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chief a hefty \$93,688 salary. Nor are federal social programs immune from criticism. Peters argues that Social Security benefits should go only to the needy aged, not "my aunt who uses her . . . check to go to Europe."

"We want a government that can fire people who can't or won't do the job," Peters declares. "And that includes teachers." He favors gradually making up to half the federal government's 2.8 million civil service slots appointive positions, with terms limited to five years. That would bring risk-takers and innovators into the government. Invigorating the bureaucracy, not tearing it down, is Peters's goal. But too many bureaucrats are getting "fat, sloppy, and smug."

Traditional liberals, Peters believes, were beginning to take on some of those same traits. The neoliberals prefer the lean and hungry look.

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Good Neighbor?

"The Explosive Soviet Periphery" by Jiri Valenta, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1983), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The Soviet Union's reactions to unrest in Poland, Hungary, Afghanistan, and other neighboring states have repeatedly strained superpower relations since World War II. To avert such tensions, says Valenta, a Soviet affairs specialist at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Washington must somehow steer Moscow toward a more tolerant view of its neighbors' domestic matters.

History, Valenta notes, offers abundant examples of how *not* to moderate Soviet behavior. In November 1956, inflammatory U.S. Radio Free Europe broadcasts incited Hungarian freedom fighters by arousing hopes of U.S. military support. When Russian tanks rolled in, those hopes proved mistaken.

In 1968, when Czechoslovakia's Alexander Dubček carried his "Prague Spring" reforms too far for Moscow's liking, Washington went to the other extreme. President Lyndon Johnson, preoccupied with the Vietnam War and its domestic repercussions, seemed indifferent to Czechoslovakia's fate. By continuing to call for SALT talks, he implied American "acquiescence" to Soviet aggression, says Valenta. Again, the Red Army marched in.

Before Moscow's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter's White House sent contradictory signals, leaving Moscow no way to anticipate the resulting U.S. grain embargo and the death of the SALT II treaty.

Over the years, American efforts to discourage Soviet military intervention in Poland may have been more successful. In October 1956, the Soviet Union, after flexing its muscles, chose not to invade, deterred chiefly by Polish leader Władysław Gomułka's expressed resolve to put

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up armed resistance. But President Dwight Eisenhower's offer of economic assistance to Gomulka's reformist regime—a moderate but credible sign of U.S. concern—may also have influenced the Soviet decision.

During the 1980 Polish crisis, the Carter administration drew up a list of sanctions to impose in the event of invasion (and privately threatened to supply China with advanced weapons), while offering economic aid to debt-burdened Poland if Moscow restrained itself.

Such carrots and sticks, argues Valenta, can help forestall conflict on the Soviet periphery (particularly if Washington avoids the kind of "empty rhetoric" that misled Hungary's freedom fighters).

Yet, he adds, short-term measures are not enough. The United States must convince the Soviet Union that unrest among its neighbors is due not to American efforts but to local Communists' rigidity on political and economic issues. In fact, only by allowing real reform to occur in its troubled satellites can Moscow avoid the peripheral flare-ups that threaten to erupt into wider conflict.

Mixed Ideas for The Pentagon

"Alternate Futures" by Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster, in *Parameters* (March 1983), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013.

The new military "reformers"—junior officers, academics, and Senators and Congressmen, notably Senator Gary Hart (D.-Colo.)—all agree that, in both weapons and Pentagon budgets, bigger is not necessarily better.

Yet Yarmolinsky and Foster, a former Pentagon official and a defense consultant, respectively, note that contradictions are beginning to emerge in various reformers' arguments.

What worries the reformers is the Pentagon's penchant for high-tech weaponry—the \$2 million M-1 tank and \$22 million F-18 jet fighter—equipped with costly and unreliable electronic gadgetry. Too few defense dollars, they believe, are devoted to "training, maintenance, and general readiness."

Some reformers pin their hopes on simple, rugged, and inexpensive weapons that they believe would be more reliable in combat. This emphasis would free more Pentagon money for "readiness." But other reformers also admire the "sophisticated simplicity" of weapons such as the heat-seeking Sidewinder air-to-air missile and "smart" antitank missiles. Planning for "automated" warfare, conducted mostly by skilled technicians, the authors note, may save money by "obviating the need for overwhelming firepower." But this vision of the battlefield of the future is a far cry from back-to-basics.

Another favored theme of the reformers is "maneuver" warfare. Its advocates would, for example, replace the current U.S. military doctrine for the defense of Western Europe, based on a fixed-line "forward defense" and massed firepower, with a mobile, lightly armed defense