show has been aimed, Archie Bunker's world is the one they left behind—and on which they now want to look back and, for the most part, down. Having rejected the values of "middle America," the new class of liberals, says Lasch, "needs to repudiate its own roots, to exaggerate the distance it has traveled, and also to exaggerate the racism and bigotry of those lower down on the social scale. At the same time, it occasionally sheds a sentimental tear over the simpler life it thinks it has left behind."

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Scholars View Religious America

"Religion in America since Mid-Century" by Martin E. Marty, in *Daedalus* (Winter 1982), 1172 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02134.

Over the past three decades, scholars have had difficulty deciding if America is becoming less—or more—religious. So writes Marty, a historian at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

During the 1950s and early '60s, sociologists believed that industrial societies, in the long run, were bound to become increasingly secular. Many discounted the religious revival evident in public opinion polls as a superficial "search for identity" in religious institutions that were, at base, secular and modern. And the rest of "religious America" they regarded as marginal, "underclass" or ethnic.

Theologians in those years tended to agree. U.S. theologians developed theories of "secular theology," centered around such notions as "religionless Christianity" and "Christian atheism." Harvey Cox's celebration of *The Secular City* (1965) became a best seller.

Then, during the late '60s, the secular tide in scholarship began to turn—as the adolescent children of journalists, professionals, and even sociologists embraced religious cults or the occult. Leaving *The Secular City* behind, theologian Cox wrote *The Feast of Fools* (1969), in which he celebrated the "magic, myth, mystery, and mysticism of religiousness."

By the '70s, religion seemed to be everywhere. If the major traditional religious bodies were losing strength, the Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and evangelical churches were thriving. With three successive American Presidents (Ford, Carter, Reagan) professing to be evangelical Christians, it is now secularity that seems marginal. How have scholars explained the change? Sociologist Robert N. Bellah has written about the diffusion of religion, arguing, Marty says, that religion has become "a private affair, its fate no longer tied to organizations." Sociologist John Murray Cuddihy interprets evangelicalism as an "antidote" to growing cultural fragmentation. Among some scholars, broad definitions of religion have emerged that take in any way that people "transcend their mere biological nature."

"The new danger now," writes Marty, "is that the persistent secularity of American culture will be forgotten. The nation is as pluralistic as ever. . . . In the university, the marketplace, or the legislature—America remains secular, with no single transcendant symbol to live by."

No Indifference in Poland

"The Church in Poland" by Jan Nowak, in *Problems of Communism* (Jan.–Feb. 1982), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

In an age when the Catholic Church faces growing indifference, especially in the world's urban and industrial precincts, the Polish Catholic Church stands out sharply. During the Solidarity sit-ins of 1980, for instance, one of the workers' demands was that Sunday mass be broadcast by government-run radio. Nowak, former director of Radio Free Europe's Polish Division, examines the Polish church's relations with its flock and with its government adversary.

Through the centuries, the Polish church has shared the Poles' sufferings—and so kept their allegiance. When the Poles rebelled against their tsarist occupiers in 1863, the Russians cut enrollments in Polish Catholic seminaries. During World War II, one out of every five priests and religious was executed by the Nazis or put in a concentration camp. Today, the number of priests is actually rising, and more than 93 percent of Poles are Catholic.

When the Communists came to power after World War II, the Polish church, led from 1948 to 1981 by Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, variously compromised, protested, and defied the state, in an effort to avoid the Communist takeover of church affairs that had occurred in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The regime first confiscated Catholic charities and put them in the hands of collaborationist "patriot priests." Then it began arresting "disloyal" priests. Wyszynski objected. But when the government insisted he sign an agreement not to oppose state policies such as collectivized agriculture, he signed. Finally, the regime went too far: In 1953, it claimed the right to make church appointments and met defiance. Wyszynski was arrested.

But Poland's Catholics ostracized the state's few collaborationist clerics. In August 1956, one million Poles on a religious pilgrimage demanded Wyszynski's release. Under pressure, the government freed the cardinal—a response that would make it very difficult to arrest him again. Thus strengthened, the church began to vigorously champion Poles' human rights—to study religion, to "live under more democratic conditions," to protest without fear.

Nowak thinks Pope John Paul II's 1979 visit to his native land marked a turning point. The millions who greeted him came away with "a marked sense of their own strength and their rulers' weakness." One year later, Solidarity was born. The church suddenly found itself in a mediating role between workers and state, a role that continues, even