

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

the numbers dictate replacing the classic maneuvering dogfight with surprise attacks and fast retreats. A second crewman is essential to spot swarming enemy planes because when radar "locks on" to a target, it cannot scan effectively. Unlike their lighter World War II predecessors, today's fighters can carry a second human without a fall-off in performance. What fighter pilots need most now, Flanagan concludes, is a second pair of eyes provided by a backseat partner.

*Before the
Spirit of '76*

"The New England Soldier" by John Ferling, in *American Quarterly* (Spring 1981), 303 College Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104; "Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers?" by F. W. Anderson, in *The William and Mary Quarterly* (July 1981), P.O. Box 220, Williamsburg, Va. 23185.

By the 1770s, many New England colonists were spoiling for a revolt that would rid Americans of the oppressive influence of England. According to Ferling, a West Georgia College historian, this sentiment signaled a dramatic change in New Englanders' attitudes on soldiering.

The Puritans of a century before had been fearsome in skirmishes with the Indians (whom they viewed as servants of Satan). But their mission was primarily spiritual. Their clerics interpreted the suffering brought by Indian battles as signs of God's displeasure. With every conflict's outcome predestined by the Lord, they regarded American warriors as "bees in a hive" who drew strength from God, not as heroes.

But by 1700, New Englanders were embroiled in a series of full-scale intercolonial conflicts with French and Indian armies. These wars seemed far from divine punishments to the merchants who made fortunes supplying the troops. Eighteenth-century leaders exhorted soldiers to "play the *Man*," emphasizing that human courage—not God's intervention—defeated England's rivals. Even churchmen began likening fallen warriors to biblical heroes. As their political conflicts with England intensified, New Englanders increasingly believed that only the rugged, austere American soldier could secure their liberty.

Nevertheless, frequent mutinies and desertions during the 18th-century wars convinced many British officers that colonists made pitiful soldiers. The Americans' unruly behavior stemmed from their unique view of soldiers as wage-earners, writes Anderson, a Harvard historian, in a separate article.

Until the Seven Years War (1756–63), New Englanders defended themselves against the French. Their militia reflected their egalitarian societies, based on covenants and contracts between legal equals. Colonial governments treated their troops as employees entitled to specified terms of enlistment, pay, and rations. But like all professional European armies, the British Army was founded on unquestioned authority. British generals sent to the New World in the 1750s insisted that the Americans serve under them for the war's duration.

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Many colonists resisted, claiming that not even a king could alter the "Terms and Conditions" of their enlistment. The nature of their protests—desertions en masse, nonviolent mutinies, and collective strikes—indicate that their grievances were narrowly drawn and, in their minds, negotiable. Some British officers tried threats of punishment and, in one case, force. But the British needed colonial manpower and usually accommodated some of the rebels' complaints.

The Seven Years War, notes Anderson, exposed one-third of New England's men to royal authority. As the British learned contempt for the disrespectful colonials, so New Englanders got a first taste of the royal abuse that sparked revolution a decade later.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

*Recipes for
Success*

"Economic Success, Stability, and the 'Old' International Order" by Charles Wolf, Jr., in *International Security* (Summer 1981), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

For more than 100 developing countries outside OPEC, prosperity seems as distant a goal as it was 30 years ago. Yet despite initial poverty and steep oil prices, a few Third World nations have engineered vigorous (eight-plus percent) sustained economic growth over the past decade. How did they do it? Wolf, chief economist at the Rand Corporation, describes successful "development recipes" followed, notably, by South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore.

There are some familiar ingredients. One is a relatively free domestic market. The government intervenes to give certain price incentives, rather than to exert bureaucratic control. (South Korea, for instance, has held farm prices high to encourage food output and to keep rural folk from flooding the cities.) There is respect for private property—no sudden nationalizations of domestic or foreign firms. The successful regimes have received generous foreign aid and short-term loans (to take care of current account deficits), plus long-term bank loans and private investment once they have demonstrated economic potential.

Essential is political stability, which eases uncertainty for domestic and foreign capitalists, accompanied by an "explicit and enforced system of laws." If broadly accepted rules for government succession are absent (as they are in South Korea and Brazil), then changes of regime must be kept infrequent. Wolf rejects the claim that military spending can *only* siphon off scarce local resources. A 1972 study, he notes, found that developing nations with the greatest budget emphasis on defense enjoyed the highest economic growth rates. Further, military training of conscripts, as in South Korea, may create a literate, competent work force that can aid the civilian economy.