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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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Many colonists resisted, claiming that not even a king could alter the "Terms and Conditions" of their enlistment. The nature of their protests—desertions en masse, nonviolent mutinies, and collective strikes—indicate that their grievances were narrowly drawn and, in their minds, negotiable. Some British officers tried threats of punishment and, in one case, force. But the British needed colonial manpower and usually accommodated some of the rebels' complaints.

The Seven Years War, notes Anderson, exposed one-third of New England's men to royal authority. As the British learned contempt for the disrespectful colonials, so New Englanders got a first taste of the royal abuse that sparked revolution a decade later.

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**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**


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*Recipes for  
Success*

"Economic Success, Stability, and the 'Old' International Order" by Charles Wolf, Jr., in *International Security* (Summer 1981), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

For more than 100 developing countries outside OPEC, prosperity seems as distant a goal as it was 30 years ago. Yet despite initial poverty and steep oil prices, a few Third World nations have engineered vigorous (eight-plus percent) sustained economic growth over the past decade. How did they do it? Wolf, chief economist at the Rand Corporation, describes successful "development recipes" followed, notably, by South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore.

There are some familiar ingredients. One is a relatively free domestic market. The government intervenes to give certain price incentives, rather than to exert bureaucratic control. (South Korea, for instance, has held farm prices high to encourage food output and to keep rural folk from flooding the cities.) There is respect for private property—no sudden nationalizations of domestic or foreign firms. The successful regimes have received generous foreign aid and short-term loans (to take care of current account deficits), plus long-term bank loans and private investment once they have demonstrated economic potential.

Essential is political stability, which eases uncertainty for domestic and foreign capitalists, accompanied by an "explicit and enforced system of laws." If broadly accepted rules for government succession are absent (as they are in South Korea and Brazil), then changes of regime must be kept infrequent. Wolf rejects the claim that military spending can *only* siphon off scarce local resources. A 1972 study, he notes, found that developing nations with the greatest budget emphasis on defense enjoyed the highest economic growth rates. Further, military training of conscripts, as in South Korea, may create a literate, competent work force that can aid the civilian economy.

**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**

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"The recipes for sustained development are neither unfamiliar nor arcane," writes Wolf. Why haven't they been widely adopted? Rhetoric aside, he says, leaders of poorer Third World nations have seldom made economic uplift an overriding priority; most prefer to focus on disputes with neighbors, the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, or various forms of "socialism." It is no coincidence, he suggests, that such policies enhance the power of the government and its leaders, while proven development "recipes" set limits on state intervention.

### *Preventing Public Strikes*

"Challenging the Taylor Law: Prison Guards on Strike" by Lynn Zimmer and James H. Jacobs, in *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* (July 1981), New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853.

On April 18, 1979, after contract negotiations broke down, 7,000 prison guards illegally walked off their jobs at 33 New York State institutions. The events of the strike reveal the limitations of collective bargaining, particularly in dealings with public employees, say Zimmer and Jacobs, a graduate student and law professor, respectively, at Cornell.

At the bargaining table, the guards had demanded unusually high wage increases and benefits, which they believed were justified by their high-stress work. Their militancy sprang from resentment over reforms enacted after the 1971 inmate uprising at the Attica prison. After the state's McKay Commission criticized racist, poorly trained corrections officers at Attica, the guards' status and authority suffered. State "pens" were inundated with outside experts who agreed with prisoners that the guards' "brutality" undermined rehabilitation. Several court rulings curbed guards' disciplinary powers. And new policies permitting uncensored mail and work release time for prisoners not only angered the guards but also enhanced convicts' opportunities for prison assaults, drug use, and thefts.

The state's formal grievance procedure was designed to resolve specific disputes over administering existing contracts. And worker-management committees usually restricted their agendas to minor, localized complaints (e.g., concerning mess hall schedules or forced overtime). Collective bargaining served well as a wage negotiating process but not as a forum for resolving more complex problems; collective bargaining also raised union members' expectations in a situation where, in reality, the employer, government, held the trump cards.

New York Governor Hugh Carey broke the strike (which lasted 17 days) by calling in 12,000 National Guardsmen to run the prisons and by invoking the state's Taylor Law, which imposes stiff fines on striking public workers. In the end, the guards won only token wage boosts.

When dealing with public employees in stressful jobs, say the authors, traditional union-management confrontations are no substitute for responsible personnel policies. In the case of New York's prison