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**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**


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speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its source." From its decision to permit a Massachusetts bank to run advocacy ads during a statewide referendum, Phillips believes, it is only a short step to allowing corporate campaign endorsements.

The Court's apparent expansion of corporate First Amendment rights is timely for business, writes Phillips. Pressures are mounting in Congress to reduce the level of campaign donations corporations have lately been allowed to make through political action committees.

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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*How Not to Link*

"To Link or Not to Link" by John A. Hamilton, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1981), P. O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

"Linkage"—giving a little here to get a little there—has appealed to President Reagan and his three immediate predecessors as a way to deal with the Soviets. Unfortunately, one chip they have put on the bargaining table—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—is unlinkable, writes Hamilton, a U.S. Foreign Service officer.

Successful linkage requires certain conditions, says Hamilton. Concessions offered must be roughly equal in value. And bargaining must be behind closed doors, to prevent pressure groups from attaching their own conditions and to avoid high public expectations.

In 1969, however, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger publicly linked U.S. willingness to begin SALT talks with Soviet assistance in ending the Vietnam War. Many Americans quickly perceived the proposed deal as an obstacle to slowing the arms race. And they pressured the Nixon administration to disengage quickly from Vietnam without reciprocal Soviet concessions—as Kissinger later admitted.

President Carter initially opposed linking progress on SALT to Soviet military restraint in the Third World but reversed course briefly during 1978—with disastrous results. Administration warnings that Soviet interference in the Ethiopian-Somali border war might prevent SALT's ratification by the Senate were just what the Senate's anti-SALT hawks needed. They proceeded to hold the treaty hostage. When Moscow invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter had to withdraw it from Senate consideration. The problem with such linkage, writes Hamilton, is that no U.S. foreign objective compares with avoiding nuclear war—the aim of SALT. Linkage has worked better when SALT has not been involved. Carter's post-Afghanistan grain embargo did penalize the Soviets, even if it did not force a withdrawal.

Why has strategic arms linkage been so popular? Hamilton writes that Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter hoped to curb Soviet adventures while avoiding the interventionism and high defense budgets the American public no longer seemed to support. Ironically, Reagan's

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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planned arms build-up could enable him to ditch the linkage strategy he has endorsed—permitting the United States to pursue arms control pacts on their merits and meet Soviet nonnuclear military challenges with prudent, yet credible threats of force.

*FDR's Covert  
'Peace Plan'*

"A Presidential *Démarche*" by Richard A. Harrison, in *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1981), Department of History, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt is generally portrayed by scholars as a watchdog who couldn't bark much during the 1930s—an internationalist by inclination who was constrained by staunch isolationism at home. But Harrison, a Pomona College (Calif.) historian, writes that FDR once tried to organize a world peace conference where the democracies would unite to confront Hitler's "grievances."

In 1936, Roosevelt believed that it was up to the great democracies to present a unified front and keep the peace, by diplomatic, economic and even limited military means. Unable to take the lead himself, he considered England, economically strong and politically secure, the logical European alternative. But Britain's Conservative leaders preferred appeasement over resistance to Hitler's ambitions. Only by convincing London that it had a reliable silent partner could Roosevelt hope to "put some steel into the British spine." FDR's encouragement took several forms. He tried to defuse Anglo-U.S. trade disputes by promising closer political ties; he reached a currency-stabilization agreement with Britain and France; and he endorsed Britain's naval pre-eminence.

Several weeks after Germany's occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, Roosevelt launched his peace initiative. The conference he proposed, rather vaguely, would focus on economic themes (his way of securing U.S. involvement without inciting isolationist protest). If the final terms failed to satisfy the aggressor nations, he figured, most Americans would at least see clearly who the villains in Europe were. Roosevelt melted the skepticism of key British officials—even after he angered them by floating his plan to Hitler first.

Yet two obstacles remained. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, unaware of FDR's strategy, was vigorously pushing for trade concessions in bilateral Anglo-U.S. talks and irritating the British. Moreover, in November 1936, Neville Chamberlain was chosen Britain's new Prime Minister. Roosevelt cautiously tried to win over the anti-American, pro-appeasement leader. But a vaguely worded feeler was misinterpreted as a call for British disarmament and only convinced London of his unreliability. The idea was dropped.

Soon, appeasement's failure became increasingly clear to all. London and Washington finally drew together—not to preserve peace, but to prepare for the war even Chamberlain realized was inevitable.