develops selfish interests of its own. And they failed to see that public intervention "is often merely another way for private groups to impose costs on the society at large."

At its best, writes Graham, liberalism is a broad "impulse for gradualist reform," aimed at correcting the abuses of modern industrialism and rallying citizens "from privatism and resignation" to action in the community's interest. But liberals must abandon ad hoc economic tinkering and return to some form of laissez-faire economics guided by key planning agencies (e.g., a national development bank, a national service program). And they must acknowledge the need for "social cohesion." Americans' physical and "genetic" health, selective curbs on immigration, and an emphasis on community and cultural bonds, Graham insists, can be promoted by individuals with a "progressive" outlook and not left to "ethnocentric conservatives."

A Political Voice for Business?

"Business and the Media" by Kevin Phillips, in *Public Affairs Review* (vol. 2, 1981), 1220 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

For all its real or imagined power, Big Business is a largely silent player in American politics. But several recent Supreme Court decisions point the way toward looser legal restraints on corporate political advocacy. So reports Phillips, a Washington political consultant.

The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees individuals the freedom to express almost any sentiment under almost any circumstance. But corporate speech has traditionally enjoyed fewer protections. Though the guidelines for noncommercial corporate speech (as opposed to pure advertising, which may be tightly regulated) are generally vague, some strict limits have been set. For instance, in order to check the influence of money on elections, federal and state laws bar corporations from advertising on behalf of political candidates (but allow businesses to make limited campaign contributions). The Internal Revenue Service decides whether corporate purchases of "advocacy" ads—which promote a company's views on public policy—are tax deductible.

But the ever-growing importance of economic and energy issues has increasingly blurred the distinction between commercial advertising and corporate political speech. (Is an oil company's exhortation to "develop energy for a strong America" a sales pitch or a political statement?) And no clear judicial yardstick exists for telling the difference. In two 1980 rulings that Phillips believes defy all logic, the Supreme Court deemed one New York utility's literature promoting electricity use as commercial but another's pro–nuclear power pamphlets to be noncommercial.

But future rulings may considerably broaden the bounds of protected corporate speech if *First National Bank of Boston* v. *Bellotti* (1978) is any indication. There, the Court suggested that the "inherent worth of speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its source." From its decision to permit a Massachusetts bank to run advocacy ads during a statewide referendum, Phillips believes, it is only a short step to allowing corporate campaign endorsements.

The Court's apparent expansion of corporate First Amendment rights is timely for business, writes Phillips. Pressures are mounting in Congress to reduce the level of campaign donations corporations have lately been allowed to make through political action committees.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

How Not to Link

"To Link or Not to Link" by John A. Hamilton, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1981), P. O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

"Linkage"—giving a little here to get a little there—has appealed to President Reagan and his three immediate predecessors as a way to deal with the Soviets. Unfortunately, one chip they have put on the bargaining table—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—is unlinkable, writes Hamilton, a U.S. Foreign Service officer.

Successful linkage requires certain conditions, says Hamilton. Concessions offered must be roughly equal in value. And bargaining must be behind closed doors, to prevent pressure groups from attaching their own conditions and to avoid high public expectations.

In 1969, however, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger publically linked U.S. willingness to begin SALT talks with Soviet assistance in ending the Vietnam War. Many Americans quickly perceived the proposed deal as an obstacle to slowing the arms race. And they pressured the Nixon administration to disengage quickly from Vietnam without reciprocal Soviet concessions—as Kissinger later admitted.

President Carter initially opposed linking progress on SALT to Soviet military restraint in the Third World but reversed course briefly during 1978—with disastrous results. Administration warnings that Soviet interference in the Ethiopian-Somali border war might prevent SALT's ratification by the Senate were just what the Senate's anti-SALT hawks needed. They proceeded to hold the treaty hostage. When Moscow invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter had to withdraw it from Senate consideration. The problem with such linkage, writes Hamilton, is that no U.S. foreign objective compares with avoiding nuclear war—the aim of SALT. Linkage has worked better when SALT has not been involved. Carter's post-Afghanistan grain embargo did penalize the Soviets, even if it did not force a withdrawal.

Why has strategic arms linkage been so popular? Hamilton writes that Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter hoped to curb Soviet adventures while avoiding the interventionism and high defense budgets the American public no longer seemed to support. Ironically, Reagan's