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nik attitudes and styles as by early struggles to end racial segregation in the South. Mostly children of affluence, these unlikely rebels saw links between their personal troubles (a nagging sense of meaninglessness, disenchantment with materialism) and larger public issues. Indeed, it was this merger of private and public concerns that gave the youthful Movement its vitality and broad appeal, even before the Vietnam draft loomed up as a focus for campus protest.

Why did such a lively social phenomenon fade by 1973? Certainly its many spokesmen lacked a clear, consistent ideology. Its strongest original elements—the white Students for a Democratic Society and the black Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—were eclipsed as the Movement expanded. The fusion of communitarian visions and “revolutionary” politics, which seemed to unite Maoists and hippies, white radicals and Black Panthers, was fragile; the violence of extremists (such as the Weathermen) and external events (the “winding down” of the war) led to the Movement’s decline.

The irony, writes Clecak, was that the initial ideological fuzziness of the Movement enabled it to gather wide campus support. But as anti-war protest mounted, self-styled “New Left” leaders spouting Marxist rhetoric alienated more moderate “fellow travellers.”

The Movement’s anti-establishment spirit lives on, most obviously in some liberal single-issue advocacy groups—environmentalists, pacifists, feminists. But a continuing search among adults for individual self-fulfillment, accompanied by a distrust of doctrinaire politics, may be the more lasting legacy.

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*‘MAD’ Was
Not so Bad*

“Tilting Toward Thanatos: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy” by Louis Rene Beres, in *World Politics* (Oct. 1981), Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08540.

Until 1980, American nuclear strategy stressed “massive retaliation” against Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet attack on this country or its European allies. The prospect of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD), it was believed, would make starting a nuclear conflict unthinkable for either side. But, in July 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59, adopting a “countervailing” strategy that called for a graduated U.S. nuclear response to Soviet aggression; its principal targets are Soviet missile silos. Beres, a professor at Purdue, writes that this directive, which still represents U.S. policy, “can only hasten the

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eventuality of a desolated planet.”

Moscow has nothing to gain by launching the limited nuclear attack anticipated by U.S. strategists, Beres argues. Moreover, even a limited strike would leave some 18 million Americans dead, so the Soviets have no reason to believe Washington would restrain itself in case of such an attack. Finally, the Soviets themselves reject the notion of a limited nuclear war—they would not play by the rules.

Indeed, the American strategy is likely to be a temptation to the Soviets. “Used in retaliation,” Beres notes, “counterforce-targeted warheads would only hit empty silos.” The Soviets suspect that the United States has really targeted their silos in preparation to strike first; thus, they have grounds for launching their own missiles early in a crisis. On the U.S. side, the new strategy “contributes to the dangerous notion that nuclear war might somehow be endured or even ‘won.’” Beres notes that Moscow targets American silos and continues to improve its ability to knock out U.S. bombers and submarines. But that, he says, is no reason for Washington to follow suit.

To avoid nuclear war, Beres believes, the two superpowers should return to “minimum deterrence.” They should begin negotiations on a new SALT accord and adopt a comprehensive test ban. The United States should build up its conventional forces to raise the threshold at which a nuclear response seems necessary.

Finally, America must unilaterally pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nonnuclear attack. Only then, Beres writes, “can the United States hope for a reduction in Soviet conventional and theater nuclear forces and for a reciprocal abandonment of the first-use option by the Soviet Union.”

Curbing the Arms Trade

“Lessons of the Carter Approach to Restraining Arms Transfers” by Michael D. Salomon, David J. Louscher, and Paul Y. Hammond, in *Survival* (Sept. 1981), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London WC26 7NQ, United Kingdom.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter, alarmed at the growth of the international arms trade (then approaching \$20 billion annually), imposed an \$8.6 billion ceiling on U.S. sales of conventional arms to the Third World and attempted to negotiate a multinational agreement limiting the trade. The effort failed, but it provided some valuable lessons.

The Soviet-American Conventional Arms Transfer talks (CAFT) opened in December 1977. (France, West Germany, and Britain had insisted upon a Washington-Moscow agreement before they would discuss their own sales.) Salomon, assistant dean at Carnegie-Mellon University, and Louscher and Hammond, professors at the universities of Akron and Pittsburgh, respectively, observe that Carter’s unilateral