

agency. When a Budget Bureau order established the Coordinator of Information in early 1941, the question immediately arose: To whom should the coordinator report? During World War II, Army intelligence (G-2) resented the semi-autonomy of Donovan's new Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and was jealous of its direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover urged that OSS responsibilities be handed over to his agency after the war. And, in fact, the OSS was abolished in 1945 by Truman. Then, almost immediately, the State Department set up its own intelligence office, and the bickering resumed. Ensuing rounds of political wrangling were brought to an end in 1947, when Truman signed the National Security Act. With this legislation, writes Troy, a "company" man himself, the country "officially, albeit tacitly, authorized the conduct of peacetime espionage and counterespionage." It also created an independent intelligence agency—the CIA—that would report directly to the President but not encroach upon intelligence activities of other departments.

**EISENHOWER'S  
LIEUTENANTS:  
The Campaigns of France  
and Germany, 1944–1945**  
by Russell F. Weigley  
Ind. Univ., 1981  
800 pp. \$22.50

Against the Nazis, the U.S. Army failed to combine effectively what had served it well in previous wars: mobility and concentration of force. In mid-1944, the German Army, bled by the Soviet onslaught in the East, found itself increasingly short of petroleum, munitions, and air support. Yet it would take the Allies almost a year to clinch victory. Why? In Weigley's view, Eisenhower and his chief lieutenants (Generals Omar Bradley, Lesley McNair, George Patton, et al.) lacked a clear conception of war. From D-Day until victory in May 1945, U.S. strategy (which dominated Allied efforts) aimed at overwhelming the war-weary *Wehrmacht* across a broad front—with forces more appropriate for mobile operations. Time was lost, men and lives were squandered, and the Soviet area of domination inched westward. Weigley, a Temple University historian, praises a few innovative

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tacticians in the Allied leadership, including General Carl Spaatz, whose close air support of the Normandy invasion and the subsequent "break-out" departed from the conventional deployment of bombers against strategic targets. The author concludes that the United States must choose its lessons from World War II carefully. The Allies won because their enormous material advantage compensated for uninspired tactics. Today's world balance affords us no such cushion.

**FRONTIERS OF  
CHANGE: Early  
Industrialism in America**  
by Thomas C. Cochran  
Oxford, 1981  
179 pp. \$15

In this mildly chauvinistic but highly readable account of industry in early America, Cochran, a professor emeritus of business and economic history at the University of Pennsylvania, shows how culture and geography distinguished the industrial revolution here from its counterparts in Europe. Less constrained by tradition and social hierarchy, Americans proved to be extremely flexible workers (unlike European artisans, who tended to specialize), as well as resourceful entrepreneurs. In Europe, national banks were the norm; in America, regional credit facilities—state banks, urban money markets—attuned to community needs, underwrote the creation of new industries. Laws governing bankruptcy, incorporation, and shareholding were drafted and interpreted by men who usually knew first-hand the hazards of a new enterprise. Advances in steam power and metallurgy were more important to industrialization in Europe than in the New World, where water power was abundant and the wood supply was seemingly limitless. The one resource lacking on the early American scene was manpower. Responding creatively were inventors such as Oliver Evans, whose Delaware flour mill, built in the 1780s, was the first completely mechanized factory. U.S. products often appeared crude by European standards. But Americans' penchant for the "practical or useful" had brought such results that, by the mid-19th century, Britain was sending investigators to study the young nation's successful ways.