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lowed to have private lives," one retiree complained. The public holds officialdom in generally low regard, especially since Watergate, and that also takes away from job satisfaction. "Imagine living under a cloud of suspicion all the time," one ex-Representative remarked.

Many of the ex-politicians said that they enjoyed campaigning but found fund-raising "degrading." Moreover, congressional pay (\$60,662) has not kept pace with private sector salaries. Lobbying, law, and other likely jobs for former Congressmen are now far more lucrative.

The job itself is less rewarding. It is harder to "do good" amid what seems to many to be a "legislative deadlock," fostered by time-consuming quorum calls and votes on meaningless issues (such as choosing the National Dance), by a new breed of Congressman intent on posturing for the media, and by a fragmented subcommittee system. The congressional reforms of the 1970s are partly to blame. Now that committee chairmanships are not awarded by seniority, there is less incentive to stay in office.

Older retirees (over age 60) were more likely to cite the diminished advantages of seniority or the desire to try something new "before it was too late" as the cause of their decisions; younger retirees more frequently cited the strains on family life. Hibbing concludes that since the percentage of older Congressmen is declining, the total number of voluntary retirements will drop off as well. But younger Congressmen will still face the same pressures and will probably quit at the same or higher rates as they have in the past.

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*Why NATO
Is in Trouble*

"The Dilemma of the West: A Transatlantic Parting of the Ways?" by Theodore Draper, in *Encounter* (March 1982), 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS, United Kingdom.

The NATO alliance is in trouble, torn by dissension over proposals ranging from new trade sanctions against the Soviet Union to the deployment of new medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Draper, an author and former member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., writes that the tensions stem from fundamental shifts in the balance of power since the 1950s and from Washington's attempts to make the alliance into something that it is not.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, when Western Europe, devastated by war, was nearly defenseless and the United States enjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons. The NATO treaty provided for the mutual defense of Western Europe and carried the implicit promise of massive U.S. atomic retaliation for any Soviet attack on the region. The American "nuclear umbrella" left the Europeans relatively free to

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pursue their own foreign policies and interests. But during the 1970s, with the relative decline of U.S. power, Washington called on the NATO nations for help in coping with crises outside Europe (e.g., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). A break in the ranks was inevitable, Draper writes, because the alliance was never intended to serve such a purpose.

Meanwhile, something else had happened: America had lost its monopoly on atomic and nuclear weapons during the 1950s. French President Charles De Gaulle was the first to size up the implications. Believing that Europe could not depend on the United States to risk devastation for Europe's sake, he withdrew France from NATO's military organization in 1966 and set about building up French nuclear forces. The NATO plan to base U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe, though advanced by the Europeans themselves during the '70s, made Europe's predicament even more apparent: Theoretically, the United States could survive a nuclear war unscathed by limiting the conflict to an exchange of missiles in Europe and western Russia.

Should they choose to shed their "dependence" on America, the Europeans have three options, says Draper. They can follow the French "nuclear" path; eschew nuclear weapons but build up their conventional defenses to maintain an anti-Soviet deterrent; or allow "nuclear pacifism" to degenerate into full-fledged pacifism. Strong public opinion against nuclear weapons seems to rule out the first course in most countries, but Draper writes that Europe can follow the middle way "if only it has the will and fortitude to do so."

What can the United States do? Draper believes that pressure from Washington on the allies will do more harm than good. He writes: "Whatever the future relationship to the United States may prove to be, it should be decided by Europeans for the sake of Europe, without making the United States an alibi, a scapegoat, or a savior."

Proliferation for Peace?

"The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better" by Kenneth N. Waltz, in *Adelphi Papers* (no. 171, 1981), The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock Street, London WC2E 7NQ, United Kingdom.

The "proliferation" of nuclear weapons increases the chances of global catastrophe by making it more likely that some irresponsible ruler, some Idi Amin, will get his hands on one of the devices. So goes the usual argument in Washington. But Waltz, a political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, disagrees. He contends that the slow spread of nuclear weapons may actually have a stabilizing effect.

The shift to a world dominated by two nuclear superpowers, each deterring the other, has kept the general peace since 1945—the longest such period in this century. Where the risk of U.S.–Soviet confrontation once seemed greatest, along the Iron Curtain, there has been not a skirmish. Those who fear the spread of nuclear weapons, says Waltz,