

**OTHER NATIONS**

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Yet, writes Sigmund, a Princeton professor of politics, there is now another side to the story, including the "faint outlines" of a future libertarian political system. Since taking power, General Augusto Pinochet's regime has gone through several phases:

¶ In 1973–77, wholesale police repression, designed to emasculate the Left and, later, the Center, easing with the dissolution of the notorious DINA secret police and public discussion of past "excesses."

¶ In 1975–78, rigorous implementation of a free enterprise economic policy, influenced by Milton Friedman's "Chicago-school" theories, leading first to a wracking depression, then to strong economic growth and a sharp decline in the inflation rate (700 percent in 1973, six percent in early 1981).

¶ In 1978–81, "structural reforms" of the economy, notably ending much state control and many direct services. Under threat of an American AFL-CIO boycott of Chilean exports, for instance, the Pinochet regime allowed unions to organize at the plant level and to strike for up to 60 days. Public housing projects were superseded by subsidized low-interest home loans to the needy. By early 1981, social security was revamped, allowing employees to invest in private pension funds; national health services were replaced by vouchers that gave patients a choice of physicians.

The latest stage—establishing a new political system—seems more difficult. Adopted by a two-thirds vote in 1980, the new constitution in effect gives Pinochet control until 1989 and permits a military-dominated council to review all government actions. Pinochet wants to establish a new political creed for Chileans—but it is not European-style fascism, for there is no mass Nazi-style party and, of late, no bar to press criticism of the regime.


After several decades of Pinochet & Co., Sigmund writes, the Chile of the future is likely to be "consumer-oriented, materialist, and modernized—and much less susceptible to the clarion calls of the Catholic or Marxist reformers and radicals."

*Israel in Africa*

"Israel and Black Africa: A Rapprochement?" by Ethan A. Nadelmann, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (June 1981), Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

A shocking, abject surrender to Arab oil blackmail—many Israelis would so describe the decision of 29 black African states to sever diplomatic relations with Jerusalem between 1967 and 1973. Yet Nadelmann, a Harvard political scientist, contends that Israeli-African relations were troubled from the start.

Seeking Third World friends, Israel established diplomatic relations with 33 of the 35 sub-Saharan African states and signed economic cooperation pacts with 20 of them from 1958 to 1972. Total Israeli aid never topped much more than \$10 million annually. But drawing on



Source: *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (June 1981).

*Africa's Muslims had long denounced Israel, but Israel's 1967 seizure of Egypt's Sinai set off the steep decline in Israeli-black African ties.*

their own "nation-building" experience, some 3,000 Israeli experts provided educational, medical, agricultural, and military training to Africans from 1958 to 1971. Black leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania reciprocated by resisting African Arabs' demands for anti-Israel declarations.

However, Israeli-African ties suffered from the disappointments that often afflict foreign aid donors and recipients. The importance of Israeli assistance declined during the late 1960s as help from the West, the communist world, and, to a much lesser extent, the Arab nations poured into black Africa. And large Muslim populations in nations such as Nigeria and Tanzania continually inhibited pro-Israel leaders. Further, while critical of apartheid, Israel angered many Africans by expanding trade with South Africa (though Western and even clandestine black African commerce with Johannesburg dwarfed Israel's).

The Six-Day War of 1967 marked a turning point; Israel had seized a chunk of Africa—the Sinai. African sympathies began to shift. When

**OTHER NATIONS**

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Israeli troops advanced west of the Suez Canal in October 1973, 20 African states severed relations. And when oil prices soared during the early 1970s, Arab aid to Africa increased.

Nonetheless, Arab assistance remains far smaller than African outlays for oil. And apparent Arab indifference to apartheid rankles most black Africans. In fact, unofficial ties with Israel have mushroomed in recent years. The number of Israeli advisers, for instance, is at a record high. (Most are "private" consultants.) Politicians in Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ghana have urged a renewal of formal ties.

But a breakthrough requires at least one of three conditions, suggests Nadelmann: determined backstage diplomacy by Israel, a cooling of the partnership with South Africa that has blossomed since 1973 (Prime Minister Menachem Begin heads the Israel-South Africa Friendship League), or progress in the Camp David talks that draws more Arab nations into the Mideast peace process.

### *Beijing's Move toward Islam*

"China's Islamic Connection" by Lillian Craig Harris, in *Asian Affairs* (May/June 1981), Heldref Publications, Suite 500, 4000 Albemarle St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

Seeking Third World allies against Soviet expansionism, especially in Asia, Chinese communist leaders have during the past four years increasingly muted their official atheism to woo the Islamic states. Harris, a political analyst in the State Department, observes that Beijing's new foreign policy experiment has not been easy going, even as it has irritated the Russians.

China, writes Harris, has tried to persuade Islamic leaders "that its sizeable Muslim population qualifies it for a special relationship" with Islamic countries—a distinction the Soviets themselves claimed with some success under Khrushchev and before their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Last year, Hsinhua, China's official news agency, fastened upon the Third Islamic Summit at Taif, Saudi Arabia, as an occasion to warn that Moscow is the "mortal enemy of the Islamic movement." Meanwhile, Beijing has eased internal bans on Muslim worship and sent its own Muslim delegations to tour Islamic nations. Ten Chinese minority groups are officially recognized as Muslim, notably the widely dispersed Hui (seven million strong) and the Uighurs (3.5 million), who live near the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their members have been allowed to make the *haj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca since 1976.

As they seek to promote Muslim unity against the Soviets, the Chinese (like others) find it difficult to deal with Islam as a bloc. The conservative Saudis remember past Chinese support for domestic radicals—as do the Indonesians and Malaysians. Beijing's long support for Egypt's Anwar Sadat stirred resentment among other Arabs after Camp David; Beijing feels it must endorse the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "Arab cause" but regards the PLO as undisciplined