August 1971. Interest rates escaped controls, and to fend off that possibility, the Fed moved on its own to keep rates low.

The accession of President Ford in 1974 was followed by a major shift in monetary policy. But there was little change at the Fed when Democrat Jimmy Carter replaced Ford. Even the post-Nixon shift was affected by the need to adapt to outside economic conditions: the 1973 abandonment of fixed international exchange rates and the 1973–74 OPEC oil price hikes.

Indeed, looking back to long-term money supply growth rates since the 1950s, Beck finds no partisan pattern in Fed policy. The highest growth rate occurred under Lyndon Johnson, followed by Kennedy, Nixon, Eisenhower, Carter, and Ford. But the Kennedy-era growth rate was only a half point higher than that under Nixon; the difference under Nixon and Ford was three-and-a-half points.

How the White House influences the Fed is difficult to determine. It may be, Beck says, that changing economic conditions, more than politics, determine how both view money policy.

Shutting Out the Public

"The Congressional Veto: Shifting the Balance of Administrative Control" by Robert S. Gilmour, in *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* (Fall 1982), University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195.

As Congress passed more and more legislation during the 1970s, it delegated greater powers to federal agencies to clarify laws in rules and regulations. But it also granted itself the right to veto agency actions. Everybody has benefited, says Gilmour, a University of Connecticut political scientist, except the public.

During the 1970s, 555 veto provisions were attached to 335 pieces of federal legislation. And under such laws as the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the 1979 Education Act, *all* the regulations promulgated by some agencies are subject to congressional veto. A pending bill in Congress would subject every federal agency to such reviews.

Gilmour argues that congressional vetoes violate the Constitution's provision for a strict separation of the legislative and executive powers. Indeed, in January 1982, a federal circuit court of appeals declared unconstitutional the "one-house" veto by either the House or Senate. While the case is being appealed to the Supreme Court, Congress can still legislate "two-house" vetoes, empowering itself to reject regulations after 30, 60, or 90 legislative working days if both houses concur.

Moreover, Gilmour notes, the veto authority delays implementation of new laws. The Federal Elections Commission, for example, issued a set of rules in August 1976, but because Congress adjourned before the 30-day review period ended, they did not take effect until 1977.

A more serious objection, Gilmour believes, is that although public hearings are required when federal agencies formulate new regulations, Congress's veto power leads to "closed-door" negotiations between the agencies and Congressmen—or worse, their unelected aides.

The congressional veto also frustrates judicial review: If Congress fails to veto regulations over which it has power, the courts must assume that they fulfill the spirit of the law. But in fact, Congress actually looks at only a fraction of the regulations subject to its veto.

Ironically, says Gilmour, the legislative veto became popular as a way of ensuring that bureaucrats carry out the will of Congress. But by confusing executive and legislative authorities, Congress's veto power has diminished the government's accountability to the public.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Hope for Poland?

"Crisis in Poland" by Richard Spielman, in *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1982/83), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

When Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland and suppressed the Solidarity trade union movement in December 1981, the Reagan administration responded with trade sanctions and harsh rhetoric. But the military takeover may have provided the United States with a historic opportunity to help liberalize Poland.

So argues Spielman, formerly of Yale's Center for Russian and East European Studies. The White House, he contends, mistakenly views Jaruzelski as a Soviet puppet and has misjudged the roots of the crisis.

During the 1970s, détente undermined the Communist Party in Poland. Unable to unite Polish society by mobilizing for confrontation with the West, the party touted material progress instead. Party First Secretary Edward Gierek relied heavily on Western bank loans to realize his goals. The new wealth "made possible a Party debauch of historic proportions," according to Spielman. "Détente does not liberalize ruling Leninist parties, it corrupts them."

The venality of party leaders angered both Solidarity and the Army. Indeed, Jaruzelski, an Army general, arrested Gierek and other party officials on the same day he declared martial law. "No individual—not even Solidarity leader Lech Walesa—has more seriously considered destroying a communist party in power," Spielman claims.

Jaruzelski is no friend of either the Polish Communist Party or Moscow. The general won only narrowly (by 104 to 79) the October 1981 vote that made him head of the party, and he sent the entire Polish Central Committee to the provinces the day before he imposed martial law to forestall organized party opposition.

Nor did Moscow benefit from Jaruzelski's move, which came when West Germany's chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was in East Germany for a meeting with that nation's party chairman, Erich Honecker. Had the Soviets been in control, Spielman says, they would have delayed the takeover to avoid embarrassing the West German leader.