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lations of New York, Boston, Chicago, and other Northern industrial cities. Fully 20 percent of American adults age 20 to 24 had been born abroad. Then, World War I and restrictive legislation dramatically slowed the influx. Today, the wave of pre-1914 immigrants accounts for the record growth in the number of "old old" Americans (age 75 and over).

The disappearance of the pre-1914 immigrants will move the elderly much closer to the mainstream of American life, writes Newitt. From 1970 to 1990, the proportion of high school graduates among the elderly is expected to jump from 25 percent to a solid majority. The typical 70-year-old in 1990 will have come of age during World War II and have bought a house in the suburbs after the war. Unlike the immigrants, many will have held salaried managerial posts—and earned substantial pensions.

Already, a few gaps in the labor pool have resulted. In 1970, men 60 years of age and older comprised only 10 percent of the male work force, but 30 percent of guards and watchmen, 23 percent of blacksmiths, and 31 percent of shoe repairmen. Women over 60 accounted for 31 percent of dressmakers and 35 percent of live-in domestics. Notes Newitt: "Older people have traditionally been an important source of workers for unskilled jobs that younger people do not want—and for highly skilled jobs for which few younger people have been trained."

### *Private Schools as Melting Pots*

"A Din of Inequity: Private Schools Reconsidered" by Denis P. Doyle, in *Teachers College Record* (Summer 1981), Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 West 120th St., New York, N.Y. 10027.

Private schools, whether secular or religious, have always smacked of elitism and privilege to many Americans. But in the wake of enrollment gains since the mid-1970s, they deserve a new image, writes Doyle, a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute.

Until recently, the private school appeared to be an endangered species. Enrollments plummeted from 6.3 million to five million between 1965 and 1975, mostly due to a sharp decline in the Catholic schools. Public schools, by contrast, grew steadily. But by 1974, these trends had begun to change: Now, private school enrollments are expected to rise from 5.1 million in 1980 to 5.6 million by 1988, and to increase their share of the nation's students from nine to 12 percent. The nose-diving reputation of public schools and the smaller size of the American family, which now has more money to spend on education, account for the turnaround.

The shift has transformed student bodies. Nationwide figures on private schools do not exist, but national data compiled by Catholic schools, state surveys, and U.S. regional censuses tell the story: In Catholic elementary and high schools, white students' share of total en-

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rollment (currently 3.1 million) fell from 89.2 percent to 81.7 percent between 1971 and 1981. Black and Hispanic students increased by 12.1 and 11.8 percent, respectively. In California during 1979, Baptist and Episcopal schools both educated higher percentages of black students (12.5 and 17 percent, respectively) than did public schools (10.1 percent). And while 1975 U.S. Census data from the Northeast showed public schools trailing private schools in their share of students drawn from families earning \$30,000 or more, the difference was surprisingly small (10.4 versus 16.7 percent). As one researcher put it, America's most exclusive schools today are public schools in affluent suburbs.

Popular support for state aid to parochial schools is growing (52 percent favored it in a 1974 Gallup survey). Doyle suggests that viewing the provision of a service—e.g., through tax credits or vouchers—as government's chief responsibility in education (rather than actually running schools) may answer constitutional objections to federal involvement. Washington already follows this rationale in assisting private colleges; the theory could easily be extended to cover private grade schools and high schools.

**PRESS & TELEVISION***Cable Comes  
to Europe*

"European Television: A Changing Force" by Michael W. Moynihan, in *The Journal of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies* (Summer 1981), Airport Road, White Plains, N.Y. 10604.

Convinced that the airwaves were too potent to be left to private hands, Western European governments nationalized television during the 1950s, as they had nationalized radio 30 years before. Now, the Age of Cable TV is dawning, and the state-run networks are having to adjust. So writes Moynihan, information director of the 17-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Most Western European systems today are financed in part by taxes on TV sets (\$61 on a color model in England). But television commercial time is also sold, except in Scandinavia. Advertising revenues today pay half the cost of French TV. So far, Western Europeans have usually kept partisan politics out of the programming office, says Moynihan. Nevertheless, in all countries, the state strictly controls television fare. Broadcast time, for example, is usually limited to evening hours before midnight (at the latest) in order to prevent "wasteful" viewing habits. Until recently, Iceland blacked out TV on Thursdays and during the entire month of July.

Light entertainment has always been popular among viewers, but European TV executives believe in giving the public "what we think they need," as a former BBC director put it—i.e., a heavy diet of news-