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Israeli troops advanced west of the Suez Canal in October 1973, 20 African states severed relations. And when oil prices soared during the early 1970s, Arab aid to Africa increased.

Nonetheless, Arab assistance remains far smaller than African outlays for oil. And apparent Arab indifference to apartheid rankles most black Africans. In fact, unofficial ties with Israel have mushroomed in recent years. The number of Israeli advisers, for instance, is at a record high. (Most are "private" consultants.) Politicians in Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ghana have urged a renewal of formal ties.

But a breakthrough requires at least one of three conditions, suggests Nadelmann: determined backstage diplomacy by Israel, a cooling of the partnership with South Africa that has blossomed since 1973 (Prime Minister Menachem Begin heads the Israel-South Africa Friendship League), or progress in the Camp David talks that draws more Arab nations into the Mideast peace process.

Beijing's Move toward Islam

"China's Islamic Connection" by Lillian Craig Harris, in *Asian Affairs* (May/June 1981), Heldref Publications, Suite 500, 4000 Albemarle St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

Seeking Third World allies against Soviet expansionism, especially in Asia, Chinese communist leaders have during the past four years increasingly muted their official atheism to woo the Islamic states. Harris, a political analyst in the State Department, observes that Beijing's new foreign policy experiment has not been easy going, even as it has irritated the Russians.

China, writes Harris, has tried to persuade Islamic leaders "that its sizeable Muslim population qualifies it for a special relationship" with Islamic countries—a distinction the Soviets themselves claimed with some success under Khrushchev and before their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Last year, Hsinhua, China's official news agency, fastened upon the Third Islamic Summit at Taif, Saudi Arabia, as an occasion to warn that Moscow is the "mortal enemy of the Islamic movement." Meanwhile, Beijing has eased internal bans on Muslim worship and sent its own Muslim delegations to tour Islamic nations. Ten Chinese minority groups are officially recognized as Muslim, notably the widely dispersed Hui (seven million strong) and the Uighurs (3.5 million), who live near the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their members have been allowed to make the *haj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca since 1976.

As they seek to promote Muslim unity against the Soviets, the Chinese (like others) find it difficult to deal with Islam as a bloc. The conservative Saudis remember past Chinese support for domestic radicals—as do the Indonesians and Malaysians. Beijing's long support for Egypt's Anwar Sadat stirred resentment among other Arabs after Camp David; Beijing feels it must endorse the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "Arab cause" but regards the PLO as undisciplined

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and unpredictable. South Yemen and Syria have close Soviet ties.

Moreover, even as Radio Beijing gloats over Moscow's difficulties with its Muslim minorities, China faces domestic repercussions from the worldwide resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism. In 1974, 1,700 people died in a Muslim uprising in Yunnan. Yet to revive old curbs on Muslim activities would now severely embarrass Beijing. "Past efforts by non-Islamic states to use Islam as a political tool have never had a happy ending," Harris notes. "Islam is a two-edged sword."

Greek Ire

"Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks"
by F. Stephen Larrabee, in *Foreign Policy*
(Winter 1982), P.O. Box 984, Farm-
ingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Last October, Greece alarmed its Western allies by electing a socialist Prime Minister who had harshly criticized Greek membership in NATO and in the European Economic Community. But Andreas Papandreou's victory turned mainly on domestic issues, writes Larrabee, a Fellow at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Foreign policy was a frequent topic during the campaign, notes Larrabee. Most Greeks believe that NATO members have sided with Turkey, their arch-enemy (and NATO partner), in long-simmering conflicts over Cyprus, Aegean air space, and the continental shelf below. (In protest, Athens withdrew from the alliance's military command from 1974 to 1980.) Many Greeks also resent Washington's arms sales to the right-wing military junta that ruled the nation from 1967 to 1974.

But, according to Larrabee, popular desires focus on more jobs, better transportation, housing, and schools, and a less corrupt and sluggish bureaucracy. In 1974, even many leftists supported conservative Constantine Karamanlis for Prime Minister, seeing his New Democracy Party as the best hope of preventing another coup. Karamanlis laid a solid foundation for democracy, chiefly by purging the Army of politically restive officers. He also dramatically reduced inflation (which hit 30 percent under the junta), virtually eliminated unemployment, and extended compulsory education from six to nine years.

Yet too much investment capital languished in the tourism and luxury real estate sectors. Agriculture stagnated, and the city-country income gap widened. Economic growth plunged from 6.4 percent to 1.6 percent between 1978 and 1980, and inflation rebounded to 25 percent. Finally, as Greek memories of the junta faded, pressure to oust the centrists mounted. In 1980, the weary Karamanlis quit his post for the less demanding (but potentially powerful) Presidency.

The new Prime Minister has promised major improvements in Greek life, and Larrabee predicts that he will initially focus on domestic affairs. Yet even if Papandreou seeks major foreign policy changes, two big obstacles loom: a conservative Army, and the pro-Western Karamanlis, who as President, has the power to dissolve Parliament, veto legislation, and declare a state of emergency.