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eventuality of a desolated planet."

Moscow has nothing to gain by launching the limited nuclear attack anticipated by U.S. strategists, Beres argues. Moreover, even a limited strike would leave some 18 million Americans dead, so the Soviets have no reason to believe Washington would restrain itself in case of such an attack. Finally, the Soviets themselves reject the notion of a limited nuclear war—they would not play by the rules.

Indeed, the American strategy is likely to be a temptation to the Soviets. "Used in retaliation," Beres notes, "counterforce-targeted warheads would only hit empty silos." The Soviets suspect that the United States has really targeted their silos in preparation to strike first; thus, they have grounds for launching their own missiles early in a crisis. On the U.S. side, the new strategy "contributes to the dangerous notion that nuclear war might somehow be endured or even 'won.'" Beres notes that Moscow targets American silos and continues to improve its ability to knock out U.S. bombers and submarines. But that, he says, is no reason for Washington to follow suit.

To avoid nuclear war, Beres believes, the two superpowers should return to "minimum deterrence." They should begin negotiations on a new SALT accord and adopt a comprehensive test ban. The United States should build up its conventional forces to raise the threshold at which a nuclear response seems necessary.

Finally, America must unilaterally pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nonnuclear attack. Only then, Beres writes, "can the United States hope for a reduction in Soviet conventional and theater nuclear forces and for a reciprocal abandonment of the first-use option by the Soviet Union."


Curbing the Arms Trade

"Lessons of the Carter Approach to Restraining Arms Transfers" by Michael D. Salomon, David J. Louscher, and Paul Y. Hammond, in *Survival* (Sept. 1981), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London WC26 7NQ, United Kingdom.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter, alarmed at the growth of the international arms trade (then approaching \$20 billion annually), imposed an \$8.6 billion ceiling on U.S. sales of conventional arms to the Third World and attempted to negotiate a multinational agreement limiting the trade. The effort failed, but it provided some valuable lessons.

The Soviet-American Conventional Arms Transfer talks (CAFT) opened in December 1977. (France, West Germany, and Britain had insisted upon a Washington-Moscow agreement before they would discuss their own sales.) Salomon, assistant dean at Carnegie-Mellon University, and Louscher and Hammond, professors at the universities of Akron and Pittsburgh, respectively, observe that Carter's unilateral

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"... And this little item is guaranteed to make your neighboring third world country a fourth world country!"—a gibe at the world arms trade.

restraint gave the Soviets little incentive to negotiate. The Carter administration, meanwhile, gradually came to realize that the comprehensive, region-by-region agreement that it had envisioned would require it to cut back on military aid to valued allies, such as the Shah's strife-torn Iran, without requiring an equal sacrifice from Moscow. When, in December 1978, the American negotiators tried to limit the regions under discussion to black Africa and Latin America, the Soviets broke off the talks.

With better planning and a focus on types of weapons rather than regions, the authors say, the imbroglio might have been avoided. But Washington's biggest mistake, they maintain, was failing to get an agreement from its European allies before talking to the Soviets. It is not the volume of arms to the Third World that threatens Western interests; it is the competition among Western states to make sales.

The competition stems from the Europeans' need to sell arms to pay for oil imports and from America's domination of the NATO market—it sells 10 times as much to its NATO allies as it buys from them. To support its domestic arms industry, France exports 55 to 60 percent of the weapons it produces; Britain exports 35 percent. One result: The allies build less sophisticated weapons for the export market and then buy them for their own armed forces. This also hampers efforts to standardize NATO equipment. Some Western nations, particularly France, feel compelled to peddle arms even to countries that are unfriendly to the West. Our Third World allies pay high prices for arms from inefficient Western manufacturers and receive a hodgepodge of weapons that often are not compatible.

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Future conventional arms limitation efforts should focus first on solving the problems within the NATO alliance and coordinating Western overseas arms sales policies, the authors argue. Only then, will it make sense to talk to Moscow about limiting *its* sales of conventional arms.

*Machines, Men,
and Warfare*

"Technological War: Reality and the American Myth" by Donald R. Baucom, in *Air University Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1981), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

In the spring of 1943, Axis troops were dug into high ground near the North African city of Tunis. The American commander watched as a heavy artillery barrage smothered the enemy's emplacements, then turned to a war correspondent and said: "I'm letting the American taxpayer take this hill." Citing this incident, historian Allan Nevins later wrote that U.S. technological prowess in World War II had brought "not only speedier victory but victory purchased with fewer (American) lives."

Faith in a "technical solution" to the horrors of the battlefield now underlies much popular and professional thinking about U.S. military preparedness, writes Lieutenant Colonel Baucom, deputy director of research at the Airpower Research Institute. It helps to explain the Pentagon's increasing reliance on sophisticated matériel (e.g., precision-guided munitions, satellite telecommunications). Unfortunately, Baucom concludes, it also "diverges dangerously from the realities of modern war."

U.S. military men were once slow to adopt new technology. World War II changed that. Nazi Germany's Blitzkrieg, Japan's lightning air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the intensive Allied investment in military research and development that eventually turned the tide—all demonstrated the importance of technology in warfare.

But the lesson was learned too well. Many Americans came to believe that "we won World War II because of highly reliable M-4 tanks" and "overwhelming numbers of superb B-17s, B-24s, P-47s, and P-51s," not because of the brave who manned them. The increased prominence of technology did correlate with relatively low American casualties in the two World Wars (fewer than one percent of the U.S. population killed or wounded in each) but the U.S. experience was atypical. The United States entered both wars late and fought them abroad.

Thinking of war as a "great, big engineering project" is bad strategy and bad psychology: It undercuts the real importance of the "good, well-trained soldier" and obscures the inevitability of "human sacrifice." Vietnam was widely described as the technologically most advanced conflict in history. At the same time, Americans deemed "unacceptable" the loss of 55,000 lives over 10 years. Is this, Baucom asks, more than a coincidence?