against Soviet attack. Again, this approach is at odds with the automated battlefield scenario.

Reorganization of the Pentagon is the aim of another group of reformers. Their leader is David C. Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argues that to minimize interservice rivalry, the chiefs should be made more independent of the services they represent [see *WQ*, Spring 1983, p.17]. That would allow them to make decisions without becoming bogged down in the Pentagon bureaucracy.

In sum, the reformers' four approaches do not all necessarily go in the same direction, the authors note. But rising defense outlays ($233 billion next year, up eight percent in real dollars) are sure to make some of their ideas increasingly attractive on Capitol Hill.

The Falklands War Revisited

"The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislearned" by Norman Friedman, in *Orbis* (Winter 1983), 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

When a sea-skimming Argentine Exocet missile sank the British destroyer *Sheffield* off the Falkland Islands last year, some U.S. defense analysts declared that the incident proved that sophisticated missiles have rendered large warships obsolete.

But Friedman, a Hudson Institute staff member, contends that the lessons for U.S. defense planners are precisely the opposite. The Falklands War shows how vital a large fleet of sizeable ships is to military expeditions far from home. Indeed, Britain's ship losses demonstrate the high cost of skimping on the navy.

During the 1960s, London began economizing by building smaller, "no frills" warships. The *Sheffield* was a product of the "new" Royal Navy, lacking, among other things, many standard damage-control features. The Exocet that struck it never actually exploded, but it ignited an oil fire in the ship's engine room that spread rapidly and sank the ship.

The older, larger destroyer *Glamorgan*, by contrast, was also struck by an Exocet, but remained in action. Three other British warships, all smaller frigates, went down in the Falklands, victims not of the French-built Exocet missiles, but of ordinary bombs dropped by Argentine jets. And two of them were particularly vulnerable because they had superstructures made of aluminum—lighter and cheaper than steel, but liable to bend or even burn after an explosion. The U.S. Navy, too, now uses aluminum in most new ship construction.

The two aircraft carriers (*Hermes* and *Invincible*) dispatched by London as part of its 26-ship Falklands task force also suffer the defects of the slimmed-down Royal Navy. They are too small to carry patrol planes with "look down" radar that detects missiles such as the Exocet, which are capable of dipping below ships' radar. And they carry only nine fighter-bombers each (a typical U.S. carrier holds 70–95), not enough to maintain a regular guard against the Argentine bombers that

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Big aircraft carriers are the mainstays of today's U.S. Navy. But reformers
argue that the ships are "sitting ducks" in an age of "smart" missiles.

launched the Exocets. Moreover, the British carriers' Sea Harriers were
too few to give full air support to the British assault force on the island
itself or to knock out the Argentines' airfield at Port Stanley.

Friedman has reservations about the "big ship, big navy" school of
thought. Surface ships *are* vulnerable. But for a nation fighting a far-
away war, there is no substitute for a sturdy, full-fledged navy.

ECONOMICS, LABOR, & BUSINESS

The Robot Scare

"Grasping the New Unemployment" by
A. F. Ehrbar, in *Fortune* (May 16, 1983),
541 North Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill.
60611.

Some economists and politicians worry that high-tech factories and
foreign competition will cost millions of American blue-collar workers
their jobs over the next several decades. But Ehrbar, a *Fortune* editor,
says such fears are "overblown."

An oft-cited Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, for example,