrine of "limited war" still shapes how and why U.S. conventional forces would fight in such far-off trouble-spots as the Persian Gulf. Yet, despite the failure of this doctrine in Vietnam, the theory of limited war has never been revised.

According to Rosen, an aide to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling, both academics, set the terms of American thinking on limited war in books published in 1957 and 1960, respectively. They emphasized that traditional military goals (i.e., destroying enemy forces) should be subordinated to the political goal of forcing the foe to negotiate. Thus, U.S. politicians, not generals, should direct the war effort.

At first, the American effort in South Vietnam was left mostly to military men. But by 1964, as American "advisory" commitments grew, high-level civilian officials became involved. Few had experience in combat or in military planning; most were former business executives, professors, or lawyers. They distrusted the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but were attracted to the academic theory of limited war, which seemed to offer both civilian control and flexibility.

Thus, Lyndon Johnson adopted a diplomatic "signaling" strategy in 1964-65. White House and Pentagon civilians controlled bombing targets and troop deployments. In late 1964, as intermittent U.S. bombing began, State Department official Walt Rostow complained that "too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North,